Antifederalists

In analyzing the debates between the Federalists and the Antifederalists, McWilliams, Gibbons, and their contributors break sharply with interpretations of the founding of America as either the work of pure pragmatists or as the institutionalization of class interests. This study of the very nature of modern representative democracy explains past and present dilemmas and contradictions in terms of Federalist and Antifederalist views. This examination of the political theory of the American founding deals with differing beliefs about pluralist interests and political compromise, human nature, the public good and the public sphere, the relationship between polity and economy, the role of religion in politics, and political traditions.

This study of exemplary writings from the debates over the ratification of the 1787 Constitution deals with the American constitutional founders' understandings of citizenship and civic virtue. Discussion of these debates is set in an analytical and historical context, addressing the rationales for and the nature of civic allegiance in liberal political regimes. Sinopoli analyzes the development of a distinctly liberal political psychology from its origins in John Locke, Adam Smith, and David Hume through the American founding and traces its implications for the current American polity.

What were the intentions of the Founders? Was the American constitution designed to protect individual rights? To limit the powers of government? To curb the excesses of democracy? Or to create a robust democratic nation-state? These questions echo through today's most heated legal and political debates. In this powerful new interpretation of America's origins, Max Edling argues that the Federalists were primarily concerned with building a government that could act vigorously in defense of American interests. The Constitution transferred the powers of war making and resource extraction from the states to the national government thereby creating a nation-state invested with all the important powers of Europe's eighteenth-century "fiscal-military states." A strong centralized government, however, challenged the American people's deeply ingrained distrust of unduly concentrated authority. To secure the Constitution's adoption the Federalists had to accommodate the formation of a powerful national government to the strong current of anti-statism in the American political tradition. They did so by designing a government that would be powerful in times of crisis, but which would make only limited demands on the citizenry and have a sharply restricted presence in society. The Constitution promised the American people the benefit of government without its costs. Taking advantage of a newly published letterpress edition of the constitutional debates, A Revolution in Favor of Government recovers a neglected strand of the Federalist argument, making a persuasive case for rethinking the formation of the federal American state.