At the March 2006 Arab summit in Khartoum, Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa called on Arabs to "enter into the nuclear club and make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." (1) This call comes in the midst of global concern over the proliferation, particularly in the Middle East, of nuclear material and technology. In the last several years, significant developments have heightened this global concern. In 2003, the United States led an international coalition to destroy Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. Almost simultaneously, Libya, another Middle Eastern state, was holding secret negotiations with the United Kingdom and the United States to dismantle its nonconventional capabilities. These negotiations reached a successful conclusion in December 2003, with announcements in London, Tripoli, and Washington confirming Libya's intentions to fully cooperate with the international nonproliferation regime. Since then, Mummar al-Qadhafi has made good on this pledge, and gradually Libya has been reintegrated in the international community.
Iran, on the other hand, has continued to pursue its nuclear ambition for the last two decades. Since the early 2000s, Iran's nuclear program has been under intense international scrutiny. The United States and several European countries accuse Tehran of seeking to build nuclear weapons, whereas Iranian leaders categorically deny these accusations and claim that their nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. International efforts to end the dispute have gained momentum since early 2006, when the United Nations Security Council started debating the issue. Israel, meanwhile, is recognized by almost all intelligence services as the only nuclear power in the Middle East, although the Jewish state has never admitted such capability.
Regional and international dynamics complicate the Middle East's nuclear uncertainty. Several Middle Eastern countries have accumulated an extensive arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and means of delivery (e.g., ballistic missiles). India and Pakistan, two large nations on the Middle East's periphery, have developed nuclear capabilities but have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
To end this nuclear uncertainty, several diplomatic, economic, and military options have been considered, and some have already been implemented. The list includes prolonged negotiations, economic sanctions, and military strikes. Meanwhile, proposals to establish a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East have been under consideration for more than three decades. An NWFZ is a specified region whose countries forswear the manufacture, acquisition, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons. Each treaty establishing an NWFZ includes a legally binding protocol with the five nuclear weapons states recognized under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The protocols call on these five powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty parties. (2) These declarations are referred to as negative security assurances. Thus, proposals to create an NWFZ in the Middle East would achieve two fundamental goals--abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the region and provision of guarantees against attack from existing nuclear weapons states. Article VII of the NPT endorses the NWFZ concept by stating, "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." (3) In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed that right. (4)
The current strategic environment in the Middle East might make proposals to establish an NWFZ seem a utopian dream. The ongoing fighting in Iraq, the diplomatic confrontation between Western powers and Iran, and the lack of any meaningful peace between Israel and the Palestinians indicate grave instability and mutual suspicion. But these very conditions only underscore the need for a fresh and serious look at all proposals for reducing tension and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
This article first examines NWFZ experiences and lessons in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It then focuses on recent arms control negotiations and efforts to establish a Middle Eastern NWFZ, paying particular attention to the Israeli, Arab, and Iranian positions.
This article argues that any realistic proposal to establish a Middle Eastern NWFZ should follow three guidelines. First, the NWFZ proposal should be part of a comprehensive strategy to achieve peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the Persian Gulf, and between these two Middle Eastern subsystems. A comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East requires a rapprochement or detente between Israel and major powers in the Persian Gulf. (5) Second, the NWFZ proposal should extend to chemical and biological weapons as well as short- and medium-range missiles. Proliferation of these weapon systems promises unprecedented casualties in any future military conflict. Third, the NWFZ proposal should parallel similar attempts to reduce conventional weapons. An overall reduction in arms races would greatly contribute to confidence building between major powers in the Middle East.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
There are five NWFZs in the world (created by five regional agreements): the Latin and Caribbean NWFZ (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific NWFZ (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), the Southeast Asian NWFZ (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), the African NWFZ (the 1995 Treaty of Pelindaba), and the central Asian NWFZ (the 1997 Treaty of Semipalatinsk). One hundred and eleven countries with approximately 1.8 billion people are state parties to these NWFZs. (6) There are treaties that ban nuclear weapons on the seabed and in outer space as well. Thus, NWFZs are "part and parcel of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime." (7)
Different dynamics created the appropriate conditions for establishing each NWFZ. As Muhammad ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), explains, "Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues and NWFZs are so beneficial." (8)
The NWFZ idea arose in the mid-1950s in response to growing tension among major global powers and threats of escalating conflicts, particularly in Europe. The Soviet Union introduced the idea of an NWFZ in central Europe at the UN General Assembly in 1956. Two years later, in 1958, Poland made a similar proposal, known as the Rapacki Plan--named after the country's foreign minister, Adam Rapacki. The proposed NWFZ would have included Poland, Czechoslovakia, West and East Germany, and other European countries. The Polish government was mainly concerned about Americans deploying nuclear weapons in West Germany and the Soviets deploying nuclear weapons in Poland. In addition to banning the manufacture, possession, stationing, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and equipment, the proposal called for the prohibition of nuclear attacks against state members in the zone. The Rapacki Plan also included the establishment of an international verification mechanism. Given the intense strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Rapacki Plan was rejected. Nevertheless, several of its principles have since served as guidelines in NWFZ negotiations.
Similar efforts to establish NWFZs in the Mediterranean and northern Europe in the 1960s failed for similar reasons. The breakthrough came in February 1967, when the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed at a regional meeting of Latin American countries at Tlatelolco, a section of Mexico City. The treaty came into force in April 1969, and all thirty-three nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have since signed and ratified it. In this treaty, Latin American parties agree not to acquire, possess, or permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. (9)
In August 1985 the South Pacific Forum, a body composed of the thirteen independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific region, endorsed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga) and opened it for signature. The treaty bans the manufacture, possession, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device in state parties' territories. It also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. (10) In the mid-1980s, Indonesia and Malaysia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), but opposition from some Association of Southeast Asian Nations members slowed the drafting and signing of a treaty. In December 1995 ten Southeast Asian states signed the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (also known as Treaty of Bangkok). In the treaty, state parties forswear conducting, receiving, or aiding the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, and control of any nuclear explosive device. They also agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against one another or within the zone. (11)
The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (also knows as Treaty of Pelindaba) was approved in Addis Ababa at the June 1995 meeting of the heads of African states and governments, and the UN subsequently endorsed it. The treaty is largely based on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in Cairo at the 1964 Summit of the Organization of African Unity. The treaty prohibits stationing and testing nuclear explosive devices, dumping radioactive waste, and conducting armed attacks against nuclear installations in the zone; it promotes using nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. Signatories must prevent theft and unauthorized use by applying the highest standards of security and physical protection to nuclear material, facilities, and equipment. (12)
Finally, since 1997 the leaders of five central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have negotiated a treaty on a central Asian NWFZ (CANWFZ). A summit of leaders from the five states issued the Almaty Declaration endorsing the CANWFZ. Working groups to draft the treaty followed. In September 2006 the leaders of these five central Asian states officially signed a treaty in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. They accepted IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material, including international recommendations on the security of nuclear facilities--particularly important given concerns over nuclear smuggling in the region. They also agreed to forbid the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, and possession of any nuclear explosive device. Addressing environmental issues is another major purpose of the zone, as various stages of the nuclear weapons production process took place in the region during the Soviet era. Finally, the CANWFZ serves as an "island of non-nuclear stability to the north and east of the Middle East and South Asia." (13)
These five NWFZs suggest two crucial criteria are necessary for successfully establishing an NWFZ: a common historical understanding among regional states and a manageable relationship with the five recognized nuclear weapons states. Stated differently, deep-rooted hostilities among regional states and intense tensions with one or more of the nuclear weapons states are factors likely to complicate the creation of an NWFZ. This largely explains the failure to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES: A MIDDLE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE
The Middle East has experienced probably the most deadly military conflicts since World War II, including several wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the Gulf War (1991), and the Iraq War (2003-present). Military confrontations can be seen as both a symptom and a cause of deep-rooted insecurity and political instability. Wars have aggravated a sense of insecurity both internally and externally, and several major Middle Eastern powers have engaged in arms races of both conventional and unconventional weapons in response. These arms races, particularly the stockpiling of WMDs, have in turn increased military and political tension and the risk of catastrophic wars. A Middle Eastern NWFZ has been proposed and sought to prevent the trend toward escalation.
It is widely believed that Israel built its first nuclear device in the late 1960s. Despite serious efforts, other regional powers have failed to achieve nuclear parity with Israel. A proposal to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East is aimed at closing regional military asymmetry. Thus, Egypt and Iran have called for the denuclearization of the entire Middle East, a proposal enshrined in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3263. Israel initially opposed the resolution, but in 1980 it produced its own version, endorsed as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/52. For the next several years the resolution was adopted annually unanimously without a vote. In both resolutions the UN invites Middle Eastern states to adhere to the NPT, to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards, and--pending the establishment of an NWFZ--not to develop, produce, test, acquire, or station nuclear weapons. (14)
Frustrated with the lack of progress on the NWFZ and the continuing military imbalance in the region, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak introduced a new proposal--known as the Mubarak Initiative--to broaden the proposed NWFZ into a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ). This initiative called for prohibiting biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and implementing verification measures to ensure full compliance. (15)
The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War underscored the danger of WMD stockpiling in the Persian Gulf and its potential spillover to the entire Middle East. The 1991 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 notes that the disarmament of Iraq should be a step toward "the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from WMD[s] and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons." (16)
To enlist Arab cooperation in the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush promised that in the wake of Kuwait's liberation and the Gulf crisis's resolution, the United States would focus its attention on a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, the Madrid Peace Conference, which brought Israel, the Palestinians, and thirteen Arab states to the negotiating table for the first time under the auspices of the United States and Russia, began in late 1991. Working groups were one outcome of the conference, and an arms control and regional security (ACRS) group was created, along with four other multilateral working groups, to complement negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The ACRS group held six sessions between 1992 and 1995. ACRS parties focused on confidence-building measures, including "creating a communication network across the region; coordinating search and rescue operations; and establishing regional security centers." (17) These measures were expected to establish and enhance cooperation and common interests among all involved parties, and eventually to reduce tension and lay the foundation for a lasting peace.
The 1995 Conference of State Parties to the NPT in New York made calls for similar measures. In a resolution on the Middle East, the conference endorsed the aims and objectives of the peace process, called on states not party to the NPT--such as Israel (see table 1)--to accede to it and accept IAEA safeguards, and urged nuclear weapon states to fully cooperate in regional efforts to create a Middle Eastern WMDFZ. (18)
These serious efforts across more than three decades to prevent WMD proliferation and create a Middle Eastern NWFZ have failed. The realization of these goals still seems highly unlikely. Despite peace agreements between Israel and two of its Arab neighbors (Egypt and Jordan), and ongoing negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no consensus on the strategic foundations of an arms-control regime, particularly an NWFZ. The Israeli approach differs from the Arab-Iranian stand.
The Israeli Approach
Israel has always adopted a skeptical view of global arms control and disarmament treaties, (19) and Israeli leaders have always stressed that the proliferation of WMDs in the Middle East will have to be handled within a regional framework. (20) The Israeli stand on an NWFZ has five characteristics.
First, the creation of the state of Israel followed the extraordinary experience of the Holocaust in which the Nazis killed millions of Jews. This dramatic experience shaped the Israeli collective psyche, particularly in the first decades after the formation of Israel. Israeli leaders have always believed that nuclear weapons will shield them from a future Holocaust and see nuclear weapons as a last line of defense--an "insurance policy" to guarantee their survival. Refusal to recognize Israel and rhetoric calling for its destruction only feed this belief in the necessity of the nuclear option.
Second, Israeli leaders present their country's supposed nuclear capability as a deterrent helping to stabilize the Middle East. They argue that Israel's presumed nuclear capability has forced its adversaries to accept that Israel is here to stay. Israel's conventional weapon superiority and its nuclear arsenal make it an indispensable part of the Middle Eastern landscape. Israeli conventional and unconventional might, the argument goes, has forced Arabs to negotiate and reduced incentives for all-out war.
Third, Israel has aimed to monopolize the nuclear option, always seeking to deny its adversaries such capability. To achieve this end, Israel has employed diplomatic and military pressure against potential nuclear proliferators, culminating in the 1981 attack destroying Iraqi nuclear facilities. Israel is considered the first nation to launch a preemptive strike against an adversary's nuclear reactors.
Fourth, Israel has hesitated to fully endorse the global nonproliferation regime. It has "never placed its Dimona nuclear facility under the IAEA safeguards, nor has it since 1970 allowed any other type of inspection visits to that site." (21) Israel has not signed the NPT or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) (see table 2); it has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (see table 3) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (see table 4). Israeli analysts argue nevertheless that Israel abides by the global norms and rules of the global nonproliferation regime. Gerald M. Steinberg claims that unlike Pakistan, whose chief nuclear scientist Abdel Qadir Khan provided nuclear technology to several potential proliferators, Israel has refused to share its nuclear expertise with other regimes (except the South African apartheid regime). (22)
Fifth, Israeli leaders have repeatedly made a comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab states and Iran a prerequisite to joining an NWFZ. Israel, they insist, would only cede its nuclear option if all its neighbors recognized and engaged in diplomatic and commercial ties with it. In other words, peace treaties would not be sufficient: Israelis require complete normalization of relations to ensure full acceptance from Israel's neighbors.
These five characteristics suggest three conclusions. First, Israel is highly unlikely to endorse a Middle Eastern NWFZ. The few statements Israeli leaders have made regarding nuclear weapons indicate that they link their national survival to their nuclear capability. Second, the refusal by Israel, India, and Pakistan to join the NPT has prompted some analysts to suggest special arrangements to accommodate these three nonsignatory states. Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr., for example, propose a form of NPT associate membership. (23) Others, including ElBaradei, have called on Israel to follow the path taken by South Africa and relinquish its nuclear weapons. (24) Israel is unlikely to accept either proposal. Third, presumed Israeli nuclear capability, and Arab and Iranian lack thereof, is considered a major reason for the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the region. Unable to achieve nuclear capability, Israel's adversaries have sought other WMDs as second-best deterrents.
The Arab-Iranian Approach
Although there is no single united Arab-Iranian approach to a Middle Eastern NWFZ, Iran and most Arab states do have shared sentiments. First, the Arabs and Iranians do not see the Israeli nuclear arsenal as a "weapon of last resort" or insurance policy ensuring Israel's survival. Military asymmetry, and particularly Tel Aviv's nuclear capability, is seen in Tehran and most Arab capitals as enforcing the occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories.' Second, the Iranian and many Arab governments view the Israeli nuclear arsenal as a "primary threat to regional security and a factor of instability." (25) That Israel is the region's only presumed nuclear power underscores and feeds a sense of Arab and Iranian technological and military inferiority.
Third, the Iranian and many Arab governments accuse Western powers of applying a double standard regarding Middle Eastern nuclear proliferation. To Arab and Iranian eyes, the United States and major European powers have allowed--even assisted--Israel in acquiring nuclear weapons but have strongly resisted Arab and Iranian attempts to develop similar capability. Many Arab officials have argued that so long as Israel maintains its nuclear option, Iran and other regional powers will have incentives to seek a similar capability. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal has voiced this sentiment forcefully: "Iran is always condemned but no one mentions Israel, which already has nuclear weapons. We wish the international community would enforce the movement to make the Middle East a[n] NWFZ." (26) The most effective way to deal with Iran's nuclear ambition, some Arabs argue, is to pressure Israel to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the NPT.
Fourth, several Arab countries have unsuccessfully sought to buy or build nuclear weapons. To maximize international pressure on Tel Aviv, all Arab states and Iran signed and ratified the NPT, leaving Israel as the only nonsignatory state in the region. Egypt, a leading Arab state and a close U.S. ally, has championed Arab efforts to break Israel's nuclear monopoly. For several years, Egyptian leaders called on Arab states not to sign the CWC until Israel joins the NPT. These efforts largely failed. Most Arab states, along with Iran, signed and ratified both the CWC and the BTWC. Most Arab states and Iran see the creation of an NWFZ as a necessary first step toward a comprehensive and lasting peace. The denuclearization of the Middle East would eliminate what Arabs and Iranians see as nuclear intimidation by Israel. It would lead to broad regional arms-control measures and lay the foundation for a lasting peace.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST--WHAT LIES AHEAD
The history of NWFZs suggests that once a state actually possesses nuclear weapons, establishing an NWFZ in the region becomes very difficult. African states signed the Treaty of Pelindaba after South Africa dismantled its six nuclear bombs and joined the NPT, but this is a unique case in nuclear nonproliferation history. (27) It is important to emphasize, moreover, that Israel's presumed nuclear arsenal is not the only reason for WMD proliferation in the Middle East. Egypt's role in the Yemen War (early 1960s), Libya's involvement in Chad (1980s), and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) all contributed to the proliferation and use of WMDs. Still, as Rebecca Johnson argues, Israel's policy of nuclear opacity and widespread belief in its significant nuclear arsenal "serve as an excuse and impediment to efforts to persuade other states in the region to adhere to and abide by non-proliferation constraints and commitments." (28)
Three conclusions can be drawn from more than three decades of failure to establish a Middle Eastern NWFZ. First, what should come first--peace or disarmament--is a major hurdle to creating a Middle Eastern NWFZ. The Israelis insist that a comprehensive and genuine peace with all their neighbors is a prerequisite for any negotiations on denuclearization or a WMDFZ. The Arabs and Iranians argue that there will be no peace so long as Israel maintains a nuclear monopoly.
Second, a conflict-ridden region such as the Middle East does not possess the right dynamic for creating and maintaining an NWFZ. Experience in other regions indicates that peace and nonproliferation go hand in hand and reinforce one another. Given the deep-rooted conflicts in the region, an NWFZ would require considerable changes in the strategic landscape, including a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, stability in the Persian Gulf, and a rapprochement between Israel and major Persian Gulf states.
Third, settling these conflicts and creating the fight environment for a comprehensive and durable peace will take a long time. In the short and medium terms, Middle Eastern states need to implement confidence-building and arms-control measures reducing the underlying causes of violence and war. Most notably, they need to engage in "mutually beneficial economic and cultural relations." (29) Disarmament efforts should address both conventional and nonconventional weapons and should emphasize transparency and verification.
For the foreseeable future, however, it seems that creating a Middle Eastern NWFZ is closer to mirage than reality. Yet hope remains for a comprehensive peace and the abolition of all regional WMDs. Realizing this hope would substantially enhance prospects for regional and international peace.
(1.) "Arab Nations Urged to Enter Nuclear Club," New York Times, March 28, 2006.
(2.) There are a few exceptions to this rule. The five recognized nuclear powers have at times signed and ratified an NWFZ protocol while reserving the right to use nuclear weapons against its members under certain conditions.
(3.) The full text of the treaty is available at http:// www.UN.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty (accessed April 2, 2006).
(4.) Chrstine Kucia, "Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZones (NWFZ) at a Glance," available at http://www .armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz.asp?print (accessed April 4, 2006).
(5.) See Gawdat Bahgat, Israel and the Persian Gulf: Retrospect and Prospect (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 44-55.
(6.) Wakana Mukai, "The Importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones," Journal of Science and World Affairs 1, no. 2 (2005): 81.
(7.) Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment," Non-Proliferation Review 4, no. 3 (1997): 19.
(8.) Muhammad ElBaradei, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Pursuing Security, Region by Region," Statements of the Director General, Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties That Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Tlatelolco, Mexico, April 26, 2005, available at http://www.iaea .org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n005 .html (accessed January 24, 2006).
(9.) The full text of the treaty is available at hap:// www.opanal.org/opanal/Tlatelolco/P-Tlatelolco-i.htm (accessed April 4, 2006).
(10.) The full text of the treaty is available at http:// www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5189.htm (accessed April 4, 2006).
(11.) The full text of the treaty is available at http:// www.aseansec.org/2082.htm (accessed April 4, 2006).
(12.) The full text of the treaty is available at http:// state.gov/t/ac/trt/4699.htm (accessed April 4, 2006).
(13.) Scott Parrish, "Central Asian States Achieve Breakthrough on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020930.htm (accessed April 4, 2006).
(14.) The full text of December 4, 1990, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/52 is available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ UN/unga45_52.html (accessed January 24, 2006).
(15.) For more details on the Mubarak Initiative, see Ambassador Mohamad I. Shaker, "The Middle East Issue; Possibilities of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone," availalbe at http://www.opanal.org/Articles/ Aniv-30/shaker.htm (accessed April 6, 2006).
(16.) The full text of the 1991 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 is available at http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm (accessed December 26, 2005).
(17.) Gitty N. Amini, "Issue Brief: Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February, 2003, available at http://www.nti.org/ e_researctge3_24a.html (accessed January 24, 2006).
(18.) The full text of the Resolution on the Middle East is available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control /npt/text/resoluti.htm (accessed April 7, 2006).
(19.) See Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," Survival 36, no. 1 (1994): 126-41.
(20.) Emily Landau and Tamar Malz, "Israel's Arms Control Agenda," Strategic Assessment 2, no. 4 (2000), available at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/ index.html (accessed March 15, 2000).
(21.) Avner Cohen, "The Nuclear Issue in the Middle East in a New World Order," Contemporary Security Issue 16, no. 1 (1995): 66.
(22.) Gerald M. Steinberg, "The International Atomic Energy Agency and Israel: A Realistic Agenda," Jerusalem Issue Brief 3, no. 27 (2004), available at http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-27.htm (accessed August 10, 2004).
(23.) Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham, Jr., "An NPT for Non-Members," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, no. 3 (2004): 40-44.
(24.) Yossi Melman, "ElBaradei Calls on Israel to Give up Nukes," Haaretz, December 12, 2003.
(25.) Sami G. Hajjar, "Regional Perspectives on the Causes of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Comparative Strategy 19, no. 1 (2000): 40.
(26.) See Walter Pincus, "Push for Nuclear Free Middle East Resurfaces," Washington Post, March 6, 2005.
(27.) Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 407-18.
(28.) Rebecca Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed," Disarmament Diplomacy 80 (Fall 2005): 18.
(29.) Claudia Baumgart and Harald Muller, "A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East: A Pie in the Sky?" Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004-5): 57.
Gawdat Bahgat is a professor of political science and the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on energy security, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.
TABLE 1. Status of Signature and Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification Algeria July 1, 1968 February 4, 1970 Bahrain July 1, 1968 June 27, 1969 Egypt July 1, 1968 February 26, 1981 Iran July 1, 1968 February 2, 1970 Iraq July 1, 1968 October 29, 1969 Israel Jordan July 10, 1968 February 11, 1970 Kuwait August 15, 1968 November 17, 1989 Lebanon July 1, 1968 July 15, 1970 Libya July 18, 1968 May 26, 1975 Mauritania April 17, 1969 February 6, 1970 Morocco July 1, 1968 November 27, 1970 Oman July 1, 1968 February 5, 1969 Qatar July 1, 1968 June 12, 1969 Saudi Arabia July 1, 1968 August 10, 1970 Sudan December 24, 1968 October 31, 1973 Syria July 1, 1968 September 24, 1969 Tunisia July 1, 1968 February 26, 1970 United Arab Emirates January 28, 1969 April 17, 1980 Yemen November 14, 1968 June 1, 1979 TABLE 2. Status of Signature and Ratification of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification Algeria July 22, 2001 July 22, 2001 Bahrain October 28, 1988 October 28, 1988 Egypt April 10, 1972 Iran April 10, 1972 August 22, 1973 Iraq May 11, 1972 June 19, 1991 Israel Jordan April 10, 1972 May 30, 1975 Kuwait April 14, 1972 July 18, 1972 Lebanon April 10, 1972 March 26, 1975 Libya January 19, 1982 January 19, 1982 Mauritania Morocco May 2, 1972 March 21, 2002 Oman March 31, 1992 March 31, 1992 Qatar November 14, 1972 April 17, 1975 Saudi Arabia April 12, 1972 May 24, 1972 Sudan October 17, 2003 October 17, 2003 Syria April 14, 1972 Tunisia April 10, 1972 May 18, 1973 United Arab Emirates September 28, 1972 Yemen April 26, 1972 June 1, 2002 TABLE 3. Status of Signature and Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification Algeria January 13, 1993 August 14, 1995 Bahrain February 24, 1993 April 29, 1997 Egypt Iran January 13, 1993 November 13, 1997 Iraq Israel January 13, 1993 Jordan October 29, 1997 November 28, 1997 Kuwait January 27, 1993 May 29, 1997 Lebanon Libya January 6, 2004 February 5, 2004 Mauritania January 13, 1993 February 9, 1998 Morocco January 13, 1993 December 28, 1995 Oman February 2, 1993 February 8, 1995 Qatar February 1, 1993 September 3, 1997 Saudi Arabia January 20, 1993 August 9, 1996 Sudan May 24, 1999 June 23, 1999 Syria Tunisia January 13, 1993 April 15, 1997 United Arab Emirates February 2, 1993 November 28, 2000 Yemen February 8, 1993 October 2, 2000 TABLE 4. Status of Signature and Ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification Algeria October 15, 1996 July 11, 2003 Bahrain September 24, 1996 April 12, 2004 Egypt January 14, 1996 Iran September 24, 1996 Iraq Israel September 25, 1996 Jordan September 26, 1996 August 25, 1998 Kuwait September 24, 1996 May 6, 2003 Lebanon September 16, 2005 Libya November 13, 2001 January 6, 2004 Mauritania September 24, 1996 April 30, 2003 Morocco September 24, 1996 April 17, 2000 Oman September 23, 1999 June 13, 2003 Qatar September 24, 1996 June 26, 2000 Saudi Arabia Sudan June 10, 2004 June 10, 2004 Syria Tunisia October 16, 1996 September 23, 2004 United Arab Emirates September 25, 1996 September 18, 2000 Yemen September 30, 1996 March 10, 2006…