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A history of U.S. relations with Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1960.

Keeping Tito Afloat draws upon newly declassified documents to show the critical role that Yugoslavia played in U.S. foreign policy with the communist world in the early years of the Cold War. After World War II, the United States ...

A history of U.S. relations with Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1960.

Keeping Tito Afloat draws upon newly declassified documents to show the critical role that Yugoslavia played in U.S. foreign policy with the communist world in the early years of the Cold War. After World War II, the United States considered Yugoslavia to be a loyal Soviet satellite, but Tito surprised the West in 1948 by breaking with Stalin. Seizing this opportunity, the Truman administration sought to "keep Tito afloat" by giving him military and economic aid. President Truman hoped that American involvement would encourage other satellites to follow Tito's example and further damage Soviet power. However, Lees demonstrates that it was President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who most actively tried to use Tito as a "wedge" to liberate the Eastern Europeans.

By the end of 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles discontinued this "wedge strategy" because it raised too many questions about the ties that should exist between communist, non-communist, and neutral states. As Tito shrewdly kept the U.S. at arm's length, Eisenhower was forced to accept Tito's continued absence from the Soviet orbit as victory enough. In the period between 1958 and 1960, Lees examines U.S. political objectives that remained after military support for Tito was discontinued. Although use of Yougoslavia as a wedge never fully succeeded, Lees shows how that strategy reflected the pragmatic and geopolitical pol

In American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941, Ivo Tasovac contends that Yugoslavia acted as an unwilling prop for American involvement in World War II. As a result of America's commitment to Britain as an exception to their doctrine of neutrality, and of Winston Churchill and Franklin ...

In American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941, Ivo Tasovac contends that Yugoslavia acted as an unwilling prop for American involvement in World War II. As a result of America's commitment to Britain as an exception to their doctrine of neutrality, and of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt's shared eagerness for conflict and suppression of Germany, the war and ensuing Communist takeover of Eastern Europe were inevitable.

With Yugoslavia cast as the endangered barrier between the Germans and the Mediterranean, Churchill was able to establish an unquestionable need for U.S. military action. Britain's leader could seize on the small country as a staging area for activating the Soviets in order to eliminate Italy and weaken Germany in the process. Tasovac contends that pressure from the British government and the American diplomats investigating the situation in fact enforced the Serbian coup d'etat to overthrow Prince Paul of Yugoslavia when he appeared sympathetic to Germany, even though the Serbians had no intentions of fighting.

With all of the ingredients for conflict in place, the ensuing struggle for Yugoslavian freedom was unavoidable. By bringing the war to the Balkans, Churchill and Roosevelt shaped the next half-century of international politics and domination.

American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia documents and analyzes the decisions and policies that made this action so detrimental to Yugoslavia and other Balkan states. Tasovac brings new light to the realities of the engagement in Yugoslavia and the long-standing effects, discarding the appearances of history for the truth.

This study is ideal for a broad audience of scholars, including those interestedin NATO policies applied to the Balkan states, the relationship between the United States and those states, Franklin D. Roosevelt's influence on the world stage during his presidency and World War II, and the history of Yugos