Virtue and Consequences: Hobbes on the Value of the Moral Virtues
Journal article by Alex John London; Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 24, 1998
Journal Article Excerpt
Virtue and consequences: Hobbes on the value of the moral virtues. by Alex John London In the last fifty years, interest in Hobbes's moral theory has witnessed something of a renaissance.(1) David Gauthier has even gone so far as to proclaim Hobbes "the greatest of the English moral philosophers."(2) As Gauthier reads him, Hobbes is a contractarian of sorts. Recently, however, David Boonin-Vail has argued that Hobbes's moral theory is more substantial than Gauthier would allow, because Hobbes is actually offering a kind of virtue theory.(3) Although a number of commentators have suggested that Hobbes is a kind of virtue theorist, their Projects have been devoted almost entirely to a defense of this view.(4) As a result, very little energy has been expended on assessing whether Hobbes remains one of the greatest of the English moral philosophers if Gauthier is wrong and those like Boonin-Vail are right. For this reason, the following discussion does not attempt to provide further support for the claim that Hobbes is a virtue theorist. Rather, assuming that Hobbes does in fact hold such a view, I attempt to distinguish Hobbes's view of the virtues from those of Plato and Aristotle and to argue that, in the end, those who are interested in the place of the virtues in the moral life should look beyond Hobbes to the classical tradition. First, I will summarize the challenge of the Fool in Hobbes's Leviathan and outline some of the problems faced by Gauthier's contractualist reading of Hobbes and Kavka's rule-egoistic reading. This will provide a background against which we can distinguish Boonin-Vail's virtue theoretic account of Hobbes's moral theory. I will then compare the value that Hobbes ascribes to the virtues with the way that Plato and Aristotle take the virtues to be good, and suggest that Hobbes's account is less satisfying than its classical predecessors. An Overview of Traditional Accounts of Hobbes's Moral Theory The best way to get a sense of Hobbes's virtue theory is to see it in action. Before examining how this reading provides Hobbes with a compelling reply to the Fool, it will be useful to look briefly at some of the problems the Fool poses for alternative accounts of Hobbes's moral theory. An act-egoistic moral theory evaluates particular actions in terms of their (actual or expected) consequences for the acting agent. It differs from act utilitarianism in that the latter evaluates the consequences of an action in terms of all those affected, whereas the former focuses only on the agent herself. On this view, the laws of nature represent rules of thumb that supplement our own decision-making process. They are a repository of knowledge to which we defer when we are not ourselves able to weigh out the possible consequences of an action. The Fool, however, poses some fairly straightforward problems for this view of morality. The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice... that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice. . . may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good.(5) It is important to note that the Fool's question applies to case where: Either . . . one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against reason. (L 15, 204) How are we to understand Hobbes's claim that it is against reason to violate a covenant where there is either a power to enforce them or where the other person has already complied? What are we to make of the kind of reasoning involved here?According to act egoism, the Fool claims that there might be circumstances in which it would be to one's advantage to break a covenant. If another has already complied, we stand to gain more by not complying--so long as we are not found out. In ... |
End of free preview...
To continue reading this publication, you must have a Questia Subscription.
Try Us Today! Click Here
Questia provides the world's largest online library of scholarly books and journal articles, with integrated footnote and bibliography tools, highlighting, note taking and book marking. With a Questia subscription, you'll have access to the full text of more than 67,000 books and 1.5 million articles.
Already a subscriber? Login:
Sponsored Links
Free Newsletter
Get helpful how-to's, writing tips, search strategies, quizzes & more!
Search the Library
