Moshe Dayan

This collection uses a series of case studies to assess the impact of heretical military leaders who developed policy and strategy during war and peace in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The issue for each contributor is not necessarily to show whether the endeavors of individuals and their unorthodoxy were successful or unsuccessful--though this important consideration is not ignored. Rather, each chapter offers differing points of view on accomplishments and failure because, as is so often the experience in historical study, the record is mixed; and this is especially so in terms of the application of military power in the period since the Napoleonic wars. Technological and scientific innovation, the rise of mass armies, the advent of total war, and the need to develop effective armed forces in a period of rapid change prompted new approaches in policy and strategy. In this period, it is clear that a dialectic in military thinking existed between those who followed what can be thought of as orthodox ideas, based generally on the lessons of preceding wars, and heretics who advocate new policies and strategies.

Focusing on 45 military leaders from four continents and 13 countries, spread across four centuries, this study paints, for the first time, a collective, comparative portrait of high-ranking military officers. The authors develop an interactional theory of military leaders, stressing the interplay between sociodemographic variables, psychological dynamics, and situational factors. They examine age and birthplace, socioeconomic status, family life, ethnicity and religion, education and occupation, activities and experiences, and ideologies and attitudes. They find military leaders to be a remarkably coherent and homogeneous group of men propelled toward the military by a combination of nationalism, imperialism, relative deprivation, love deprivation, marginality, and vanity.

This book analyzes Israel's leadership from the rise of the Zionist movement to the present. That leadership, Abadi holds, has been declining since David Ben Gurion, the founder and first prime minister of the state, retired from politics. Not only were the early leaders of Zionism more charismatic, the author argues, but later leaders have faced domestic and external constraints that tied their hands regarding the economy, the need to absorb immigrants, and the demand to expand and modernize the army. Contemporary leaders have proven to be unequal to the task of dealing with these problems. In addition, the book mentions the erosion of the Zionist dream and the inability of native-born Israelis to provide a new ideology. Abadi concludes with possible solutions and prospects for the future.

Schoenbaum's book is a history of one of the most remarkable liaisons in international experience, a portrait of the special relationship between the last remaining superpower and the tiny Jewish state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, and a study of how that relationship grew and works. From Truman to Bush, the United States has assured Israel's existence, while providing billions in military and economic support. Over the same period, no U.S. president has ever submitted a formal treaty of alliance to the Senate, or even moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In fact, cross-purposes and mutual doubts have always coexisted with shared values, complementary interests, great expectations, and real achievements. Schoenbaum's book traces Israeli-American relations from their roots in both American and Jewish experience to the risks and opportunities of the current peace process. It also examines the relationship in the perspective of two world wars, the Cold War, the Gulf War, European colonialism and Middle Eastern nationalisms, global policy, and domestic politics in both countries. The result is the story of one of history's oddest international couples, hard-pressed to live together, but unable to live apart.

This book looks at the development of Israeli-Arab relations during the formative years 1949 to 1956, focusing on Arab infiltration into Israel and Israeli retaliation. Palestinian refugee raiding and cross-border attacks by Egyptian-controlled irregulars and commandos were a core phenomenon during this period and one of the chief causes of Israel's invasion of Sinai and the Gaza strip in 1956. Benny Morris probes the types of Arab infiltration and the attitude of Arab governments towards the phenomenon, and traces the evolution of Israel's defensive and offensive responses. He analyzes Israeli decision-making processes, including the emergence and ultimate failure of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett's dissident policy of moderation, and describes in detail the history of the Arab infiltration, including the terrorist-guerrilla raids by state-organized Fedayeen in 1955-6, and of the IDF raids of Qibya, Nahhalin, Kinneret, and the Sabha. This was a precedent-setting period in the making of Israeli defense policy, and this pattern of raiding and counter-raiding served to define Israeli-Arab relations during the subsequent four decades. In this pioneering study Morris deepens our understanding of the current tuation in the Middle East and of the prospects for a lasting peace there.

This informal history by a former long-time editor of The Jerusalem Post represents the only book to date that depicts the relationship between the press and the political system in Israel. This is an invaluable insider's report of Israel's only English-language daily newspaper and its role in society and in political developments from the 1930s to the present. Erwin Frenkel's story is a chronological account of the newspaper from the days of Palestine under the British mandate system, through independence, to the 1990s. It shows how the newspaper has functioned both in support of and in opposition to various governments and political parties.