Carl von Clausewitz

Clausewitz, Karl Von - kärl fən klouˈzəvĭts, 1780–1831, Prussian general and military strategist. Clausewitz was an original thinker most influenced by the Napoleonic wars in which he fought. He served in the Rhine campaigns (1793–94), won the regard of Gerhard von Scharnhorst at the Berlin Military Academy, and served in the wars against Napoleon Read More...

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Carl von Clausewitz

1.

On War
by Karl von Clausewitz. 641 pgs.

Book

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Title Page

Contents

Foreword

Preface

Introduction

Two: Notes by the Author

Author's Preface

Book I: On the Nature of War

Chapter I: What Is War?

Chapter II: End and Means in War

Chapter III: The Genius for War

Chapter IV: On Danger in War

Chapter V: On Physical Effort in War

Chapter VI: Information in War

Chapter VII: Friction in War

Chapter VIII: Concluding Remarks on Book I

Book II: The Theory of War

Chapter I: Branches of the Art of War

Chapter II: On the Theory of War

Chapter III: Art of War or Science of War

Chapter IV: Methodism

Chapter V: Criticism

Chapter VI: On Examples

Book III: Of Strategy in General

Chapter I: Strategy

Chapter II: Elements of Strategy

Chapter III: Moral Quantities

Chapter IV: The Chief Moral Powers

Chapter V: Military Virtue of an Army

Chapter VI: Boldness

Chapter VII: Perseverance

Chapter VIII: Superiority in Numbers

Chapter IX: The Surprise

Chapter X: Stratagem

Chapter XI: Assembly of Forces in Space

Chapter XII: Assembly of Forces in Time

Chapter XIII: Strategic Reserve

Chapter XIV: Economy of Forces

Chapter XV: Geometrical Element

Chapter XVI: On the Suspension of Action in Warfare

Chapter XVII: On the Character of Modern War

Chapter XVIII: Tension and Rest

Book IV: The Engagement

Chapter I: Introductory

Chapter II: Character of the Modern Battle

Chapter III: The Engagement in General

Chapter IV: The Engagement in General (Continued)

Chapter V: On the Significance of the Engagement

Chapter VI: Duration of the Engagement

Chapter VII: Decision of the Engagement

Chapter VIII: Mutual Understanding as to an Engagement

Chapter IX: The Battle

Chapter X: The Battle (Continued)

Chapter XI: The Battle (Continued)

Chapter XII: Strategic Means of Utilizing Victory

Chapter XIII: Retreat after a Lost Battle

Chapter XIV: Night Fighting

Book V: Military Forces

Chapter I: General Scheme

Chapter II: Theater of War, Army, Campaign

Chapter III: Relative Strength

Chapter IV: Relation of the Three Arms

Chapter V: Battle Order of the Army

Chapter VI: General Disposition of an Army

Chapter VII: Advance Guard and Outposts

Chapter VIII: Mode of Action of Advanced Corps

Chapter IX: Camps

Chapter X: Marches

Chapter XI: Marches (Continued)

Chapter XII: Marches (Continued)

Chapter XIII: Quarters

Chapter XIV: Subsistence

Chapter XV: Base of Operations

Chapter XVI: Lines of Communication

Chapter XVII: Country and Ground

Chapter XVIII: Higher Ground

Book VI: Defense

Chapter I: Offense and Defense

Chapter II: The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Tactics

Chapter III: The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Strategy

Chapter IV: Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defense

Chapter V: Character of the Strategic Defensive

Chapter VI: Extent of the Means of Defense

Chapter VII: Reciprocal Action and Reaction of Attack and Defense

Chapter VIII: Methods of Resistance

Chapter IX: Defensive Battle

Chapter X: Fortresses

Chapter XI: Fortresses (Continued)

Chapter XII: Defensive Position

Chapter XIII: Fortified Positions and Entrenched Camps

Chapter XIV: Flank Positions

Chapter XV: Defense of Mountains

Chapter XVI: Defense of Mountains (Continued)

Chapter XVII: Defense of Mountains (Continued)

Chapter XVIII: Defense of Rivers and Streams

Chapter XIX: Defense of Rivers and Streams (Continued)

Chapter XX: Defense of Swamps

Chapter XXI: Defense of Forests

Chapter XXII: The Cordon

Chapter XXIII: Key of the Ountry

Chapter XXIV: Operating against a Flank

Chapter XXV: Retreat into the Interior of the Country

Chapter XVII: Arming the Nation

Chapter XXVII: Defense of a Theater of War

Chapter XXVIII: Defense of a Theater of War (Continued)

Chapter XXIX: Defense of a Theater of War (Continued)

Chapter XXX: Defense of a Theater of War When No Decision Is Sought

Book VII: The Attack

Chapter I: The Attack in Relation to the Defense

Chapter II: Nature of the Strategic Attack

Chapter III: On the Objects of the Strategic Attack

Chapter IV: Decreasing Force of the Attack

Chapter V: Culminating Point of the Attack

Chapter VI: Destruction of the Enemy's Military Forces

Chapter VII: The Offensive Battle

Chapter VIII: Crossing of Rivers

Chapter IX: Attack of Defensive Positions

Chapter X: Attack of Entrenched Camps

Chapter XI: Attack of a Mountain Range

Chapter XII: Attack on Cordon Lines

Chapter XIII: Maneuvering

Chapter XIV: Attack of Morasses, Inundations, Woods

Chapter XV: Attack on a Theater of War When a Decision Is Sought

Chapter XVI: Attack on a Theater of War When a Decision Is Not Sought

Chapter XVII: Attack of Fortresses

Chapter XVIII: Attack of Convoys

Chapter XIX: Attack on the Enemy's Army in Its Quarters

Chapter XX: Diversion

Chapter XXI: Invasion

Chapter XXII: On the Culminating Point of Victory

Book VIII: Plan of a War

Chapter I: Introduction

Chapter II: Absolute and Real War

Chapter III: Interdependence of the Parts in War

Chapter IV: Aim of War More Precisely Defined

Chapter V: Aim of War More Precisely Defined (Continued)

Chapter VI: Influence of the Political Object on the Military Aim

Chapter VII: Limited Aim -- Offensive War

Chapter VIII: Limited Aim -- Defense

Chapter IX: Plan of War When the Destruction of the Enemy Is the Aim

Index
2.

Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist
by Christopher Bassford, Tiha von Ghyczy, Bolko von Oetinger. 196 pgs.

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From Clausewitz on Strategy . . . On strategic genius 'If the mind is to survive this constant battle with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that even in this moment of intense darkness retains some trace of the inner light that will lead it to the truth, and second, the courage to go where that faint light leads.' On the role of strategic theory '. . . all principles, rules, and methods increasingly lack universality and absolute truth the moment they become a positive doctrine. They are there to present themselves for use. Judgment must always be free to determine whether or not they are suitable. Criticism must never use these results of theory as laws and standards, but only as a person acting in war should also do: as aids to judgment.' On risk 'It is not true that we should always choose the case with the least uncertainty. That would be a terrible mistake, as all of our theoretical deliberations show. There are instances in which the most daring course of action is the wisest choice.' On leadership qualities 'The further we go up the chain of command, the more necessary it becomes for boldness to go hand in hand with the superior mind . . .' On strategy 'Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not make everything easy.'

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Title Page

Contents

The Strategy Institute of the Boston Consulting Group

Acknowledgements

Prelude

Introduction

Marie Von Clausewitz: Preface to the Posthumous Edition (1832) of Her Husband 's Works, Including on War

The Genius of Strategy

The Coup D'Oeil

Theory in the Service of Genius

The Theater of Strategy

The Clash of Wills

Friction

Thinking Strategy

Tactics and Strategy

Simple, but Not Easyss

Attack and Defense

Elements of Strategy

Dynamics of Strategy

The Virtues of Strategy

Moral Forces

The Virtues of the Army

The Moral Virtues of the Commander

Beyond Strategy

Sources for Sidebars

Index
3.

Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War
by Andreas Herberg-Rothe. 194 pgs.

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Contents

Part I: Prologue

1: Clausewitz and Napoleon: Jena, Moscow, and Waterloo

2: Violence, Fear, and Power: The Expansion and Limitation of War

3: Concepts of Absolute and Real War

4: Clausewitz's Legacy: The Trinity

5: Polarities and the Asymmetry between Attack and Defence

6: The Formula: Politics in War

Notes

Bibliography

Index
4.

Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia
by Isabelle Duyvesteyn. 185 pgs.

Book

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Clausewitz suggested that war is fought by states for political ends, but that does not appear to have been the pattern in Africa. This volume explores how alternative social organisations have used war as a political instrument, refining the classic theory in the contexts of 'failed states'.

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Title Page

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

1: Clausewitz, the Nature of War and African Warfare

2: Case Study I

3: Case Study II

4: Political Actors

5: Political Interests

6: Political Instruments and Conventional War

7: Politics and Strategy in African Wars

Notes

Bibliography

Index
5.

Modern Strategy (Chap. 3 "The Strategist's Toolkit: The Legacy of Clausewitz")
by Colin S. Gray. 418 pgs.

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Modern Strategy explains the permanent nature, but ever changing character, of strategy in light of the whole strategic experience of the twentieth century. The book is a major contribution to the general theory of strategy; it makes sense of the strategic history of the twentieth century, and provides understanding of what that strategic history implies for the century to come. The book offers a uniquely comprehensive analysis of the different facets of modern strategy. The classic writings of Carl von Clausewitz are reconsidered for their continuing relevance, while possible successors are appraised. In addition to arguing that Clausewitz figured out what strategy was, and how it worked, the book probes deeply into strategy's political, ethical, and cultural dimension. The book explains how strategic behaviour in the twentieth century has expanded from the two-dimensional world of the land and the surface of the sea, to include the ocean depths, the air, space, and most recently the 'cyberspace' environments. It also offers details analyses both of nuclear matters and of the realm of irregular violence. This is the first comprehensive account of all aspects of modern strategy since the Cold War ended and will be essential reading for all students of modern strategy and security studies.

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Title Page

Forethoughts

Preface

Contents

Introduction: The Expanding Universe of Strategy

Chapter 1: The Dimensions of Strategy

Chapter 2: Strategy, Politics, Ethics

Chapter 3: The Strategist's Toolkit: the Legacy of Clausewitz

Chapter 4: The Poverty of Modern Strategic Thought

Chapter 5: Strategic Culture as Context

Chapter 6: Windows on War

Chapter 7: Patterns in Strategic Experience

Chapter 8: The Grammar of Strategy, I: Terrestrial Action

Chapter 9: The Grammar of Strategy, II: Altitude and Electrons

Chapter 10: Small Wars and Other Savage Violence

Chapter 11: Second Thoughts on Nuclear Weapons

Chapter 12: Nuclear Weapons in Strategic History

Chapter 13: Strategy Eternal

References

Index
6.

Military Education: Past, Present, and Future (Chap. 2 "Educating Bellona: Carl von Clausewitz and Military Education")
by Gregory C. Kennedy, Keith Neilson. 245 pgs.

Book

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Often the only time a nation evaluates the education of its armed forces is during the aftermath of a great military disaster. This work brings together the ideas of international scholars, all recognized as leaders in their fields, to examine the professional military education experience of various nations during the last 250 years. Case studies of each branch of the military reveal success and failure in the past and present, with a goal of improving military education in the future.

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Contents

Preface

Preface and Acknowledgments

1: The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective

2: Educating Bellona: Carl Von Clausewitz and Military Education

3: No Officer Rather Than a Bad Officer: Officer Selection and Education in the Prussian/German Army, 1715-1945

4: Sylvanus Thayer and the Ethical Instruction of Nineteenth-Century Military Officers in the United States

5: History as Process and Record: the Royal Navy and Officer Education

6: Officer Education and Training in the British Regular Army, 1919–39

7: To Make the Men for the Next Crisis: the USAF Air War College and the Education of Senior Military Leaders, 1945–93

8: The War Colleges and Joint Education in the United States

9: The Labors of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education

10: European Military Education Today

Bibliography

Index
7.

Southern Trident: Strategy, History, and the Rise of Australian Naval Power (Chap. 3 "History and Theory: The Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications")
by John Reeve, David Stevens. 363 pgs.

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Examines how and why the Australian navy has evolved to the type of force it is today.

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Title Page

Foreword

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Illustrations, Maps and Tables

Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I: Concepts and Approaches to Maritime Strategy

1: The Rise of Modern Naval Strategy C. 1580–1880

2: Sea Power in Modern Strategy

3: History and Theory: the Clausewitzian Ideal and Its Implications

4: Imperial Naval Defence—a Model for Transnationalism: a Canadian Perspective

5: Maritime Forces and Expeditionary Strategies: We Are All Corbettians Now

6: Strategic Culture and the Australian Way of Warfare: Perspectives

Part II: Perspectives on Imperial and Australian Naval Defence

7: Australia, the Trent Crisis of 1861 and the Strategy of Imperial Defence

8: New Zealand's Naval Defence, 1854–1914

9: Colonial Naval Forces before Federation

10: ‘a Vigorous Offensive’: Core Aspects of Australian Maritime Defence Concerns before 1914

11: ‘the View from Port Phillip Heads’: Alfred Deakin and Themove towards an Australian Navy

12: ‘a Sea of Troubles’: the Great White Fleet's 1908 War Plans for Australia and New Zealand

13: A.W. Jose in the Politics and Strategy of Naval Defence, 1903–1909

14: Sir John Fisher, the Fleet Unit Concept, and the Creation of the Royal Australian Navy

15: ‘defend the North’: Commander Thring, Captain Hughes-Onslow and the Beginnings of Australian Naval Strategic Thought

16: Divergent Paths: Problems of Command and Strategy in Anglo—australasian Naval Operations in the Asia—pacific(August—November 1914)

17: A Strategy for the Lower Deck of the Early Royal Australian Navy

18: The Royal Australian Navy, the Constitution and the Law—then and Now

19: A Fleet Not a Navy: Some Thoughts on the Themes

Notes

Index
8.

Strategic Logic and Political Rationality (Chap. 12 "Clausewitz and the Two Contemporary Military Revolutions: RMA and RAM")
by Brandford A. Lee, Karl F. Walling. 306 pgs.

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"One of three volumes in honour of the teaching and scholarship of the late Michael I. Handel, this book details the universal logic of strategy and the ability of liberal-democratic governments to address this logic rationally. Treating war as an extensio"

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I:: Strategic Logic

1: Strategy in War and Sports: a Comparison

2: What is a Military Lesson?

3: Why the Weak Win: Strong Powers, Weak Powers, and the Logic of Strategy

4: Attrition in Modern and Post-Modern War

5: Sunzi Bingfa as History and Theory

6: Policy, Strategy, and Operations

Part Ii:: Political Rationality

7: Thucydides on Democratic Politics and Civil-Military Relations

8: Winning Without Fighting: British Grand Strategy and Its Application to the United States, 1815-65

9: British Strategy and Winning the Great War

10: The Architecture and Soft Spots of Israeli Grand Strategy

11: Winning the War but Losing the Peace? the United States and the Strategic Issues of War Termination

12: Clausewitz and the Two Contemporary Military Revolutions: Rma and Ram

Index
9.

European Armies and the Conduct of War (Chap. 7 "Clausewitz and the Rise of Prussian Military Hegemony")
by Hew Strachan. 226 pgs.

Book

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Discussing the key issues of modern warfare, Hew Strachanâ¬"s work examines the theory and practice of land warfare in Europe since 1700.Looking at warfare in the context of social and political change, Dr. Strachan interprets his subject matter as widely as possible, and European Armies and the Conduct of War considers the roles of air power and the impact of the United States on European military developments.Through the eyes of the major theorists of the day, European Armies examines:* how the social and political influences which shape armies, also mould the attitude of those armies to warfare* the story of techinal innovation* the mounting pace of industrialization and its impact of warfare.Recent military history has tended to focus on the relationship between armies and society and there has been much original research on the subject of the conduct of war. This book brings these approaches together, providing information and insight vital to the study of this fascinating era.

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Title Page

Contents

List of Maps and Figures

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1: The Study of War

Chapter 2: The Age of Marlborough and Frederick

Chapter 3: The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Tactics

Chapter 4: Napoleonic Warfare

Chapter 5: Jomini and the Napoleonic Tradition

Chapter 6: Colonial Warfare, and Its Contribution to the Art of War in Europe

Chapter 7: Clausewitz and the Rise of Prussian Military Hegemony

Chapter 8: Technology and Its Impact on Tactics

Chapter 9: First World War

Chapter 10: Blitzkrieg

Chapter 11: Total War

Chapter 12: The Revolution in Strategy

Epilogue

Select Bibliography

Supplementary Bibliography

Index
10.

The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War (Chap. 12 "Clausewitz's On War and the Gulf War")
by William Head, Earl H. Tilford Jr. 356 pgs.

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This book is a reexamination of the Persian Gulf War by a number of academic and military historians to determine what we did right, what we did wrong, and how our performance could have been improved. This study addresses the questions: Why did the war happen? Was the Gulf War a vindication of Vietnam? Did the American military really learn anything from the war in Vietnam? Did they really adapt? What did the Allies actually win in the Gulf War, if anything? Finally, have we learned anything from the Gulf War? Some authors conclude that in retrospect many analysts have become convinced that, despite its military successes, the United States garnered little of worth from the Gulf War. Others believe a great deal was achieved, and others have withheld final judgement.

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Title Page

Contents

Illustrations

Preface

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Introduction William Head

Part I: Politics, Alliances, and Regional Views

1: The Gulf War Coalition: The Politics and Economics of a Most Unusual Alliance

2: But Was Jihad? Islam and the Ethics of the Persian Gulf War

Part II: Bringing the Eagle to the Gulf Desert: Airlift, Supplies, and Logistics

3: Air Mobility in Operations Desert Sield and Desert Storm: An Assessment

4: Sustaining the War Machine: U.S. Air Force Logistics Support during the Gulf War

Part III: The Air War: Planning and Combat

5: Thunder and Storm: Strategic Air Operations in the Gulf War

6: Parallel Warfare: What Is It? Where Did It Come From? Why Is It Important?

7: Command and Control in the Gulf War: A Military Revolution in Airpower?. Mark D. Mandeles

Part IV: The Ground War: The Army and the Marines

8: Playing in the Sandbox: Doctrine, Combat, and Outcome on the Ground

9: U.S. Marine Operations in the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991

Part V: The Navy's Role in the Gulf War

10: On the Storm's Outer Edge: U.S. Navy Operations in the Persian Gulf War

11: Sailing in the Sand: The U.S. Navy's Role in the Gulf War

Part VI: Reexamining the Allied "Victory" in the Gulf War

12: Clausewitz's On War and the Gulf War

13: A New Covenant?: The Apostles of Douhet and the Persian Gulf War Caroline F. Ziemke

Selected Bibliography

Index

About the Editors and Contributors
11.

Strategic Thinking: An Introduction and Farewell (Chap. 4 "The Political Context of Strategy: Clausewitz")
by Philip Windsor, Mats Berdal, Spyros Economides. 204 pgs.

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Contents

Foreword

Preface

1: The Autonomy of Strategy in the Nuclear Age

2: The Just War

3: The Legal Tradition

4: The Political Context of Strategy

5: The Transformation of War

6: The Evolution of Strategic Thinking

7: The Evolution of Strategic Thinking

8: The Evolution of Strategic Thinking

9: Patterns of Soviet Strategic Thought

10: Alliances

11: Arms Control

12: War All the Same

13: Guerrilla

14: The Rationality and Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence

15: Beyond the Cold War

Bibliography

Index

About the Book
12.

The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Chap. 3 "The Napoleonic Legacy: The Influence of Jomini and Clausewitz")
by Brian Bond. 240 pgs.

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In Western Europe and North America the idea that war can deliberately be used as an `instrument of policy' has become unfashionable, not least because of the carnage of two World Wars and the Americans' humiliating experience in Vietnam. But wars are still fought. Those who start wars clearly believe they are worthwhile. Why? In this original and provocative study, Brian Bond discusses the successes and failures of military and political leaders in their pursuit of victory over the last two centuries. Professor Bond argues that in order to be counted victorious, a leader has to progress beyond military triumph to preserve the political control needed to secure an advantageous and enduring peace settlement. Napoleon was a brilliant general, but failed as a statesman. Bismarck, on the other hand, was a success in skilfully exploiting Moltke's victories on the battlefield to create a unified Germany. In the First World War, Germany and her allies were defeated but at such great cost that confidence in the idea that war could be controlled, and the pursuit of victory made rational, received a terrible shock. Germany and Japan exploited their military opportunites between 1939 and 1942, but lack of political control and moderation brought them catastrophic defeat. After 1945, nuclear weapons and the increased complexity of international relations blurred the identity of `victors' and `losers' and seemed to make the idea of a `decisive' victory almost unthinkable. But this study warns against the assumption that war as an instrument of policy has now been completely discarded. The Falklands and Gulf conflicts show that aggressors are still prepared to risk war for tangible goals, and that their opponents are quite capable of responding successfully to such challenges.

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Acknowledgements

Contents

Introduction

1: Frederick the Great and the Era of Limited War

2: Napoleon and the Decisive Battle

3: The Napoleonic Legacy: the Influence of Jomini and Clausewitz

4: Moltke and the Wars of German Unification

5: The Quest for Victory in the Schlieffen Era 1890-1914

6: The Pursuit of Victory in the First World War and the Aftermath

7: The Pursuit of Victory in the Second World War

8: The Pursuit of Victory in the Nuclear Age

Conclusion

Notes

Select Bibliography

Index
13.

Lieutenants: The Evolution of Political Styles (Chap. 4 "Carl von Clausewitz")
by Michael Maher. 194 pgs.

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This book examines the unique relationships between seven important leaders in history--from Henry VIII to Martin Luther King, Jr.--and their principle advisors. Studying the common psychological themes in such relationships, as well as the consequences of the collaborations, Michael Maher traces the evolution of new styles of political leadership from absolutism through nationalism and socialism to the social advocacy developed by Martin Luther King and Ralph Abernathy. The book uncovers the complex systems each team creates and the way these systems evolve toward a point of impasse or gridlock that requires the emergence of a new political system.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Preface

1: Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell

Notes

2: Father Joseph

Notes

3: Jean-Baptiste Colbert

Notes

4: Carl Von Clausewitz

Notes

5: Friedrich Engels

Notes

6: Harry Hopkins

Notes

7: Reverend Ralph Abernathy

Notes

8: Conclusion

Selected Bibliography

Index
14.

World Military Leaders: A Collective and Comparative Analysis ("Carl von Clausewitz" begins on p. 89)
by Mostafa Rejai, Kay Phillips. 172 pgs.

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Focusing on 45 military leaders from four continents and 13 countries, spread across four centuries, this study paints, for the first time, a collective, comparative portrait of high-ranking military officers. The authors develop an interactional theory of military leaders, stressing the interplay between sociodemographic variables, psychological dynamics, and situational factors. They examine age and birthplace, socioeconomic status, family life, ethnicity and religion, education and occupation, activities and experiences, and ideologies and attitudes. They find military leaders to be a remarkably coherent and homogeneous group of men propelled toward the military by a combination of nationalism, imperialism, relative deprivation, love deprivation, marginality, and vanity.

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Contents

Tables

Preface

Acknowledgments

Introduction

NOTE

PART I Theory

Chapter 1 Military Leaders: An Interactional Theory

PART II Foundations

Chapter 2 General Patterns

Chapter 3 Seeking Comparative Patterns

PART III Propellants

Introduction

Chapter 4 American Leaders

Chapter 5: British Leaders

Chapter 6 French Leaders

Chapter 7 German Leaders

Chapter 8 Other Leaders

PART IV Synthesis

Chapter 9: Military Leaders in Theoretical Perspective

Appendix: General Code Sheet

Index

About the Authors
15.

The Ongoing Civil War: New Versions of Old Stories ("McClellan, von Clausewitz, and the Politics of War" begins on p. 40)
by Herman Hattaway, Ethan S. Rafuse. 164 pgs.

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In 1997, John Stanchak, an editor at Cowles Enthusiast Media (now part of Primedia), realized his vision of "a publication that contained the best, most up-to-date scholarship on the [Civil] war, but was edited with the amateur historian in mind," with the publication of Columbiad: A Quarterly Review of the War between the States. In the four years the journal was published, it strived to lessen the rift between the scholarly world of professional historians and the "popular" history with which the general reader is more familiar. Now, a selection of the essays that best represent the successful balance between "serious scholarship" and a narrative reading style preferred by the educated layman has been collected in The Ongoing Civil War. The nine essays, written by such distinguished scholars as John Marszelak, Albert Castel, Archer Jones, Mark Snell, Noah Trudeau, and others, provide deeper insight into the war, introduce the general reader to unsung heroes, and correct some popular misrepresentations of history. They cover a range of topics as diverse as conflict among commanders, the supply runs vital to the Union victory at Gettysburg, the network of scouts and spies used by Robert E. Lee, and the painstaking process of organizing and publishing the Official Records. The synergy of sophisticated research combined with a compelling narrative style makes The Ongoing Civil War an enjoyable, informative work suitable for scholars and the general reader alike.

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The Ongoing Civil War: New Versions of Old Stories

Contents

Introduction

The Professional Historian and “popular History”

“old Brains” Was Brainy After All

Mcclellan, Von Clausewitz, and the Politics of War

Franklin Pierce and the Civil War

Union Lifeline

Before the Wilderness What Lee Knew

History in Hindsight William T. Sherman and Sooy Smith

Philatelic Pugilists

To “mold the Judgment of History”

Contributors

Index
16.

The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders
by Richard Ned Lebow. 405 pgs.

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Title Page

Contents

Preface Page

Acknowledgments

1: Nixon in Hell

2: Tragedy and Politics

3: Thucydides and War

4: Thucydides and Civilization

5: Carl Von Clausewitz

6: Hans J Morgenthau

7: The Wisdom of Classical Realism

8: Running Red Lights and Ruling the World

9: Tragedy and Scholarship

Name Index

Subject Index

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