Kosovo and the Balkan Wars

O'Neill analyzes the nature of the violence that continues to plague Kosovo & assesses UN & NATO efforts to guarantee public security.

Part tour book, part historical guide, The Road to Kosovo shows us war and the struggle for peace through the eyes of a young journalist forced by circumstances to travel to Kosovo the hard way, by car, after being turned down for a Yugoslavian visa.

This work provides an analysis of Serbian politics from 1987 to 1999 that centres on an examination of Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power and his pattern of rule up to and including the war in Kosovo.

Offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force from a military, political, and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking.

Most Europeans were more shocked at their lack of insight into the Balkan conflict than would admit it. These collected writings encompass the history of public perceptions of the conflict, the response of the 'Media' and the lessons learned by NATO, the UN and the international community.

This new edition of the Carnegie Endowment bestseller -- selected by Choice as "an outstanding academic book of 1995" -- now also discusses the interventions in Haiti and Bosnia, the 1998 crisis (and earlier skirmishes) with Iraq, and the decision to not intervene to halt apparent genocide in Central Africa. In the core original study, which draws upon twelve cases -- including Somalia, Lebanon, Panama, Grenada, and the Gulf War -- Richard Haass suggests political and military guidelines for potential U.S. military interventions ranging from peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to preventive strikes and all-out warfare.

More than any other episode since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Kosovo revealed the distinctive attributes of a new American "way of war." In so doing, Kosovo also brought into sharp focus the military, political, and moral dilemmas confronting a liberal democracy intent on wielding preeminent power on a global scale. What are the moral implications posed by waging high-tech warfare for humanitarian purposes? Does the precedent set by intervention of this type point toward peace and stability or toward more war? How well suited are the United States military and American society as a whole to the security challenges of the age of globalization? According to Bacevich and Cohen, gauging the "success" achieved in Kosovo yields important answers to these and related questions. The volume includes a well-crafted historical overview of the war and six essays that place it in a broader context. The contributors explore the conflict's relationship to U.S. grand strategy, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and American civil-military relations, among other topics. Contributors: William A. Arkin, Andrew J. Bacevich, Eliot A. Cohen, Alberto R. Coll, James Kurth, Anatol Lieven, Michael Vickers

Recent bombing campaigns and peacekeeping efforts have achieved a fragile and uncertain peace in Kosovo. However, NATO will need help from both the European Union and the United Nations to create and maintain a lasting peace in the region. An expert in the affairs of the troubled region, Rezun traveled to the crisis zone to interview Kosovar refugees and foreign statesmen. He offers a sharp critique of the conflict, taking NATO and the entire Western Alliance to task and emphasizing the villainous behavior of the Milosevic regime. One cannot consider what happened in Kosovo to be an isolated affair, Rezun contends.

The Kosovo conflict has the potential to redraw the landscape of international politics, with significant ramifications for the UN, major powers, regional organizations, and the way in which we understand and interpret world politics. This book offers interpretations of the Kosovo crisis from numerous perspectives: the conflict-parties, NATO allies, the immediate region surrounding the conflict, and further afield. Country perspectives are followed by scholarly analyses of the longer-term normative, operational, and structural consequences of the Kosovo crisis for world politics.

This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. The report analyzes the assumptions and otehr calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo and the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resultin expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms.