Pacifism and the Eastern Martial Arts

Allan Bäck and Daeshik Kim

In this article we wish to claim that, despite the paradoxical appearances, there is
a positive relation between pacifism and the Eastern martial arts. We shall argue
that all moral agents, even absolute pacifists, have a duty to learn how to fight.
Further, after making some observations about the peculiar way in which the
consciousness of the practitioner of the Eastern martial arts is supposed to be
related to his acts of violence, according to the tradition, we shall claim that it is
morally preferable to learn to fight in such a system rather than in one without
such features.

It is obvious that a decision whether to learn how to fight and a decision to fight
or not to fight on a certain occasion or in general are moral decisions. One would
be asking what one should do, and the decisions commit one to a certain course
of action, regardless of whether one is resolute enough to carry out his decisions.
Further, these decisions are ones that everyone makes, either by taking a specific
stand, or by declining to consider the issue. Everyone, then, has a moral position
on fighting. For everyone is faced with confrontations with physical force, or the
possibility of such confrontations, in everyday life.

Let us be more specific about the meaning of 'fighting'. Here we primarily
mean by fighting the exchange of direct physical force between individuals with
the intention of coercing the opposition to behave or refrain from behaving in a
certain way.¹ Therefore, if I decide to fight, I am deciding to act violently toward
another while being aware that he might react in kind. If I strike a dead body, I
would not be fighting; if I strike a sleeping person, I would be fighting, for the
person who was sleeping might wake up and retaliate. However, insofar as the
person is asleep, he would not be said to be fighting. In this way, I may choose to
fight someone who has decided not to fight back; however, such a nonaggressor
would not be fighting me. Later we shall make some remarks on institutional
fighting, as in war. But at present we shall be concerned only with personal
violence and fighting.

There are many possible moral positions that one could take with regard to
personal fighting. One way of categorizing them is on a pacifist-non-pacifist
continuum. On one extreme it is morally wrong to commit any act that might
endanger any living being (even an ant or amoeba can fight back) or to refrain
from any act that might prevent an occurrence of violence. On the other extreme,
fighting per se is considered a good, and one ought to wallow in blood and
violence. We are not aware of any instantiation of either ideal extreme: the first
seems to lead to annihilation shortly, and the second is reminiscent of the circle of

Allan Bäck is affiliated with the Department of Philosophy, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.

Daeshik Kim is affiliated with the Department of Health and Physical Education, University of Texas,
Austin, Texas.

Philosophy East and West 32, no. 2 ( April, 1982 ). © by the University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.

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