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• Epistemology
• Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

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Epistemology: Or the Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction to General Metaphysics Vol 1

by P. Coffey. 378 pgs.

Contributors:

   P. Coffey

Publisher:

   Longmans, Green

Place of Publication:

  New York  

Publication Year:

  1917

Subjects:

Knowledge, Theory Of

	CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
	PREFACE	vii
	INTRODUCTION.
1.	Epistemology: its Place in Philosophy	1
2.	Bearing of Epistemology on Spontaneous Convictions, on the Sciences, and on Religious Belief	5
3.	Conspectus of Problems raised by Reflective Thought	8
4.	Rise and Development of Theories of Knowledge: Historical Outlines	12
5.	Epistemology not an Introduction to Metaphysics but a Department of Metaphysics	22
	PART I. THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY. CHAPTER I. THE TERMS AND DATA OF THE INQUIRY.
6.	Cognition. Knowledge. Science. Belief. Faith	25
7.	Doubt. Opinion. Conviction. Certitude	31
	S. Cognitive and Non-cognitive States of Consciousness. Consciousness, Knowledge, and Objectivity	36
9.	Truth. Error. Ignorance	39
10.	Faculties and Sources of Knowledge. Classification of Spontaneous Convictions	43
11.	Irresistible Certitude and Freely Formed Convictions	49
12.	Influence of the Will on Free Convictions	51
13.	Reasonableness of Free Convictions: Certitude of Science and Certitude of Belief or Faith	53
14.	Bearing of Intellectual and Moral Discipline on Free Convictions and on "Free Thought"	56
15.	Universally Entertained Spontaneous Convictions: their Bearing on Human Life	59
16.	Spontaneous Conviction or Certitude not always True: Hence the Origin of Critical Investigation	66
	CHAPTER II. THE SCOPE AND INSTRUMENTS OF THE INQUIRY.
17.	The Real Problems to which Reflection on Knowledge gives rise	71
18.	Subject and Object of Knowledge. The Knowing Subject	74
19.	"Object" in the Sense of (I) Whatever is Real; (2) Whatever we are aware of	76
20.	"Mental Presence" or "Objectivity to Subject," and "Real Being" or "Real Objectivity	78
21.	Alternative Solutions of Questions raised by Mental Objectivity	79
22.	Epistemological Sense of "Object of Knowledge and Objectivity of Knowledge". Truth of Knowledge	84
23.	Alternative Statements of the General Problem of Epistemology	86
24.	General Data and Conditions of the Investigation	87
	CHAPTER III. THE METHOD OF THE INQUIRY.
25.	Initial Attitude of the Subject towards his Capacity for Discovering Truth with Certitude	90
26.	Difficulties against this Attitude	92
27.	The Question of Method in Critical Inquiry. Doubt as a Method	94
28.	Real Doubt and "Methodic" Doubt Compared. "Methodic" Doubt never Real. "Negative Methodic Doubt"	95
29.	Legitimate Use and Limits of Methodic Doubt	102
30.	Descartes' Employment of Real Doubt as a Method	109
31.	Criticism of Descartes' Doubt	112
32.	What sort of Doubt is Lawful regarding the Real Objectivity of Self- Evident judgments?	118
33.	Their Real Objectivity not a Matter for Logical Demonstration but for Intuition through Reflective Analysis	120
34.	Inconsistencies Consequent on Excessive Doubt	125
35.	The Opposite Mistake: Excessive Dogmatism	127
	CHAPTER IV. UNJUSTIFIABLE ISSUE OF THE INQUIRY: SCEPTICISM.
36.	Order of Problems	135
37.	Forms of Scepticism	136
38.	Its Main Historical Manifestations	138
39.	Critique of Scepticism	142
	PART II. INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE: JUDGMENT. CHAPTER V. NECESSARY JUDGMENTS: ENGLISH SUBJECTIVISM.
40.	Objectivity of the Necessary Nexus Asserted in Immediate Judgments of the Ideal Order	148
41.	Subjective Necessity through Association	149
42.	Subjective Necessity through Evolution	154
43.	The Test of Inconceivability	157
44.	Relative and Absolute Inconceivability	160
45.	Is Experience of Absolutely Necessary Relations between Thought- Objects Conditioned by Subjective Mental Forms?	167
	CHAPTER VI. NECESSARY JUDGEMENTS: KANT'S THEORY EXPOUNDED.
46.	General Outline of Kant's Theory of Knowledge	168
47.	Necessary and Universal judgments described an 11 A Priori	174
48.	Those of them that Amplify our Knowledge claimed to be "Synthetic-a- priori"	176
49.	Even Concepts, regarded as "Objective," i.e. as Necessarily and Universally Valid, claimed to be "Synthetic-a-priori	180
50.	Analysis of "A Priori" Conditions of Knowledge in Sensibility and in Understanding	181
51.	The "A Priori" Forms of Sense Intuition	183
52.	Conception and judgment. "A Priori" Forms of the Understanding	184
53.	Their Application in Mathematics and Physics	189
54.	The "Illusion" of Metaphysics	191
55.	The "Copernican Revolution"	194
56.	The Influence and the Issues of Kant's Teaching	197
	CHAPTER VII. NECESSARY JUDGMENTS: KANT'S THEORY EXAMINED.
57.	The Case for the Critique of Pure Reason	201
58.	"A Priori" Forms neither Essential nor Sufficient to account for Necessary and Universal judgments	202
59.	Significance of the "Critique": its Thesis Mutually Destructive	206
60.	How the Function of "A Priori Synthesis" is described as Permeating Judgment, Conception, and even Perception	209
61.	How the Necessity-and-Universality of the Apprehended Product of the Synthesis is Subjective	213
62.	Grades of Necessity in Judgments. Singular Judgments. Validity of Concepts. The Problem Stated	216
63.	Kant's Claim Examined. A. Mathematical Judgments. B. Geometrical Judgments. C. The Principles of Physics	219
D.	The Principle of Causality and Metaphysics. Doctrines of Kant and Hume	223
65.	Scholastic Account of the Principle	225
66.	Inadmissibility of Kant's Limitation of the Principle to the Domain of Sense Experience	228
	CHAPTER VIII. NECESSARY JUDGMENTS: SCHOLASTIC THEORY.
67.	In Necessary and Universal Principles of the Ideal Order the Ground of the Judicial Nexus is seen to be in the Objects as Conceived: Objective Evidence	232
68.	Proofs of the Thesis	234
69.	In Necessary judgments the Character of the Apprehended Nexus is due to a Property of the Thought-Objects or Concepts, viz. their Abstractness	241
70.	What can be Inferred from the Characteristics of Abstract Thought- Objects or Essences? A Debatable Question	245
	PART III. INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE: CONCEPTION. CHAPTER IX. ORIGIN AND VALIDITY OF CONCEPTS: MODERATE REALISM.
71.	Problem of the Origin of Concepts	250
72.	Problem of the Validity of Concepts	253
73.	The Process of Conception: Terms Defined	256
74.	Analysis of Conception. Various Theories. Kant on Intuition	259
75.	Scholastic Theory of Abstraction	262
76.	Reality of Objects of Conception: Moderate Realism Explained	268
77.	Generalization. Intellectual Apprehension of the Individual	279
78.	Proofs of Moderate Realism	287
	CHAPTER X. VALIDITY OF CONCEPTS: EXTREME REALISM.
79.	Plato's Doctrine on Universals	292
80.	Ontologism	298
80.	Medieval Forms of Extreme Realism	300
	CHAPTER XI. VALIDITY OF CONCEPTS: NOMINALISM.
82.	The So-called Medieval Nominalism	312
83.	Modern Nominalism: General Exposition and Criticism	315
84.	The Sensist and Positivist Theory of "Abstraction" and Generalization	319
85.	Positivism as a Theory of Knowledge	324
	CHAPTER XII. VALIDITY OF CONCEPTS: CONCEPTUALISM; KANT'S DOCTRINE.
86.	General View of Conceptualism	330
87.	Conceptualism of Kant's Doctrine	331
88.	If all Concepts Involve "A Priori" Syntheses, what Moves or Determines the Mind in Forming such Syntheses?	332
89.	Kant's Vindication of Universal Concepts as "A Priori" Syntheses of the Categories with a Manifold of Sense Intuitions	336
90.	Kant's Account of the Transition from Individual to Universal in Cognition	338
91.	General Criticism of Kant's Theory of Universal Concepts. A. The Theory Fails to Account for the Facts	343
92.	B. Conception is not an "A Priori" Synthesis whereby our Mental Representations are made "Objective" and thus become Cognitions	352
93.	The Concept of "Causal" or "Necessary" Succession of Events in Physical Nature is, for instance, not made "Objective" by the Application of an "A Priori" Mental Rule to "Mere Mental Representations"	359
94.	Retrospect. Psychological Grounds of Conceptualism	366
	INDEX	371

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