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Clean Thoughts and Dirty Minds: The Politics of Porn.
by Kevin B. Smith Various justifications are given for regulating sexually explicit material, including that it causes social harm by eroding behavioral norms or violating basic civil rights. Theories of morality politics and policy, however, suggest that regulation of sexually explicit material is driven by attempts to redistribute values, i.e., by groups who seek to use the coercive power of the state to impose their moral codes on others. The analysis here tests for relationships predicted by morality policy theory and generally finds patterns consistent with the argument that policing pornography is driven primarily by attempts at value redistribution. Underlying much of the research examining the regulation of pornography is an unresolved question: Does the state regulate sexual expression primarily in response to real or perceived threats to social order, or is it simply an effort to legitimate one group's moral norms? (Childress, 1992; Davies, 1997; Daynes, 1988; Kutchinsky, 1973). If the answer is the latter, the normative implications are substantial--it suggests the state is willing to suppress individual liberties not because their exercise is a threat to society as a whole, but simply because their exercise is an offense to other groups in society. Yet the emerging theory of morality politics suggests that exactly such outcomes are predictable products of competing value agendas within society. While this framework does not preclude social harm as a driving force behind the regulation of sexual expression, it is strongly suggestive that this policy arena will be dominated by efforts to use the coercive power of the state to legitimate one set of mo ral norms while outlawing others. This article adopts the morality politics framework to assess empirically its ability to predict the regulation of sexually explicit materials. The results indicate that the politics of porn indeed are less about the struggle to balance individual freedom and social harm than an effort by one group to impose its moral taboos on everyone else. Pornography and Public Policy In the United States sex and politics always have made for a volatile mix. As recreation or entertainment sex is often viewed as a threat, something with the power to alter norms of behavior, undermine morality, and erode social order (Daynes, 1988). On such grounds, the coercive power of the state long has been used to define, regulate, and suppress sexually explicit material. But regulating sexually explicit material, or "pornography," brings into conflict two core values: (a) the individual freedoms considered necessary to liberty and guaranteed by the First Amendment; and (b) a set of behavioral norms--often with religious foundations--considered important to a stable society. This collision of values results in pornography being considered as both a civil right and a civic threat. According to the Reverend Jerry Kirk, of the National Coalition for the Protection of Children and Families, "Pornography is anti-children, and-woman, anti-family, anti-church and anti-God" ("Ohio Minister" 1995). According to Nadine Strossen (1995), of the American Civil Liberties Union, pornography covers such a broad area of sexually related speech that it should be protected as a political freedom. The public seems to hold these contradictory viewpoints simultaneously: Opinion polls indicate most people view pornography as a threat to community standards and moral norms, yet there is a broad and consistently high demand for these same sexually explicit materials in virtually every community in the nation (Daynes, 1988). As Meier (1997) has noted, few politicians are willing to stand up for "sin," and this raises the possibility that one set of these values is going to be overrepresented in the polic ymaking process. Generally there is only one acceptable political position on pornography--opposition. Officials may label themselves as pro-First Amendment, but few are willing to call themselves pro-pornography. Unsurprisingly, balancing freedom of speech and sexual autonomy with social morals and norms has been an elusive political goal. State and federal governments have passed numerous laws regulating sexually explicit material, and in various challenges the Supreme Court consistently has ruled that obscenity has no First Amendment protection and may be outlawed. But instead of providing a framework for resolving such conflicts, these decisions have fueled them. The basic problem of these efforts was articulated most famously by Justice Potter Stewart in his concurring opinion of the 1964 case Jacobellis v. Ohio (378 U.S. 184, p. 197). Stewart admitted that "perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly (defining obscenity). But I know it when I see it." The 1973 Miller decision set three criteria for judging ...
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