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China: A Political History, 1917-1980
by Richard C. Thornton. 520 pgs.
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publication details
 Table of contents
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Contents |
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Preface |
xv |
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Part I The Origin and Development of Chinese Communism, 1917-1941 |
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| I |
To Build a Communist Movement in China, 1917-1927 |
3 |
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The Bolshevik Experience |
4 |
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The Soviet Union Aids the Kuomintang |
6 |
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Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists |
8 |
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The Communist Attempt to Seize Power |
10 |
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Stalin, Trotsky, and the Chinese Revolution |
16 |
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The Communists in Revolt |
19 |
| II |
The "Soviet" Experiment, 1927-1931 |
24 |
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Moscow's Policy in Practice |
28 |
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Moscow's Misgivings |
30 |
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The Chinese Eastern Railway Crisis |
32 |
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The Formulation of the Li Li-san Line |
34 |
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The Fateful Decision to Adopt the Li Li-san Line |
39 |
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The Tide Turns Against Li Li-san |
42 |
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The Comintern Reasserts Control |
44 |
| III |
Defeat in Kiangsi, 1931-1934 |
49 |
|
The Internationalists "Bolshevize" the Party |
50 |
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The Establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic |
54 |
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Tokyo,Moscow, and Juichin |
56 |
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The Fourth Encirclement Campaign-Stalemate |
58 |
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Mobilization for Armageddon |
65 |
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The Fukien Rebellion |
69 |
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Defeat and Flight from the Central Soviet Area |
74 |
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IV From the Long March to the United Front, 1934-1937 |
76 |
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Long March--The First Six Hundred Miles |
76 |
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The Tsunyi Conference |
78 |
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Long March--Phase Two: The Conflict with Chang Kuo-t'ao |
81 |
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Organizational Reconstitution of the Communist System |
87 |
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International United Front |
88 |
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The CCP and the United Front |
90 |
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Turning Point at Sian |
95 |
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Continuation of the Internal Struggle |
98 |
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V The Road to War, 1937-1941 |
100 |
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United Front Policy in China |
102 |
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Stalin, Wang Ming, and Mao Tse-tung |
105 |
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The Two-Front War Danger Mounts |
110 |
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From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Fall of France |
114 |
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Strategic Impact of the Fall of France |
121 |
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Part II The American Experience in China, 1941-1949 |
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| VI |
World War II, the United States and China, 1941-1944 |
127 |
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The Strategic Defensive |
127 |
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Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung, and World War II |
130 |
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Mao Gains Command of the CCP |
133 |
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World War II, the Turning Point |
137 |
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Cairo-Tehran-Cairo |
141 |
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The Final Counteroffensive and America's "China Policy" |
144 |
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Nationalists and Communists Negotiate |
146 |
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Shifts in American Policy Emphasis |
149 |
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China Crisis--Japanese and American |
151 |
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Renewed American Efforts Toward Unification |
156 |
| VII |
The United States, the Soviet Union, and China, 1945 |
160 |
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Yalta, Outline for the Postwar World |
160 |
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The Immediate Repercussions of Yalta |
163 |
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Chiang Initiates and Mao Responds to "Constitutional Government" |
165 |
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The "Victory" of Mao Tse-tung |
169 |
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Gnawing Doubts Weaken the Prospects for Soviet-American Cooperation |
171 |
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The Effort to Stabilize Manchuria |
178 |
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The Soviet Union, the United States, and China |
180 |
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The Appointment of General Marshall |
184 |
| VIII |
Strategies in Conflict, 1946-1949 |
188 |
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Marshall Arranges a Settlement, December 22-March 11 |
188 |
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Chiang Kai-shek Takes the Initiative |
193 |
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America's Failure in China |
196 |
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The Soviet Achievement in China |
205 |
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The Truman Doctrine and American China Policy |
207 |
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Victory of the Chinese Communists |
212 |
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The Chinese Revolution in Global Perspective |
216 |
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Part III The Sino-Soviet Relationship, 1949-1968 |
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| IX |
The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, 1949-1959 |
227 |
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Strategy of Conflict |
227 |
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The Establishment of the Chinese People's Republic |
231 |
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The Politics of Centralization |
233 |
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Stalin's Death and the Succession Struggle |
238 |
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Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU and Its Aftermath |
242 |
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Eighth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party |
244 |
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Great Leap Forward: The Choice for Independent Action |
249 |
| X |
The Polarization of Communist Politics, 1959-1965 |
252 |
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The Military Response to the Great Leap |
253 |
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Breach in Sino-Soviet Relations |
255 |
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Economic Crisis and Organizational Conflict |
256 |
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Mao Tse-tung and the PLA |
259 |
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Army Corps, Regional Forces, and Militia |
261 |
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Struggle for the Provincial Apparatus, Phase I |
264 |
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Struggle for the Provincial Apparatus, Phase II |
267 |
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The Fall of Khrushchev and Vietnam |
271 |
| XI |
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution-- I: The Mounting Crisis, 1965-1967 |
278 |
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The Decision to Initiate the "Cultural" Revolution |
278 |
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Mao Tse-tung Takes the Offensive |
282 |
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The Great "Proletarian" Cultural Revolution--Initial Strategy |
285 |
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The Red Guards, Mao's Student Left |
289 |
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The Attempt to "Seize Power" |
294 |
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Crisis in Peking over Greater PLA Involvement |
298 |
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Mao Alters the Theoretical Basis of the Cultural Revolution |
302 |
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The Mounting Crisis, February-March 1967 |
306 |
| XII |
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution-- II: Protracted Crisis, 1967-1968 |
310 |
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"Carry the Cultural Revolution Through to the Very End" |
310 |
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Failure of Mao's Policy and Increase in Violence |
314 |
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To Whom the Leading Role, Rebels or Soldiers? |
318 |
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The Attempt to Construct a Civil-Military "Balance" |
324 |
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Cultural Revolution on the Verge of Success |
328 |
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The Decision to Terminate the Cultural Revolution |
331 |
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"Unity and Strength Under Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin" |
335 |
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The Soviet Legacy |
338 |
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Part IV The Evolution of U.S.-China Relations, 1969-1980 |
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| XIII |
China in a Tri-Polar World, 1969-1973 |
341 |
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The Soviet Union Probes China's Defenses |
341 |
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The Continuing Struggle in Peking: The Challenge of Lin Piao |
345 |
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The Second Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party |
347 |
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The "Lin Piao Incident" |
350 |
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Peking, Washington, and Moscow |
355 |
| XIV |
The End of the Maoist Era, 1973-1976 |
361 |
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The Return to Power of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Moscow's Offer |
361 |
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From the Tenth Party Congress to the Fourth National People's Congress |
367 |
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Internal Change and Foreign Policy Stagnation |
372 |
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The Death of Chou En-lai and Designation of Mao's Heir |
378 |
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Dissolution of the Maoist Coalition |
383 |
| XV |
The Struggle for Succession, 1976-1978 |
386 |
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The Fall of the Gang of Four |
386 |
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The "Selection" of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng |
389 |
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Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-p'ing-- Triumvirate Inchoate |
391 |
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Teng Hsiao-p'ing's Return to Power and Peking's Uneasy Coalition |
396 |
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The Soviet Decision to Increase Military Pressure on China |
400 |
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Strategy, Counterstrategy, and Normalization |
403 |
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The Rise to Power of Teng Hsiao-p'ing |
407 |
| XVI |
Whither China? The Uncertain Future, 1978-1980 |
411 |
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The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party |
411 |
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The War with Vietnam: Lesson That Backfired or Signal to Moscow? |
417 |
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The Abortive Opening to Moscow |
422 |
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The Fifth Plenum and the Fate of Hua Kuo-feng |
427 |
|
Teng Hsiao-p'ing in Command of Chinese Politics |
431 |
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Implications for the Future |
435 |
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Notes |
441 |
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Suggested Readings |
498 |
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Index |
500 |
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