From Clausewitz on Strategy . . . On strategic genius 'If the mind is to survive this constant battle with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that even in this moment of intense darkness retains some trace of the inner light that will lead it to the truth, and...

From Clausewitz on Strategy . . . On strategic genius 'If the mind is to survive this constant battle with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that even in this moment of intense darkness retains some trace of the inner light that will lead it to the truth, and second, the courage to go where that faint light leads.' On the role of strategic theory '. . . all principles, rules, and methods increasingly lack universality and absolute truth the moment they become a positive doctrine. They are there to present themselves for use. Judgment must always be free to determine whether or not they are suitable. Criticism must never use these results of theory as laws and standards, but only as a person acting in war should also do: as aids to judgment.' On risk 'It is not true that we should always choose the case with the least uncertainty. That would be a terrible mistake, as all of our theoretical deliberations show. There are instances in which the most daring course of action is the wisest choice.' On leadership qualities 'The further we go up the chain of command, the more necessary it becomes for boldness to go hand in hand with the superior mind . . .' On strategy 'Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not make everything easy.'

Modern Strategy explains the permanent nature, but ever changing character, of strategy in light of the whole strategic experience of the twentieth century. The book is a major contribution to the general theory of strategy; it makes sense of the strategic history of the twentieth century, and...

Modern Strategy explains the permanent nature, but ever changing character, of strategy in light of the whole strategic experience of the twentieth century. The book is a major contribution to the general theory of strategy; it makes sense of the strategic history of the twentieth century, and provides understanding of what that strategic history implies for the century to come. The book offers a uniquely comprehensive analysis of the different facets of modern strategy. The classic writings of Carl von Clausewitz are reconsidered for their continuing relevance, while possible successors are appraised. In addition to arguing that Clausewitz figured out what strategy was, and how it worked, the book probes deeply into strategy's political, ethical, and cultural dimension. The book explains how strategic behaviour in the twentieth century has expanded from the two-dimensional world of the land and the surface of the sea, to include the ocean depths, the air, space, and most recently the 'cyberspace' environments. It also offers details analyses both of nuclear matters and of the realm of irregular violence. This is the first comprehensive account of all aspects of modern strategy since the Cold War ended and will be essential reading for all students of modern strategy and security studies.

Often the only time a nation evaluates the education of its armed forces is during the aftermath of a great military disaster. This work brings together the ideas of international scholars, all recognized as leaders in their fields, to examine the professional military education experience of...

Often the only time a nation evaluates the education of its armed forces is during the aftermath of a great military disaster. This work brings together the ideas of international scholars, all recognized as leaders in their fields, to examine the professional military education experience of various nations during the last 250 years. Case studies of each branch of the military reveal success and failure in the past and present, with a goal of improving military education in the future.

Discussing the key issues of modern warfare, Hew Strachanâ¬"s work examines the theory and practice of land warfare in Europe since 1700.Looking at warfare in the context of social and political change, Dr. Strachan interprets his subject matter as widely as possible, and European Armies and the...

Discussing the key issues of modern warfare, Hew Strachanâ¬"s work examines the theory and practice of land warfare in Europe since 1700.Looking at warfare in the context of social and political change, Dr. Strachan interprets his subject matter as widely as possible, and European Armies and the Conduct of War considers the roles of air power and the impact of the United States on European military developments.Through the eyes of the major theorists of the day, European Armies examines:* how the social and political influences which shape armies, also mould the attitude of those armies to warfare* the story of techinal innovation* the mounting pace of industrialization and its impact of warfare.Recent military history has tended to focus on the relationship between armies and society and there has been much original research on the subject of the conduct of war. This book brings these approaches together, providing information and insight vital to the study of this fascinating era.

This book is a reexamination of the Persian Gulf War by a number of academic and military historians to determine what we did right, what we did wrong, and how our performance could have been improved. This study addresses the questions: Why did the war happen? Was the Gulf War a vindication of...

This book is a reexamination of the Persian Gulf War by a number of academic and military historians to determine what we did right, what we did wrong, and how our performance could have been improved. This study addresses the questions: Why did the war happen? Was the Gulf War a vindication of Vietnam? Did the American military really learn anything from the war in Vietnam? Did they really adapt? What did the Allies actually win in the Gulf War, if anything? Finally, have we learned anything from the Gulf War? Some authors conclude that in retrospect many analysts have become convinced that, despite its military successes, the United States garnered little of worth from the Gulf War. Others believe a great deal was achieved, and others have withheld final judgement.

In Western Europe and North America the idea that war can deliberately be used as an `instrument of policy' has become unfashionable, not least because of the carnage of two World Wars and the Americans' humiliating experience in Vietnam. But wars are still fought. Those who start wars clearly...

In Western Europe and North America the idea that war can deliberately be used as an `instrument of policy' has become unfashionable, not least because of the carnage of two World Wars and the Americans' humiliating experience in Vietnam. But wars are still fought. Those who start wars clearly believe they are worthwhile. Why? In this original and provocative study, Brian Bond discusses the successes and failures of military and political leaders in their pursuit of victory over the last two centuries. Professor Bond argues that in order to be counted victorious, a leader has to progress beyond military triumph to preserve the political control needed to secure an advantageous and enduring peace settlement. Napoleon was a brilliant general, but failed as a statesman. Bismarck, on the other hand, was a success in skilfully exploiting Moltke's victories on the battlefield to create a unified Germany. In the First World War, Germany and her allies were defeated but at such great cost that confidence in the idea that war could be controlled, and the pursuit of victory made rational, received a terrible shock. Germany and Japan exploited their military opportunites between 1939 and 1942, but lack of political control and moderation brought them catastrophic defeat. After 1945, nuclear weapons and the increased complexity of international relations blurred the identity of `victors' and `losers' and seemed to make the idea of a `decisive' victory almost unthinkable. But this study warns against the assumption that war as an instrument of policy has now been completely discarded. The Falklands and Gulf conflicts show that aggressors are still prepared to risk war for tangible goals, and that their opponents are quite capable of responding successfully to such challenges.

This book examines the unique relationships between seven important leaders in history--from Henry VIII to Martin Luther King, Jr.--and their principle advisors. Studying the common psychological themes in such relationships, as well as the consequences of the collaborations, Michael Maher traces...

This book examines the unique relationships between seven important leaders in history--from Henry VIII to Martin Luther King, Jr.--and their principle advisors. Studying the common psychological themes in such relationships, as well as the consequences of the collaborations, Michael Maher traces the evolution of new styles of political leadership from absolutism through nationalism and socialism to the social advocacy developed by Martin Luther King and Ralph Abernathy. The book uncovers the complex systems each team creates and the way these systems evolve toward a point of impasse or gridlock that requires the emergence of a new political system.

Focusing on 45 military leaders from four continents and 13 countries, spread across four centuries, this study paints, for the first time, a collective, comparative portrait of high-ranking military officers. The authors develop an interactional theory of military leaders, stressing the interplay...

Focusing on 45 military leaders from four continents and 13 countries, spread across four centuries, this study paints, for the first time, a collective, comparative portrait of high-ranking military officers. The authors develop an interactional theory of military leaders, stressing the interplay between sociodemographic variables, psychological dynamics, and situational factors. They examine age and birthplace, socioeconomic status, family life, ethnicity and religion, education and occupation, activities and experiences, and ideologies and attitudes. They find military leaders to be a remarkably coherent and homogeneous group of men propelled toward the military by a combination of nationalism, imperialism, relative deprivation, love deprivation, marginality, and vanity.

In 1997, John Stanchak, an editor at Cowles Enthusiast Media (now part of Primedia), realized his vision of "a publication that contained the best, most up-to-date scholarship on the [Civil] war, but was edited with the amateur historian in mind," with the publication of Columbiad: A Quarterly...

In 1997, John Stanchak, an editor at Cowles Enthusiast Media (now part of Primedia), realized his vision of "a publication that contained the best, most up-to-date scholarship on the [Civil] war, but was edited with the amateur historian in mind," with the publication of Columbiad: A Quarterly Review of the War between the States. In the four years the journal was published, it strived to lessen the rift between the scholarly world of professional historians and the "popular" history with which the general reader is more familiar. Now, a selection of the essays that best represent the successful balance between "serious scholarship" and a narrative reading style preferred by the educated layman has been collected in The Ongoing Civil War. The nine essays, written by such distinguished scholars as John Marszelak, Albert Castel, Archer Jones, Mark Snell, Noah Trudeau, and others, provide deeper insight into the war, introduce the general reader to unsung heroes, and correct some popular misrepresentations of history. They cover a range of topics as diverse as conflict among commanders, the supply runs vital to the Union victory at Gettysburg, the network of scouts and spies used by Robert E. Lee, and the painstaking process of organizing and publishing the Official Records. The synergy of sophisticated research combined with a compelling narrative style makes The Ongoing Civil War an enjoyable, informative work suitable for scholars and the general reader alike.