This contribution is based on a statement presented by General James L. Jones, NATO Supreme Allied Commander and Commander of US European Command, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 September, 2005.
In addition to discussing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's mission to support the African Union's Mission in Sudan, I also want to share U.S. European Command's broader strategy for Africa that is designed to protect U.S. interests in the region while developing the capacities of nations to more effectively address security and stability challenges.
Our history of bringing stability to areas plagued by ethnic and cultural conflict has prepared us to broaden our focus to the east and south. Instability in Africa is generally caused by variations on a consistent theme: weak political institutions and security structures lack the ability to address extremist influences and illegal activities. Our goal is to assist nations to build effective, responsive governments and to develop security structures supportive of emerging democratic governments. Our success depends on maintaining relevant, focused, and complementary security cooperation, tailored to the political, social, economic, and military realities in Africa.
As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex security environment requires a greater degree of coordination within our own government and among our allies. EUCOM's plan to promote cooperative security relationships, enhance the capacity of foreign partners, and expand cohesion amongst government agencies is consistent with these goals. We must leverage the full spectrum of diplomatic, economic, information, and military options to advance our national interests and improve our ability to bring peace to areas of current conflict, prevent future conflict and achieve post- conflict stability where necessary.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains our most important strategic partnership. The extended period of peace and prosperity in Europe is the result of our engagement within the Alliance. The United States is a direct beneficiary of this stability. The economic, social, and security ties between the United States and the countries of Europe are long-standing and firmly rooted in shared ideals. Just as our presence in Europe since the end of the Second World War helped create the conditions for security, prosperity and multinational cooperation to flourish, it is my firm belief that a transformed U.S. military posture in an expanded NATO alliance can broaden this sphere of stability beyond the borders of Western Europe. It is a strategic imperative that the United States remains engaged in Europe and maintains its influential role within the NATO framework. We will share in the benefits of a transformed alliance that has the political will and sustainable expeditionary military capability to act beyond the boundaries of its member states.
NATO's mission to Darfur is especially significant. It shows how the Alliance is shouldering the burden of 21st Century security challenges, even when they are radically different from Cold War challenges and located far beyond its traditional area of action. NATO's involvement in Darfur will help create relationships between key regional security organizations as NATO works with the African Union (AU) mission. Most importantly, this engagement will ameliorate one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. II. NATO MISSION TO DARFUR
The Darfur region became the scene of a bloody rebellion in 2003 when two local rebel groups - the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Army - attacked a number of government installations and forces, accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing non-Arabs in favor of Arabs. In response, the government mounted a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed1. The government in Khartoum set the downward spiral in motion by providing significant support to the Janjaweed. Following those attacks, the Janjaweed were accused of committing human rights violations, including mass killing, looting and rape of the non-Arab population of Darfur. By the summer of 2004, it was estimated that 50,000 to 80,000 people had been killed and at least a million driven from their homes, leading to a major humanitarian crisis. In response, on 28 May 04, the African Union established a military mission in Sudan (the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)) and deployed a small monitoring force over the summer. The aim of AMIS is to improve ecurity and political stability in order to permit the government of Sudan to provide for the needs of its people.
Since the deployment of the small monitoring force, the African Union has twice expanded the size and scope of AMIS and consequently had some success in improving security in Darfur. Nevertheless, different agencies now estimate that between 180,000 and 300,000 have died and more than 1.8 million people have been displaced from their homes. Some 200,000 refugees are estimated to have fled westward to neighboring Chad, while the vast majority of refugees remain trapped in Darfur camps and settlements. Many of these refugees live on the edge of survival, hostage to Janjaweed abuses.
The African Union and donors have expressed a desire to further improve the impact of security operations by enhancing capabilities and substantially increasing the size of the military and police components. On 26 April 2005, Mr Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, wrote to the NATO Secretary General, among others, requesting logistical support to assist with this expansion of the AU Military Mission.
Support to African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
Over the period 26-27 May 2005 the NATO Secretary General, myself, and supporting staff attended an international donors' conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. From that conference African nations pledged to provide military units to enable AMIS to expand its mission. Rwanda offered 3+ battalions2, Nigeria offered 3 battalions, South Africa offered 1+ battalion3 and Senegal offered 1 battalion.
Following discussions on 1 June 2005 with relevant authorities in the African Union, United Nations and the European Union, specific proposals for NATO support to AMIS were forwarded to HQ NATO - the proposals took into account assistance provided by other organizations. On 22 June 2005 the North Atlantic Council approved NATO's support for the African Union's Mission in Sudan. NATO's support is being offered gratis to the African Union; NATO will not be reimbursed.
Though logistics support (predominantly airlift) is needed by the African Union, the principal challenges to delivering AMIS improvements stem from AMIS' current inability to both command and control an enhanced mission and co-ordinate the deployment of the additional forces. The African Union Headquarters running AMIS are generally effective and competent but they are small in number and stretched.4 Conscious of this, NATO's proposals balance the sensitivities of the African Union and the desire for "African solutions to African problems". They also emphasized NATO's supporting role to the African Union and co- operation with other international players, notably the European Union.
As the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I have appointed a Senior Military Liaison Officer to act on my behalf with the African Union and other organizations. This Liaison Officer is the single NATO military point of contact for the African Union and representatives from African troop contributing nations, donor nations pledging support to the African Union, the United Nations and embassies.
Concept of Support
The unifying purpose of NATO's support to AMIS has been to enable the African Union to expand its mission in Darfur as smoothly and successfully as possible, in line with their plan and the defined limits of our support. Against this background, two key factors have underpinned all of NATO's efforts: NATO acts in support of the African Union and in coordination with the European Union, troop contributing nations and all other donors; and NATO personnel work closely with the appropriate African Union officials in order to facilitate logistical support to the African Union Mission in Sudan. NATO's support has fallen into three areas, each limited in scope and time: Coordinating the provision of airlift donations with African Union troop deployment plans. The deployment of African battalions and reserves/support elements was originally approved by the North Atlantic Council to take place between 1 July and 30 September 2005. Following severe weather in Darfur in early August, the African Union's local transport contractors have been unable to secure the spares and fuel required to move African Battalions out from the airheads to their assigned sectors in Darfur as quickly as NATO can bring troops in. On 30 August, the African Union formally approached NATO requesting an extension of the mission. With the support of airlift donors this has now been approved and the airlift will conclude on 22 Oct 05.
Supporting the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping in the planning and conduct of a map exercise, whose primary training audience has been the staff at the AMIS Force HQ at El Fasher. Temporarily establishing a small facility to offer capacity building for staff officers drawn from, or destined for, the AMIS HQs in Sudan or Addis Ababa. A further offer was made by NATO to act as a clearing-house to assist the African Union in de-conflicting offers of equipment, but this was declined as unnecessary.
Individual nations have offered airlift support through NATO and the European Union, and the alignment of these offers to African Union requirements has been crucial to the success of African Union troop deployments. Alignment has and continues to be achieved through close co-ordination between the Joint Administration Control and Management Center in Addis Ababa, the NATO Allied Movement Co- ordination Center at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the multilateral European Airlift Center in Eindhoven (which is working on behalf of the European Union). Airlift support offered by NATO nations includes: strategic airlift (that required to get troops from donating African nations near to the AMIS theater of operations), tactical airlift (that required to transport donated troops inside the AMIS theater of operations) and funding to finance commercial airlift. Some strategic aircraft will be constrained on the airfields they can use and will land at air transfer points outside Sudan. Tactical aircraft will then lift people and assets forward into Sudan.
NATO supported the United Nations-led map exercise that concluded on 27 Aug 05 by providing military personnel and expertise to the team that wrote the exercise. This writing team consisted of military and non-military organizations (African Union, United Nations, European Union, and humanitarian relief agencies). The exercise focused on creating opportunities for the African Union staff to practice and perfect their procedures in the areas of: command and control, integration of effort between military and civilian components, and co- ordination with humanitarian relief agencies. The African Union benefitted from this exercise, showing great interest and commitment. All participants are now taking part in the lessons learned process.
Staff capacity building has been delivered through a series of seminars and workshops. The content of these seminars and workshops focused on providing training to address real- Darfur issues, drawing where possible from lessons learned during the map exercise. NATO's staff capacity building activities will be complementary to both a Canadian offer to help the African Union develop an information management capability and a United Nations/European Union initiative to enhance staff building capacity in the field of logistics. The NATO support team is based in the African Union's training Center of Excellence in Nairobi.
NATO has approached this mission in a spirit of openness and transparency, seeking to complement and co-operate with the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations. In our dealings with these bodies, this approach has been reciprocated.
Coordination with the European Union
The European Union views its support to the African Union mission in Sudan as a packaged assistance mission, coordinated with other International Organizations, and tailored to support the operational needs identified by the African Union with the African Union retaining leadership responsibility. The European Union Military Committee considers the key challenge ahead to be the matching of African Union requirements including movement and equipment, with offers from international organizations and donors.
The legal status of NATO and European Union military personnel supporting AMIS took time to finalize but did not impede the mission. An existing AU/Sudan Status of Mission Agreement was discussed (along NATO Status of Forces Agreement lines) at an AU Conference in Tripoli on 5 Jul 05 but not formally amended for several weeks. Further delays in securing Exchanges of Letters with the AU and individual African donor nations meant early deployments were conducted on a bi-lateral basis with nations. Status of Forces was finally secured late August. Force protection for NATO and European Union personnel is provided by the African Union.
Medical support for the deployed NATO personnel is being delivered through a civilian contractor currently providing to the African Union. This arrangement was agreed upon following a European Union medical reconnaissance of the contractor's facilities and capabilities in the region. The region's medical capabilities include both Role 1 and Role 2 facilities and rotary wing aeromedical evacuation assets. Role 3 medical support is provided through a private clinic in Khartoum. Strategic aeromedical evacuation may be conducted directly from the Role 2 facility at El Fasher airfield or from Khartoum. Should it be necessary, arrangements are in place for casualties to be transferred for treatment within the French military medical facilities in Djibouti or N'Djamena, Chad.
While this effort does not involve the EU drawing on NATO assets under the Berlin Plus5 arrangements, co-ordination with the European Union has been particularly close. Regular meetings have been held in Europe and a close link has been forged between the Allied Movements Co-ordination Center at SHAPE and the European Airlift Center in Eindoven. NATO and European Union Staff work together in the Joint Administration Control and Management Center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and have overall responsibility for strategic movement planning, control and coordination. In addition, European Union military personnel join NATO, UN, AU and Aid Agency personnel on the United Nations-led map exercise. Contributions of Member Nations
Confirmed airlift contributions under the NATO banner:
Canada. Canada has offered an aircraft in July or September 2005. As this offer consisted of strategic airlift that could not operate directly into the Darfur region, thus necessitating the provision of tactical airlift by another donor nation, the Canadian offer was declined.
Denmark. Denmark offered an aircraft from 20-29 September 2005 to provide tactical movement capability; this offer is expected to remain in place during the three-week pause requested by the AU.
Italy. Italy has offered an aircraft in September for a limited number of sorties.
The Netherlands. The Netherlands originally offered an aircraft from 20-29 September 2005. Ministry of Defense officials have confirmed that aircraft and aircrew remain available for the revised deployment dates resulting from the three-week deployment pause. Turkey. Turkey has offered an aircraft from 20-29 September. This offer is expected to remain valid for the three week pause requested by the AU.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has offered financial support to Nigeria for either costs associated with a Nigerian aircraft move or civilian charter (up to 1 million. or 1.4 million.).
United States. The United States has offered the capability to move 1800 Rwandan troops, including their ammunition and cargo. To date, approximately 1200 personnel have been moved to the Darfur region, the remaining 600 are scheduled to be airlifted in late- September 2005. The Ukraine (a non-NATO member but a member of the Partnership for Peace program). The Ukraine has offered a variety of commercial charter aircraft under reimbursement arrangements for operational costs.
Confirmed airlift contributions under a European Union banner:
France. France has offered the capability to move a complete Senegalese battalion, including rotation of forces, with military strategic and tactical assets.
Germany. Germany has offered 6 aircraft, to include rotation of African Union forces. Due to a variety of other airlift offers for the movement of the 8 battalions, the German offer has been applied to the movement of approximately 380 Civilian Police personnel in the fall of 2005 (dates to be confirmed).
Greece. Greece has offered 2 military aircraft in August 2005. They have been used for transportation of the Senegal battalion from Dakar to Sudan, but under EU umbrella.
Luxembourg. Luxembourg has offered 75,000 for contracted airlift or purchase of tickets on scheduled commercial flights.
A member of the SHAPE planning staff first deployed to the African Union's Mission in Sudan HQ, Addis Ababa on 23 May 2005. On 19 June 2005, SACEUR's senior military liaison officer deployed to the AMIS HQ in Addis Abab, Ethiopia.
Personnel to support the map exercise began to deploy on 9 July 2005 and the task was completed by 27 August 2005. Personnel conducting the staff capacity building deployed on 27 July 2005 and will complete their tasks by the end of September 2005.
The airlift started on 01 July 2005. All NATO staff will withdraw from Africa on 30 September 2005 less two movements staff who will remain to support the activities of the SHAPE Allied Movements Co- ordination Center's effort. This is expected to continue until 22 October 2005.
US Financial Assistance to Sudan and the Darfur Crisis
The U.S. continues to be viewed as an influential leader in NATO and in the world and has already provided much to alleviate the complex problems involved in the Darfur Crisis, both unilaterally and multilaterally. To date, the U.S. has given $637 million dollars in humanitarian aid to the region and provided approximately $150 million in support of the African Union's (AU) military mission in Sudan.
III. THE GROWING STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA
African security issues will continue to directly affect our homeland security. The growing use of the Trans-Sahara region in Africa by terrorists threatens the security of the United States and our European allies. The spawning grounds for future terrorists share several common characteristics: vast ungoverned spaces offering sanctuary; governments unable or unwilling to provide for even the most basic of human needs; and social unrest where populist clarion calls to extremism find fertile soil. The transnational nature of these dangers undermines our ability to foster a broader and lasting stability in the region. Violence from numerous crises has created areas of lawlessness that transcend state borders and cause instability. High population growth rates, poor land management, desertification and agricultural disruptions caused by economic shifts, internal conflicts, and refugee influxes are making it increasingly difficult for several countries to feed themselves. This is especially true in Chad, where drought and refugees from the conflict in Darfur have created a humanitarian catastrophe.
Fragile democracies are having to combat serious challenges to include security concerns, social pressures, teachings of radical fundamentalism, disease, and criminality that imperil the future hopes for the people of Africa. The broad expanses of ungoverned or poorly governed regions, as well as the proximity and ease of movement to population centers in Europe, are increasingly attractive to transnational terrorists interested in exploiting the region for recruiting, logistics, and safe havens. The breeding grounds of terrorism and illicit activity on the continent of Africa require our attention at both the national and regional security level. It is against this backdrop of current and impending crises that we focus our attention, efforts, and investment.
IV. SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Failed or failing states, instability, and ethnic conflict lead to humanitarian catastrophes such as the situation in Darfur. In a progressively interdependent world, it is imperative that the U.S. address the circumstances which lead to these crises with the full range of political, economic, information, and military tools, synchronized with our international partners. The complexity of today's security environment requires new methodologies to promote conflict prevention and conduct post-conflict operations. A military approach alone will not deliver the desired outcome in countries and regions where there is little or no experience in responsible governance. Integrated interagency and international action is necessary to achieve long-term strategic goals.
Institutions that are adequately equipped or organized to confront a fluid and diverse geo-strategic landscape will be successful in protecting U.S. interests. The application of national power must include the widest array of resources and capabilities. The determination of requirements, the development of policies, and the implementation of strategies require the synchronization of all U.S. Government organizations that have a stake in the outcome.
The very nature of today's international climate dictates that policies, national policy objectives, and the execution of operations are fundamentally interagency in scope and purpose. With this understanding, and given the level of authority and responsibility of the Geographic Combatant Commanders to carry out our national security activities, it is imperative that these strategically focused staffs be organized in a manner that reflects the interagency process. The instruments of national power are most effective when applied in concert with one another. They must not only be synchronized in their application, they must also be complementary and structured in a manner that ensures unity of effort between the various agencies.
EUCOM has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve our approach to developing, sourcing, and implementing a fully integrated security cooperation strategy. DoD's Security Cooperation is an important instrument for executing U.S. Defense Strategy by building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), an element of DoD Security Cooperation, involves those activities undertaken by Combatant Commands to implement this guidance. There are number of security cooperation activities EUCOM is capable of directly targeting toward TSC priorities and objectives. There are also a number of activities that occur in our area of responsibility that the Geographic Combatant Commander has some degree of visibility, but has no direct influence over and other activities in which we have neither visibility nor influence.
Our aim is to eliminate competition for limited resources that produce overlapping programs that create unnecessary redundancies. We must also ensure our efforts generate a cohesive, interactive link with other U.S. Government agencies that will enable seamless execution. To achieve this, there must be transparency between the agencies to encourage cooperation and the sharing of ideas and information. Congressional support will be essential as the Department of Defense, together with other Executive departments and agencies seek to create greater harmonies and transform our policy making and resource allocation processes to become more agile and responsive.
The construct we currently employ to achieve our nation's security objectives is essentially a cold-war era model designed principally to face a defined and predictable threat. To achieve our goals we must be willing to embrace institutional change and a shift from our previously understood paradigms. We need to create a methodology that recognizes the interdependency of our national powers in order to become more strategically effective.
Integration of EUCOM and other U.S. agency activities throughout our area of responsibility will be necessary to achieve our stated strategic goals.
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) have been created at Geographic Combatant Commands to establish connections between civilian and military departments that will improve planning and coordination within the government. This advisory element facilitates information sharing and collaboration by providing day- to-day working relationships between military and civilian planners.
At EUCOM, we have already begun to modify our Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to better integrate all the elements of national power. We envision expanding the EUCOM JIACG to include representation from all the departments and agencies necessary to coordinate the myriad activities that take place in the theater. We must attain unity of effort in order to minimize redundancy and maximize the use of resources.
Current crisis-driven activity focusing on limited, short-term solutions is no longer adequate for dealing with the major challenges in Africa. The United States, in association with partner nations, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations, must assist African leaders to strengthen their states, revitalize their civilian institutions, and rebuild traumatized societies and economies to restore stability and security. While Africans themselves must ultimately achieve these objectives the United States needs a comprehensive, multinational, interagency approach to help make them successful.
NATO Engagement in Africa
Mediterranean Security is becoming increasingly important as an integral part of the overall European Security environment. NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have clearly recognized the reality that efforts to enhance the security of the Mediterranean region, including the countries of North Africa and the Near East, are critical missions.
Launched by NATO in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) has successfully contributed to achieving better cooperation and understanding between NATO and the seven MD partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania6, Morocco and Tunisia. In 2004, NATO leaders and the MD countries agreed to elevate the MD to a genuine partnership. The enhanced MD will contribute to regional security and stability by enhancing the existing political dialogue; achieving interoperability; assisting in defense reform; and contributing to the fight against terrorism. It will also prepare partners' forces to contribute to non-Article 5 NATO-led operations.
MD countries have already started the first steps towards an enhanced relationship: Morocco participates in NATO operations in Kosovo and both Israel and Algeria have demonstrated their interest in contributing to Operation Active Endeavor (which might also include information and intelligence sharing). Jordan's medical facility in Afghanistan, although integrated in a non-NATO operation (Op Enduring Freedom), is providing a very useful contribution to NATO operations in that country.
Operation Active Endeavor
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE) is NATO's only Article 5 operation. It began on 26 October 2001 as surveillance and monitoring operation in response to a US request for counter- terrorism support in the eastern Mediterranean. OAE has since been expanded to embrace new strategic objectives to include compliant boardings, Straits of Gibraltar (STROG) escort operations (currently suspended), and an expanded Area of Operations to include the entire Mediterranean Sea. To date, more than 66,000 ships have been hailed, 90+ suspect vessels have been compliantly boarded, and 488 ships have been safely escorted through the STROG. NATO and the AU share a clear and common interest in limiting illicit activity within the Mediterranean Sea.
Following the Istanbul summit in June 2004, NATO leaders recognized the need to enhance the partnership with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) Nations, to include Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia from the African continent. High-level staff talks are planned for July 05 in which senior members from all MD Nations are invited to SHAPE to discuss a variety of cooperation initiatives. Recognizing the effectiveness and further potential of OAE, several Partner Nations have already expressed an interest in participating with NATO in the form of information exchange or contribution of military assets. Of the MD Nations, both Algeria and Israel have each initiated formal discussions with NATO towards an ultimate goal of participating in OAE. Overall regional security and cooperation are greatly enhanced with the involvement of NATO's MD Partners.
NATO Response Force Exercise (LIVEX 06)VEX 06)
A live exercise (LIVEX) to test the NATO Response Force's full operational capability will take place in Cape Verde in 2006. The exercise will demonstrate the NATO Response Force's expeditionary capability and stretch national and NATO deployment procedures and our ability to sustain a large deployed force. Approximately 6,500 troops will deploy for 14 days to conduct selected missions and remain self-sustained due to the lack of local capability, limited local resources, and Cape Verde's minimal supporting infrastructure. Command and control of the deployed force will be executed from the Joint Force Command HQ at Brunssum, Holland. Air, Land and Maritime forces will be provided by the Air Component Command HQ at Ramstein, Germany, the Spanish Maritime Force HQ and the Eurocorps HQ, France.
An initial reconnaissance (21 - 27 May 05) to nine of Cape Verde's islands is complete. The team was warmly welcomed. Senior government officials were eager to assist the exercise, offering open access to ports, hospitals, airports, military establishments, etc. Cape Verde Government (GoCV) suggested expansion of the exercise scope to include counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-human trafficking, anti-smuggling, and illegal immigration themes, indicating the local population would be happy to act as role players! GoCV will provide one company of troops as participants and requested NATO extend invitations to their African neighbors (especially Senegal and Angola) to observe the exercise. Indications are the GoCV are willing to expand the scenario to meet as many NRF training objectives as possible.
U.S. European Command Strategy
In light of the dynamic international security environment and newly emerging threats, both the European Command and NATO have embarked upon a process of comprehensive transformation to better prepare both organizations to face today's transnational threats. As you know, in 2001 the Secretary of Defense initiated a strategy- based review of the U.S. global defense posture, and subsequently directed all combatant commands to evaluate their structure, organization and processes in order to gain transformational efficiencies and develop new capabilities to meet emerging requirements. The efforts we are undertaking to meet the objectives laid out by the Secretary represent the most extensive adjustments to the European theater in its history. The changes contain broad and far-reaching implications for our nation, our allies, and our military. As we embark upon this important mission we must be mindful of the leadership role we bear, and ensure that the measures we undertake will increase our strategic effectiveness. In a world full of uncertainty and unpredictable threats, the United States continues to be viewed as the leader in providing stability and security. As we map a course for the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that enabled us to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to recognize the new security challenges we face.
Theater Security Cooperation
EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs are the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and stability by building and strengthening relationships with our allies and regional partners and are an indispensable component of our overarching theater strategy. These programs are regionally focused to assist our allies in developing the capabilities required to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations. Well- trained, disciplined forces help mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for warfighting success, and ultimately reduce the burden on U.S. forces. Most importantly, Theater Security Cooperation efforts support the long-term strategic objectives of the Global War on Terrorism by building understanding and consensus on the terrorist threat; laying foundations for future "coalitions of the willing;" and extending our country's security perimeter. Within EUCOM, we have a variety of resources, programs, and policies available to aid us in developing and implementing our TSC strategy. The value of these strategic resources cannot be overstated.
Strategic Theater Transformation
EUCOM's Strategic Theater Transformation (STT) Plan, which is a component of the Department of Defense's Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, will permit EUCOM to transform itself into a command better able to meet the diverse challenges of this new century. The objective of our plan is to increase EUCOM's strategic effectiveness through a fundamental realignment of basing concepts, access and force capabilities.
Essential to achieving this strategic effect are the development of basing and force manning models that support the principles of an expeditionary philosophy. To achieve the first, we envision a series of smaller forward operating sites (FOS) and cooperative security locations (CSL) strategically located throughout the AOR. Such bases will be anchored by several existing Main Operating Bases (MOB), which are of enduring strategic value and remain essential to theater force projection, throughput, and sustainment.
The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) relies increasingly on EUCOM's en route infrastructure system to project U.S. forces to crises areas in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Modest investments in these bases will ensure we maintain critical southern air mobility routes for TRANSCOM and an "air-bridge" to expand operational reach. As we look even further south, we envision expanding the EUCOM en route system so we can engage future threats in sub-Saharan Africa. This new system will consist of a series of cooperative security locations, located across Africa, enabling the rapid deployment of forces. As EUCOM shapes the theater with forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, we must maintain leadership within NATO and across the AOR that is credible and capable. EUCOM must remain engaged regionally in order to build upon international relationships and strengthen the many institutions that can help manage crises when they occur or, ideally, before they occur. As such, the value of forward basing, forward presence, and focused commitment remains an essential cornerstone of our strategy for the future.
Regional Initiatives and Programs
EUCOM's TSC strategy is derived from regional priority and policy themes stated in the Secretary of Defense's Security Cooperation Guidance. EUCOM has taken a regional approach that links individual country objectives to broader theater goals.
The goal for Africa is stability, security, and prosperity. Working with the State Department, we are assisting the African Union and African regional organizations to develop their security structures. Stability programs targeting improvements in health, education, good governance, civil infrastructure are focused on countries with the greatest need. Security programs -military training and education, peace operations capabilities, resources and infrastructure -are focused on countries that possess the capability and show the desire to lead Africa into the future.
Development of effective security structures in Africa will lay the foundation for future success; however, they are dependent upon on commitment of manpower, financial, and institutional resources necessary to establish and sustain real progress. African security issues will continue to directly affect our homeland security. Modest near-term investments will enable us to avert crises that may require costly U.S. intervention in the future.
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is the long- term interagency plan to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan Africa. The goal of TSCTI is to counter terrorist influences in the region and assist governments to better control their territory and to prevent huge tracts of largely deserted African territory from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. TSCTI builds upon the successful Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) which, beginning in 2002, helped train and equip at least one rapid-reaction company, about 150 soldiers, in each of the four Sahel states: Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. TSCTI is more ambitious in both geographic and programmatic terms.
The overall approach is straightforward: build indigenous capacity and facilitate cooperation among governments in the region that are willing partners (Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, with Libya possibly to follow later) in the struggle with Islamic extremism in the Sahel region. TSCTI helps to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the region's security forces, promote democratic governance, foster development and education and ultimately benefit our bilateral relationships with each of these states. Key security-related aspects of the TSCTI include training in basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, patrolling and medical care. The military component of TSCTI, like the Pan Sahel Initiative, seeks to directly engage with participating nations and assist in protecting their borders and exploiting opportunities to detect and deter terrorists by providing basic training and equipment and train additional forces. TSCTI also engages more countries than PSI with a greater emphasis on helping to foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states. We have briefed the Ambassadors and select Country Team members from all nine TSCTI countries and have received their support. We will continue to fully coordinate with the interagency and with U.S. Country Teams to ensure that the overall TSCTI is balanced, complements the total U.S. effort in the GWOT and is tailored to the unique conditions within each country in this region.
Programs such as TSCTI support U.S. national security interests in the Global War on Terrorism by enhancing African regional security and promote an Africa that is self-sufficient and stable. These programs also better prepare participating nations to stop the flow of illicit arms, goods, and people through the region helping focus nations to better protect their own vast borders and regions.
America's war on terrorism cannot be fought alone. Historically, proactive security costs with programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative are significantly less expensive than reactive missions to the world's hotspots. Political instability in Africa that is left to fester could lead to repeated interventions at enormous costs. TSCTI is a proactive program that is a relatively small investment, but that will be a powerful inoculation against future terrorist activity, leading to an increasingly stable Africa. The Administration is working to integrate TSCTI into future budget and planning cycles. Long-term, continuous engagement will build bonds where few existed and strengthen those already established. The U.S. needs to continue security cooperation measures with nations that support regional initiatives leading to peace and stability.
Global Peace Operations Initiative
The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), fully funded in its first year as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (PL 108-447), is designed to meet the world's growing need for well- trained peace operations forces by enabling the United States to work with lead nations and selected international organizations to support, equip and train other countries' forces. In Africa, the U.S. will implement GPOI by expanding the existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program and expand exercise activity aimed at enhancing African capacity to conduct peace support operations.
We are grateful for the committee's support of this vital program, especially the $114 million authorization recommended for fiscal year 2006 in section 2515 of the reported version of the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act. This authorization is the same as the President's budget request for fiscal year 2006 which will fund the second year of this important program.
Cooperation with African Regional Organizations
EUCOM has aggressively worked with regional organizations, such as the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to develop a regional ability to respond to crises.
The African Union, formed in 2002, comprises more than 50 nations. EUCOM is helping the African Union develop a robust military planning and operational capability to deal with crises more effectively. We are also helping to establish the required command and control capabilities so that the AU can communicate with the five regional headquarters and these headquarters can communicate with the national militaries in their respective regions. Our investment in AU capabilities is reaping tremendous benefits by giving Africans the capability to deal with challenges like Darfur.
ECOWAS is a regional organization of 15 West African nations formed in 1975. Its military intervention in Liberia in 2003 proved to be a successful undertaking, but not without substantial multinational support. Working collectively with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and several other countries, EUCOM has sought to help build ECOWAS' capacity for conducting peacekeeping operations to a level that requires limited U.S. and European logistic support, and no U.S. troop support. With coordinated support and encouragement from the United States, allied donor nations including non-governmental organizations and international corporations, ECOWAS has measurably improved its capacity to respond to regionally supported operations.
We have worked closely with Uganda in the prosecution of a local terrorist organization, resulting in a country more prepared to counter insurgencies that threaten internal and regional stability. Other nations in the region have not only expressed interest in similar activities, but also provide capabilities that are found only within their region.
Many other countries in Africa have shown both the willingness and the capability to support peacekeeping operations. Nigeria provided strategic airlift for crucial peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sudan. Gabon assumed a lead role in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) mission in the Central African Republic. South Africa has supported several international military missions. Although the African Union continues to improve its peace support operations capacity, the UN remains very active on the continent. For example, there are currently more than 43,000 UN military peacekeepers involved in operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.
The U.S. needs to continue engagement with nations that are supportive of regional initiatives leading to peace and stability. Regional leaders like Senegal, Ghana and Uganda have not only been willing to support the Global War on Terrorism, but also have been proactive in facilitating dialogue between nations within their area of influence that were once in conflict. Their approach to curbing HIV/AIDS and providing economic stimulus are models that are proven to work in the African context for African nations.
State Partnership Program
One of the most successful and influential programs employed by EUCOM is the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Under this program, professional military contacts build valuable, often life-long relationships at all levels that serve to enhance cooperation and advance U.S. strategic interests. The SPP links U.S. states and territories with partner countries for the purpose of supporting EUCOM's security cooperation objectives and assists partner nations in making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governments. The unique civil-military nature of the Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities that provide great flexibility in meeting our Theater Security Cooperation objectives.
This past year was extremely successful as National Guard Soldiers and Airmen conducted over 115 events with partner nations. Indeed, SPP has been so successful that EUCOM is planning to seek funding to expand the program in Africa. In the last two years, four partnerships have been added: South Africa New York; Morocco Utah; Ghana North Dakota; Tunisia Wyoming. Currently there are 25 states partnered with 23 foreign nations in the EUCOM AOR. SPP is a key Theater Security Cooperation tool that supports U.S. Government objectives by promoting access, bolstering capabilities, and enhancing interoperability.
The regional TSC approach is being refined, in part, through clearinghouse initiatives. Clearinghouses, created for Africa, the Southern Caucasus region, and Southeast Europe, allow the United States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in security cooperation in the same region.
Each serves as a multi-national forum for interested countries to share information about their security assistance programs for specific regions. The objective is to optimize the use of limited resources by merging the various security cooperation programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort. Clearinghouses provide a medium for deconflicting programs, avoiding duplication and finding ways to collaborate and cooperate.
The Africa Clearinghouse has brought thirteen African countries together with NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. The inaugural conference, held in May 2004, focused on West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The regional approach continued in December 2004 with a conference concentrated on east Africa.
Security Assistance Programs
Security Cooperation Activities are managed programs which are planned and executed for the purpose of shaping the future security environment in ways that will be favorable to the United States' interests.
Key among EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation tools are Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and International Military Education and Training. These programs provide access and influence, help build professional, capable militaries in allied and friendly nations, and promote interoperability with U.S. forces.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical resources to assist nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment and training. It is an essential instrument of influence; builds allied and coalition military capabilities; and improves interoperability between forces. The FY'06 FMF request for African countries in the EUCOM AOR, included in the International Affairs (Function 150) account, totals $38.5 million.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) demonstrate our nation's continued commitment to the security of our allies and friends by allowing them to acquire superior U.S. military equipment and training. FMS and DCS sales are vital to improving interoperability with U.S. forces, closing NATO capability gaps, and modernizing the military forces of our new allies and partners.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) including Expanded IMET (E- IMET) provides education and training opportunities for foreign military (IMET) and civilian personnel (E- IMET). These programs enhance coalition operations by improving military-to- military cooperation and interoperability; reinforcing civilian control of the military; advancing the principles of responsible governance; and supporting the stability of newly formed democracies. As a result of the relationships that develop from IMET, our return on investment in long-term access and influence is significantly enhanced. Today's IMET participants are tomorrow's senior foreign military and civilian leaders. In Africa, IMET and E- IMET have been the most successful programs in promoting professional militaries that respect democracy and human rights.
The political goodwill accrued from these programs far outweighs the small investment. Consequently, our interests are disproportionately injured if this program is reduced or sanctioned. The EUCOM portion of the fiscal year 2006 IMET request for African countries is $12.935 million and, like FMF, is also included in the International Affairs (Function 150) account. We must continue to carry out and indeed intensify our IMET programs in order to help promote U.S. long-term objectives of democratic development and good governance. V. CONCLUSION
It is a privilege to represent this proud nation as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command. The tasks we now face in Africa are enormous, but are not insurmountable. The indispensable influence attained by our forward presence, coupled with our Theater Security Cooperation programs provides the best chance for winning the Global War on Terrorism and meeting our national security goals. As we work together to improve our capabilities and to advance U.S. policy objectives, we must also recognize that today's complex security environment requires a greater degree of coordination within our own government and among our allies.
As we support the African Union's efforts in the Darfur, NATO is determined to work in full transparency with the European Union, the United Nations, NGOs and individual nations. Although limited in scope and duration, the NATO response to the crisis in Darfur is consistent with the transformation of the Alliance in response to the new security environment. The willingness of the Alliance to engage in out-of-area operations, to now include Africa, underscores NATO's level of commitment to change and the recognition that new approaches are required.
At EUCOM we also continue to seek new and innovative ways to meet the challenges we face in Africa and throughout our entire area of operations. We will continue to reach out to multiple stakeholders in governmental, as well as non-governmental activities to maximize our ability to achieve our national objectives. Preparing for the urgent challenges before us will require institutional innovations and the creation of new capabilities, which will yield a more comprehensive security apparatus and enable greater coordination and cooperation throughout the United States government and the international community.
We look forward to working with the members of this committee as we continue to assist in the development of effective security structures in Africa that will lay the foundation for future success.
1 The Sudanese government had very few regular soldiers in the Darfur region and, since a large proportion of the Sudanese soldiers were of Darfur origin, distrusted many of its own units; the government therefore used the Janjaweed as a proxy militia force. 2 The plus represents a Kenyan Military Police company and a Force HQ company from Gambia.
3 The plus represents an Engineering Company and Explosive Ordnance Disposal team.
4 The African Union Headquarters (in Addis Ababa) are running several concurrent AU missions spread across Africa.
5 Berlin Plus derives from NATO's 1999 Washington Summit, and is based on the intention to facilitate the conduct of European Union operations using NATO asset and capabilities "for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance".
6 Due to the August 2005 Coup, all bilateral assistance programs (except for non- humanitarian assistance have been suspended with Mauritania.
VI. LEXICON A Main Operating Base (MOB) is an enduring strategic asset established in friendly territory with permanently stationed combat forces, command and control structures, and family support facilities. MOBs serve as the anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and U.S. commitment to NATO. MOBS have: robust infrastructure; strategic access; established Command and Control; Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Location support capability; and enduring family support facilities. As previously stated, these are already in existence. A Forward Operating Site (FOS) is an expandable host-nation "warm site" with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. It can host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. These sites will be tailored to meet anticipated requirements and can be used for an extended time period. Backup support by a MOB may be required. A Cooperative Security Location (CSL) is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. presence. CSLs will require periodic service, contractor and/or host nation support. CSLs provide contingency access and are a focal point for security cooperation activities. They may contain propositioned equipment. CSLs are: rapidly scalable and located for tactical use, expandable to become a FOS, forward and expeditionary. They will have no family support system. A Preposition Site (PS), by definition, is a secure site containing pre-positioned war reserve materiel (Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support), tailored and strategically positioned to enable rotational and expeditionary forces. PS's are maintained at high readiness for immediate use, strategically located with guaranteed access. They are an important component to our transformation efforts. "En Route" Infrastructure (ERI), is a strategically located, enduring asset with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly expand, project and sustain military power during times of crises and contingencies. ERI bases serve as anchor points for throughput, training, engagement and U.S. commitment. They may also be a MOB or FOS.