| Physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery Jonathan Gruber * and Maria Owings ** The "induced-demand" model states that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. We test this model using an exogenous change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/gynecologists: declining fertility in the United States. We argue that the 13.5% fall in fertility over the 1970-1982 period led ob/gyns to substitute from normal childbirth toward a more highly reimbursed alternative, cesarean delivery. Using a nationally representative microdata set for this period, we show that there is a strong correlation between within-state declines in fertility and within-state increases in cesarean utilization. 1. Introduction Since the seminal work of Arrow ( 1963 ), it has been recognized that a central feature of the medical marketplace is the agency relationship between doctors and their patients. A standard model of this relationship in the health economics literature is that of "induced demand." This model holds that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit this agency relationship by providing excessive care in order to maintain their incomes. If true, such a model has important implications for both the design of private-sector insurance policies and the optimal government response to rising medical costs. Despite its theoretical importance, however, there is only mixed empirical evidence on the role of inducement in physician decision making. The inducement model has traditionally been tested by assessing how two alternative changes in the environment facing physicians affect the utilization of medical procedures. The first is reductions in the fees paid to physicians, generally by government payers. The second is variations in the physician/population density across areas; increased density lowers the income of the existing stock of physicians, and it will lead to increased utilization of medical procedures in an inducement-type model. ____________________ | | We are grateful to Ed Bacon, Peter Diamond, Victor Fuchs, Marty Gaynor, Tom McGuire, Joe Newhouse, Robert Pokras, Jim Poterba, Jon Skinner, Richard Zeckhauser, seminar participants at MIT, Harvard, and the NBER, and to Tim Bresnahan and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not of the National Center for Health Statistics. | | * | Massachusetts Institute of Technology and National Bureau of Economic Research. | | ** | National Center for Health Statistics. | -99- |