The Representativeness of State-Level Bureaucratic Leaders: A Missing Piece of the Representative Bureaucracy Puzzle
Journal article by Norma M. Riccucci, Judith R. Saidel; Public Administration Review, Vol. 57, 1997
Journal Article Excerpt
The representativeness of state-level bureaucratic leaders: a missing piece of the representative bureaucracy puzzle. by Norma M. Riccucci , Judith R. Saidel A long tradition of research in public administration revolves around the concept of representative bureaucracy (e.g., Krislov, 1974; Grabosky and Rosenbloom, 1975; Thompson, 1976; Cayer and Sigelman, 1980; Dometrius, 1984; Meier, 1993a; see also Meier, 1993b, for a comprehensive review of representative bureaucracy theory and research). According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, the demographic composition of the bureaucracy should mirror the demographic composition of the public. In this way, the preferences of a heterogeneous population will be represented in bureaucratic decision making. The theory has been more precisely defined in recent years to include the following types of representation: passive, where the bureaucracy has the same demographic origins as the population it serves, and active, where bureaucrats act on behalf of their counterparts in the general population. Active representativeness theory holds that values linked to demographic origins will be translated into programs, policies, or decisions that benefit individuals of similar origins (Meier, 1993b). Initially, representative bureaucracy theory generated a good deal of controversy because the notion of a public bureaucracy acting as a representative political institution was considered a perversion of democratic rule (Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981). Despite these early challenges, the theory has gained considerable attention as a legitimation for bureaucratic policy making and as a justification for social policies such as affirmative action (Saltzstein, 1979; Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh, 1977). The preponderance of representative bureaucracy research has focused on the demographic representativeness of public bureaucracies, an issue that remains salient not only to researchers but also to elected officials with appointing authority.(1) The composition of government work forces is illustrative of the level of openness of bureaucracies to persons of all backgrounds (Meier, 1993b). It serves as an indicator of equality of opportunity and access. In addition, it can promote the legitimacy of government bureaucracies in that diverse communities may have a greater sense of enfranchisement when the bureaucracies that serve them (e.g., police, health, social services, etc.) are visibly diverse. In these ways, passive representativeness has important symbolic value. Our research joins the debate as to where the study of representative bureaucracy should be concentrated. We depart from previous research by focusing on agency leaders, as opposed to overall agencies or street-level bureaucrats. Top political appointees serve as our locus of representativeness. Many scholars and practitioners have argued that representation is important not just at the upper, policy-making levels, but at the lower levels as well (Meier 1993b; Meier and Stewart, 1992; Thompson 1976). The interest is in "street-level bureaucrats," a term coined by Lipsky (1980), which refers to those direct service providers (e.g., police officers, social workers) who have some discretion over the delivery of public services in their domains. In representative bureaucracy parlance, street-level bureaucrats are an important cohort of public employees because they have the power to influence the quality and quantity of services their agencies deliver. While many have acknowledged the significance of street-level bureaucrats as agency representatives (e.g., Thompson, 1976), few have contested the importance of agency leaders as pivotal bureaucratic decision makers. Policy leaders appointed by governors are an integral part of the policy-making machinery of state government. As the pace of devolution accelerates, political appointees will exercise substantial influence over policy development and participate in key resource allocation choices. This study supplies a missing piece of the representative bureaucracy puzzle in that it focuses on the most influential policy makers. This study introduces new measures of passive representativeness that provide a more comprehensive picture of the representativeness of state government bureaucracies. Using original data on gubernatorial appointed policy leaders collected from the 50 states, it offers a more detailed assessment of representativeness by providing a breakdown of the highest leadership positions in state government bureaucracies by gender, race, and ethnicity. The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy First coined by Kingsley in 1944, representative bureaucracy has been defined and interpreted in a number of different ways. Krislov (1974, 23) in his seminal work, compared representative bureaucracy to the embodiment of will." He explains that the creature in miniature (or clear, or quicker) form does precisely what the original body would have done.... The ... notion of representation suggests additional legitimacy gained from some almost intuitive or random-sample isomorphism of the two bodies. The smaller represents -- stands for -- the larger because in some way it encapsulates -- stands for -- the larger. Mosher (1982) is credited with further explicating the theory of representative bureaucracy by differentiating between passive and active representation. As noted above, the preponderance of representative bureaucracy research has focused on passive representation, yielding various measures of representativeness. The following section takes a closer look at existing measures of passive or demographic representativeness. Table 1 provides a summary of existing measures of passive representativeness. The most common measure is the representativeness index or ratio, which compares the social characteristics of the bureaucracy with those of the general population. A representativeness ratio of 1.0 constitutes a perfectly representative bureaucracy. If the value of the index is lower than 1.0, the bureaucracy underrepresents groups in the larger population; if it is greater than 1.0, it overrepresents those groups. (See Guajardo, 1996; Meier, 1993b; Kellough, 1990; Grabosky and Rosenbloom, 1975; and Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1973, for variations of this measure.) [[TABULAR DATA NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Some studies of passive representativeness have pointed to the importance of looking at the distribution or stratification of persons within the bureaucracy. Accordingly, various measures of stratification have been offered that examine the degree to which women and people of color are distributed throughout the upper levels of the organization. Sigelman (1976) was one of the first researchers to offer a stratification ratio that compared the representation of career women at the upper and lower levels of state and local government bureaucracies. This measure has been used in several subsequent studies (Sigelman and Karnig, 1976; Riccucci, 1987). Sigelman and Karnig (1977) offer another stratified measure of representativeness. They compared the percentage of African Americans in executive and managerial positions in state and local governments with the percentage of African Americans in the state population. The ratio served as an indicator of the representativeness of African Americans in upper-level positions in state and local government work forces. Neither Sigelman (1976) nor Sigelman and Karnig (1977) offer measures that incorporate gender, race, and ethnicity comparisons. Not all of the aforementioned ratios are necessarily representative bureaucracy ratios in that they do not all compare demographic representation in the bureaucracy to the demographics of the polity. Such ratios should be viewed more as measures of the integration of women and people of color into public bureaucracies rather than indicators of representative bureaucracy (Lewis, 1988). Saltzstein (1983) developed a stratified measure of representation intended to assess the status of female employment in local governments. She did not, however, offer a passive representativeness ratio in the traditional sense (i.e., one intended to compare social characteristics in the bureaucracy with the general population). She offered a straightforward calculation of women in upper-level positions in local governments. Finally, Meier (1975) relied on economic measures of inequality in examining the representativeness of the federal bureaucracy in terms of position and grade. He used the Lorenz curve and the Gini index of concentration. (The Lorenz curve measures income distribution and the Gini index is a single number that summarizes the degree of inequality.) However, as Meier (1993b) himself observed, these measures were not replicated outside his own research (also see Meier and Nigro, 1976). Additional measures of representativeness have focused on functional categories of government jobs. Cayer and Sigelman (1980) calculated representativeness ratios for women and people of color in state and local employment by functional category. Others have also assessed passive representativeness by functional areas or departments (see Table 1). The motivation for developing such a measure is based on evidence of occupational segregation, where women and people of color are "segregated" not only in certain jobs but also in certain agencies or departments (e.g., social services, civil service or personnel, housing, etc.). In fact, as we can see from Table 1, those researchers who have assessed representative bureaucracy by function or department have found that women and people of color are overrepresented in certain departments or functions (e.g., public welfare, housing, utilities, sanitation and sewage, and hospitals and sanitariums) and grossly underrepresented in others (e.g., financial administration, natural resources, police and fire). Data and Study Design Original data on policy leaders appointed by current governors were collected from the 50 states via a mail survey. Follow-up phone calls were made as needed. For the purpose of this article, "policy leaders" includes heads of departments, agencies, offices, boards, commissions, and authorities. Complete individual-level data on gubernatorial appointees were provided by 48 states. Texas supplied only summary tables, which were not usable for this study, and South Carolina declined to participate. In addition, 42 states provided 1995 EEO-4 data on the gender and race composition of their government work forces. Taken together, the representativeness measures developed for this study offer a comprehensive picture of representative bureaucracy. Using state-level data only, we computed three representative bureaucracy ratios: (1) a traditional baseline measure, (2) a stratification measure, and (3) a new aggregate measure (see Table 2). Two of these ratios expand the representative bureaucracy construct by incorporating appointed personnel into the measure. As noted earlier, the traditional measure of passive or demographic representative bureaucracy compares a group's percentage of the government work force with the group's percentage of the total population.(2) This ratio is a baseline measure of the representativeness of most government employees for a particular jurisdiction. EEO-4 data used to compute this ratio typically include all career employees and appointed administrators except top-level political appointees. Following Cayer and Sigelman (1980) and Dometrius (1984), the stratification ratio examines a group's percentage of upper-level appointments as a proportion of the group's percentage of the total population. This ratio addresses the key issue in the passive representative bureaucracy debate at the positional leadership level: in terms of demographic characteristics, to what extent are a state's bureaucratic leaders representative of that state's population? Ratios computed from government-wide statistics fail to capture a different stratification issue, sometimes referred to in the literature as functional stratification. Several researchers have found that women and people of color were overrepresented in some functional areas of governmental activity and significantly underrepresented in many others (see Table 1). Cayer and Sigelman (1980) and Dometrius (1984) documented a significant presence of women and minorities in health and welfare agencies and, for minorities, in housing agencies as well. Cayer and Sigelman (1980) also reported minority overrepresentation in utilities and sewage functions (Guy, 1992). At the same time, Dometrius makes the strong point that "among the top leadership levels, minorities and especially women are fat from overrepresented in any functional area;" (1984, 132). To re-examine this finding more than 10 years later, the current study includes stratification representativeness ratios for appointed policy leaders by governmental function and position. The third ratio in our framework is a new aggregate representativeness measure. It averages the comparisons of a group's percentage of the total government work force with the group's percentage of the total population (ratio # 1), and a group's percentage of upper-level appointments with the group's percentage of the total population (ratio #2). By integrating top-echelon appointees into the measure, the new ratio summarizes the representativeness of an entire bureaucratic system and permits comparison across systems. Analyzed together, the three ratios provide a more accurate and inclusive assessment of the representativeness of state-level bureaucracies from top to bottom. Findings Table 3 summarizes descriptive data on the gender, race, and ethnicity of policy leaders appointed by current governors. Of the total 1,000 appointments nationwide, women account for just over a quarter (25.9 percent) of the positions. A closer look at Table 3 also reveals that white women hold 22.1 percent of the appointed policy positions compared to all persons of color, both male and female, who hold only 13.4 percent of these gubernatorial policy posts. Table 3 also shows that, in every racial or ethnic category, women lag significantly behind men in the percentage of political appointments they hold. African American women hold only 47 percent as many positions as African American men. No other group of women holds even half as many appointments as their male counterparts. White women hold about 35 percent as many positions, followed by Latina and Asian American women, who each hold about 33 percent. American Indian women trail with just over one-fourth as many offices as their male counterparts. A further breakdown of policy leaders by race and ethnicity indicates that whites overwhelmingly dominate top appointed policy positions (Figure 1). Of the total 1,000 appointments, whites Table 2 Representative Bureaucracy Ratios Traditional Baseline Measure Stratification Measure a group 's % of the gov't workforce/ a group's % of upper-level appointments/ a group's % of the population a group's % of the population New Aggregate Measure a group's % of the gov't workforce/ a group's % of upper-level appointments a group's % of the population + a group's % of the population 2 account for 86.6 percent of the top policy leaders appointed by governors in the United States. African Americans hold only 6.9 percent of these posts, Latinos hold 3.2 percent, Asian Americans 2.4 percent, and American Indians 0.9 percent. Table 3 Gender, Race and Ethnicity of Policy Leaders Appointed by Governors, 1996. Note: Due to a small number of policy leaders who classified their race/ethnicity as "other," and some missing racial/ethnic data, percentages may not total 100% and numbers do not sum to the total. Table 4 provides baseline, stratification, and new aggregate representativeness ratios for each gender, facial, and ethnic group of appointed policy leaders. As the data show, women, overall, are underrepresented nationally in state government bureaucracies. As the baseline ratio of .94 indicates, women approach full representation in state government jobs when top appointed policy-making positions are excluded. On the other hand, women are considerably underrepresented in top gubernatorial appointed posts, as the stratified ratio of .51 indicates. A more complete picture of women's representativeness emerges from the aggregate ratio of .72, which suggests that women have not achieved full representation in state governments across the country. Conversely, men are significantly overrepresented in state government bureaucracies, particularly at the top appointed policy-making level, as the stratified representativeness ratio of 1.52 indicates. Table 4 Baseline, Stratified, and Aggregate Representativeness Ratios of Appointed Policy Leaders, 1996 Note: For information on state-by-state results, see Appointed Policy Makers in State Government. The National Report, Albany, NY: Center for Women in Government, Fall 1996. In virtually every racial or ethnic category, women are underrepresented in state government bureaucracies (Table 4). Latina women in particular have the lowest level of representation. African American women, on the other hand, have achieved a degree of overrepresentation in state government work forces, as the baseline ratio of 1.24 indicates. However, this may be due to the concentration of African American women in lower-level jobs. Indeed, the stratified representativeness ratio of .35 indicates that African American women are substantially underrepresented in top appointed policy-making posts. The aggregate ratio of .79 thus shows a more complete picture -- overall, African-American women are underrepresented in state governments across the nation. The picture for men is somewhat different. White men are overrepresented in state governments, particularly at the highest policy-making levels. The stratified representativeness ratio for white men is 1.75. In addition, Asian American and American Indian men have achieved a degree of representation in state government bureaucracies, particularly in terms of gubernatorial appointments. The stratified ratio for American Indians is 1.75. One must be careful in interpreting these data, however, given the small numbers of Asian Americans and American Indians in top appointed policy posts (see Table 3). The data in Table 4 also point to a glaring disparity for Latino men. Among every racial category of men, Latinos have the lowest degree of representativeness across all three ratios. The pattern is similar for Latina women. Functional Stratification A fuller picture of representative bureaucracy emerges when we examine the representativeness of women and people of color by department or functional category. Women are overwhelmingly appointed to direct agencies in traditionally female-headed fields such as civil and human rights and labor and human resources (Table 5). Women are overrepresented as heads of such departments as the stratified ratio of 1.6 indicates, and they approach full representation in labor and human resources, with a stratified representativeness ratio of.87. [TABULAR DATA NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] On the other hand, women are far from achieving representativeness in such fields as fire, police, public safety, and law enforcement. No women have been appointed by governors to head fire protection agencies, and they are dramatically underrepresented in police, public safety, and law enforcement departments, as the stratified ratio of .12 shows. Men are overrepresented in every functional category in state governments, with the exception of civil and human rights. Whites are overrepresented in virtually every department or agency (Table 6). People of color have achieved a degree of representation in only a few departments. African Americans have achieved representativeness in such fields as fire and corrections. It must be stressed, however, that the number of African Americans appointed to head such departments is relatively small. Of the eight executives appointed by current governors to head fire departments or agencies, there is only one African American male appointment. Of the 55 correction department heads, there are only eight African Americans, seven male and one female. [TABULAR DATA NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Asian Americans and American Indians have achieved a degree of overrepresentation in such fields as utilities, transportation and highways; public welfare; police; and health and civil and human rights. However, the number of Asian Americans and American Indians appointed to top policy posts is quite small (Table 3). American Indians have achieved a stratified representativeness ratio of 34.1 in civil and human rights, but only three of the total eleven appointments to head civil and human rights departments are American Indians. In sum, our findings in large part support previous research on the functional representation of women and people of color. Our data show that, overall, women are underrepresented as heads of most agencies and departments. To the extent that women have achieved a degree of representation, it is in those departments and agencies traditionally headed by women. In addition, we found that people of color have achieved representation in some functions, such as the traditionally white departments of police and fire. However, because so few persons of color have been appointed by governors to head departments and agencies nationwide, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from the representativeness ratios. Discussion This article reports on the ascribed characteristics of state bureaucratic leaders with particular attention to gender, race, and ethnicity. It examines the representativeness of state bureaucratic leaders and variation in appointment patterns among the 50 states. Our data on state-level leaders are disaggregated from data on local government officials. Much of the previous research examines representative bureaucracy either at the federal, local, or combined state and local levels of government. A number of studies examine bureaucratic leadership at the state level of government, but they are not couched within the theoretical framework of representative bureaucracy (Carroll, 1987; Jenks and Wright, 1993; Bullard and Wright, 1993; and Beyle, 1995). Two notable exceptions include Rehfuss (1986), who examined the representativeness of only one state government, California, and Dometrius (1984), who examined the representativeness of state agency leaders for 1974 and 1978. Our research, in part, updates Dometrius's but also goes well beyond it by focusing exclusively on a leadership cohort often excluded from representative bureaucracy studies -- political appointees. (Dometrius combines career and political appointees.) Adding this cohort of appointed policy leaders to the representative bureaucracy framework raises an important question: Where do the loyalties of appointed leaders lie -- with their appointers, with their racial and gender subgroups in the general population, or with the interests of their organizations? Because political appointees serve at the pleasure of elected officials, their loyalties tend to lie with their appointers (Heclo, 1977). Yet, as some research shows, political appointees will sometimes break rank with their superiors, particularly when reaching the goals of their departments or agencies is at stake. Riccucci (1995) found in her research on the federal government that President Reagan's EPA director Ann Gorsuch Burford was willing to gut environmental policy because of her loyalty to the president, but her successors, Lee Thomas (a Reagan appointee) and William Reilly (a Bush appointee) were unwilling to tow the line of their political sponsors when it meant compromising the goals of their agencies. Despite the proclivity of political appointees to direct their loyalties to their political superiors, under certain circumstances, they might push instead for policies that serve other interests, such as their organization's, their profession's, or the interests of their demographic counterparts in the general citizenry (Dometrius, 1984). The issue of loyalty has obvious relevance to the theory of representative bureaucracy, but goes beyond the scope of our study. Previous studies have combined people of color into one category -- minorities. Our study represents the first effort to disaggregate people of color by their race, ethnicity, and gender. Our study also differs from earlier research in that it offers a new measure of representativeness that more accurately assesses the extent to which state bureaucracies are representative of the populations they serve. Conclusion This article revisits the passive representative bureaucracy debate and argues that it has been framed too narrowly. A comprehensive assessment of the representativeness of a bureaucratic system requires the inclusion of all bureaucratic actors. Our study demonstrates that a composite picture with multiple measures offers a more complete analysis of the degree to which the demographic characteristics of individuals in state government bureaucracies mirror those of the general population. Two of the three measures we offer incorporate appointed personnel. Thus, they expand the representative bureaucracy construct to include both career and appointed bureaucrats at all hierarchical levels. The data in Table 4 support the conclusion that analysis of bureaucratic representativeness, based on overall work force data only, results in an inaccurate picture. Representativeness is overestimated if top-ranking, appointed, bureaucratic leaders are excluded from the analysis. The ratios were computed from original state-level data. For the first time, policy makers, researchers, advocates, and other interested audiences have access to a complete public record of the gender, race, and ethnicity of top-ranking bureaucratic leaders, as well as a comprehensive analysis of passive representative bureaucracy in the 50 states. Although the passive representative bureaucracy debate has a long history in the research literature, this study demonstrates that the operationalization of the representativeness construct itself should be reconfigured. Our findings indicate that in most cases, women a-nd people of color are not well represented in top policy making positions in state governments across the country. The reconfigured measure of passive representativeness indicates that, in most cases, women and people of color have achieved even lower levels of representativeness than is evident from an analysis of only the traditional, baseline measure of representativeness. Norma M. Riccucci is associate professor of Public Administration and Policy at the Rockefeller College of the University at Albany, State University of New York. Judith R. Saidel is executive director, Center for Women in Government, and Research Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York. She is co-principal investigator with Norma M. Riccucci of a multi-year study on appointed policy makers in state government. Additional research interests include the relationship between government and the voluntary sector, with particular emphasis on interdependence and contracting issues. Acknowledgement We would like to extend our appreciation to the Ford Foundation for funding this study. We would also like to thank members of our Project Advisory Group for their valuable contributions to this project: Susan Carroll, Jane Delgado, Katie G. Dorsett, Kelly Donley French, Mary Ellen Guy, Annette Laico, Quentin R. Lawson, and Loiuse Spieler. Special thanks also go to Soonhee Kim for her assistance on this article, and to our project staff -- Alissandra D'Aquanni, Suzette Poulin, Tina Kinney, Nicole Gillette, Richard Hoggan, Karen Johnson, and Terri Mannes -- for their invaluable contribution to every phase of this project. Notes (1.) The main focus of our research is on passive representativeness and, therefore, we do not address the issue of active representation here. The body of research on active representativeness has mainly centered on whether passive and active representation are linked. That is to say, do ascribed characteristics of an individual (e.g., race, gender, or ethnicity) relate to, or predict policy preferences, as well as actions to achieve certain policy outcomes? For a further discussion, see Meier (1993b), Saltzstein (1979), Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh (1977), Thompson (1976), and Meier and Nigro (1976). Also see Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981). (2.) 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