Your search for: subjects:"Competition"

This work considers the potential effects of competition in the natural gas pipeline industry. Contrary to published studies and government reports, this study concludes that federal regulation in the industry is no longer necessary to limit the market power of current pipeline suppliers. Rather ...

This work considers the potential effects of competition in the natural gas pipeline industry. Contrary to published studies and government reports, this study concludes that federal regulation in the industry is no longer necessary to limit the market power of current pipeline suppliers. Rather, potential entry by nearby suppliers--a competitive factor largely ignored in most economic analyses--will promote competition in most major markets. The purpose of the work is two-fold: to quantify the competitive effect of potential entry by natural gas suppliers and to demonstrate that any industry analysis which fails to consider this competitive factor is likely to be in error.

This work gives an overview of the current state of the law of unfair competition for the protection of the intellectual creations and industrial assets in the EU, the USA and other major Anglo-American jurisdictions. Despite the growing interest in this area of law in recent years, little attention ...

This work gives an overview of the current state of the law of unfair competition for the protection of the intellectual creations and industrial assets in the EU, the USA and other major Anglo-American jurisdictions. Despite the growing interest in this area of law in recent years, little attention has been given to the varying legal and economic paradigms that underlie and shape it. This need for a comparative, theoretical examination is heightened by the advent of the information age, coupled with the desire to integrate markets. These developments pose a challenge to the current regimes of intellectual property protection since these are increasingly becoming out of step with the paradigms that shaped the traditional patent, copyright and trademark regimes. In this work, the author explores the alternative to a protective regime based on unfair competition doctrines, and examines the themes of economic justification, shaping legal boundaries, finding a legal justification, practical application, and harmonization of national laws.

During the second half of the twentieth century, competition policy has been accorded an increasingly prominent role in the policy portfolios of industrialized nations. Since the late 1940s, when twenty-three nations ratified the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), tariff barriers ...

During the second half of the twentieth century, competition policy has been accorded an increasingly prominent role in the policy portfolios of industrialized nations. Since the late 1940s, when twenty-three nations ratified the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), tariff barriers have been progressively reduced throughout much of the industrialized world. The final Uruguay Round negotiations extended GATT's reach to agriculture, services, and intellectual property and clarified policies toward other aspects of trade. While great progress has been made, much remains to be done to integrate the world economy in the 21st century. In this book, part of the Brookings Integrating National Economies series, F. M. Scherer explores the three-way interaction among competition policy, national trading and investment strategies, and international trade policies. Focusing on four nations - the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan - he surveys the evolution over two centuriesof national trading and competition policies and the points at which they come in conflict. Attempts to harmonize them through multilateral institutions, such as the European Union, are examined. The principal intersections between competition and trade policies are analyzed in depth. Scherer shows how export and import cartels have effects similar to traditional tariff barriers and how restraints implemented to settle trade disputes induce cartelization. Also investigated are the substantially different rules governing price discrimination under trade laws and competition policy, how vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance serve as import barriers, and theconflict between industrial policy and competition policy goals as nations choose whether to encourage or restrict mergers. Scherer offers recommendations for substantive and procedural improvements at the interface between tra