The Cold War

The massive disorder and economic ruin following the Second World War inevitably predetermined the scope and intensity of the Cold War. But why did it last so long? And what impact did it have on the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and the Third World? Finally, how did it affect the broader history of the second half of the twentieth century - what were the human and financial costs? This Very Short Introduction provides a clear and stimulating interpretive overview of theCold War, one that will both invite debate and encourage deeper investigation.

For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle. In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam. Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry.

The Truman administration's decision to embark on an arms build-up in 1950 was a critical event. For the first time other than a World War, the United States became a global military presence. Unlike the World Wars, in this instance the deployment lasted decades, altering the nature of the Cold War and the United States' global role. The author details the strategy and politics behind this decision.

Is nuclear war just around the corner? Cimbala argues that nuclear complacency could cause a nuclear war in the 21st century. He reviews pertinent Cold War history to show the difficulty that Americans and Soviets experienced in adjusting their military thinking to the realities of nuclear stalemate. He suggests that the end of the Cold War released many of the brakes on belligerency and brinkmanship that developed as U.S. and Soviet leaders learned nuclear aversion by hard experience. Diminished credibility of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century only increases the likelihood of a post-Cold War stumble into nuclear disaster.

How and why did the Cold War begin? How and why did it end? What will its end mean for international relations? Opening his new book with the drama of people struggling to survive in rubble-strewn countries after the Second World War, Thomas G. Paterson follows the long Cold War crisis though to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He examines features of the international system that guaranteed conflict: the great-power quest for order by building spheres of influence; the power, ideology, and strategic-economic needs of the United States and the Soviet Union that compelled activist, global foreign policies; and the personalities of key figures, from Truman to Bush, Stalin to Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In his exploration of the end of the Cold War, the author concludes that the two superpowers sought detente because they had been weakened by the economic costs of the Cold War, challenges from allies, and the diffusion of power in the international system after the rise,of the Third World. As historical story and analysis, On Every Front provides a telling account of an era - of the making and unmaking of the Cold War.

In this fascinating new interpretation of Cold War history, John Lewis Gaddis focuses on how the United States and the Soviet Union have managed to get through more than four decades of Cold War confrontation without going to war with one another. Using recently-declassified American and British documents, Gaddis argues that the postwar international system has contained previously unsuspected elements of stability. This provocative reassessment of contemporary history--particularly as it relates to the current status of Soviet-American relations--will certainly generate discussion, controversy, and important new perspectives on both past and present aspects of the age in which we live.

The rhetoric that immediately followed World War II created the political environment that resulted in a new world order, and in this work Hinds and Windt examine how this national and international reality developed. They study the process that led to perceptions of threat, and subsequent policies based on these perceptions, by exploring the pre-existing set of rhetorical beliefs as well as the speeches and addresses that built upon them. Among the topics covered are Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, the Truman Doctrine, and Marshall's speech announcing the Marshall Plan.

Presenting a new interpretation of the British government's policy toward Germany from the period of Churchill and Eden to that of Attlee and Bevin, this study exploits recently released documents to illuminate the strategic maneuverings of West and East over Germany and the emergence of the Cold War.

"A masterly review of the early pahses of the conflict between the United States, Russia, China and their respective allies from 1946 to the Cuban missle crisis in the autumn of 1962. It is clear, thorough and judicious; in short, magnificent."--The Economist "...Gaddis has done a thorough job of collating material from these diverse sources...and constructing a trenchant analysis that puts these fascinating tidbits into context."--San Francisco Chronicle & Examiner Based on the latest findings of Cold War historians and extensive research in American archives as well as the recently opened archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China, We Now Know provides a vividly written, eye-opening account of the Cold War during the years from the end of World War II to the Cuban missile crisis. The book brims with new information drawn from previously unavailable sources, with fresh insight into the impact of ideology, economics, and nuclear weapons, and with striking reinterpretations of the roles of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, Mao, and Stalin. Indeed, Gaddis concludes that if there was one factor that made the Cold War unavoidable it was Stalin.

Did the West "win" the Cold War? Was it a genuine or a contrived conflict? When did it begin? How was its cause related to its end? Has it ended, or has it merely changed? In this volume, contributors assess the combination of socio-political forces and events they attribute to the ending of the Cold War. In diverse theories they challenge the self-serving orthodoxy that claims Western military prowess, economic strength, and ideological superiority produced "the triumph."

Mason provides concise coverage of the entire Cold War, paying particular attention to the Soviet-American dimension. This pamphlet:* Analyzes the origins of the conflict* Examines how the existence of nuclear weapons gives a unique character to the period* Discusses the involvement of other nations and regions, particularly China* Explains how and why the cold war ended* Draws on recent research of revisionist scholars.