Pakistan is an integral part of South Asia in geographic, cultural, linguistic and historic terms but its rulers have emphasized the country's relations with the Middle East since independence in 1947. The desire to simultaneously find national cohesion and a significant role on the world stage has shaped Pakistan's history as that of a state in search of a national identity. This article analyzes Pakistan's foreign policy, right from its origins, in order to explain this key feature of its external relations. The emphasis on ideology led to a foreign policy that rested on Islam and Islamic unity as its principal drivers. Just as Islamic ideology was to be a substitute for nationalism and the basis for a distinct Pakistani personality, Pakistan's foreign policy highlighted closer ties with Muslim Middle Eastern nations at the expense of normal relations with India.
Keywords: South Asia, Pakistan, Islam, Foreign Policy, India, Ideology, Nationalism, Middle East, United States.
After the creation of Pakistan the feeling of brotherhood and sympathy with the cause of the Arab world became all the more crystallized and found an unambiguous expression in the country's foreign policy which is in fact a carry over policy pursued by Muslims of the subcontinent during the last one century.--Zafar Mansoor, 'Pakistan's contribution to Arabs cause,' Dawn, August 14, 1959 (1)
Pakistan is an integral part of South Asia in geographic, cultural, linguistic and historic terms, but its rulers have emphasized the country's relations with the Middle East since independence in 1947. It seems that Pakistan has been making a conscious effort to redefine or escape its shared heritage with India, out of which it was carved at the end of the British Raj. Closer identification with the Middle East is part of that strategic decision that is aimed at consolidating a unique Pakistani identity. Each one of Pakistan's principal ethnic and language groups overlaps with neighbouring countries, leaving the Islamic religion as the only readily available unifying factor. Pakistan, some scholars argue, has 'nationalism without a nation' (2) because of the difficulties that have emerged in defining Pakistani nationalism and nationhood.
Nationalism refers to the attitude that the members of a nation have about their national identity. (3) Ernst Gellner describes nationalism as 'a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.' (4) In the case of Pakistan, divergent ethnic and cultural characteristics vie with the identity provided by the political unit. The solution offered over the years has been to emphasize the shared Islamic religion over other attributes of national distinctiveness. In the sphere of foreign policy, the religious dimension has resulted in accentuating affinity with the Islamic Middle East. Pakistan's conscious attempts to redefine its locus have resulted in some ironies: India's name is derived from the river Indus, which now flows primarily through Pakistan. Most of Pakistan's pre-partition history is the same as that of India. The term Pakistan is an acronym patterned on place names used in Central Asia, (5) names that were brought to India by rulers of Central Asian origin. They are not Arabic in origin. Pakistanis do not speak any of the major languages identified with the Middle East-Arabic, Persian and Turkish--and their cuisine and costumes, too, have greater similarity with South Asian food and clothing. With the exception of the Islamic religion, Pakistan has less in common with the Arab Middle East than it does with India and the rest of South Asia.
Pakistan's relatively short history provides evidence for the constructivist argument that states have constructed collective identities and that these identities define their behaviour in the international system. (6) The identity leaders choose or try to create for a nation impacts both domestic politics and foreign policy. In Pakistan's case, the conscious decision to construct an ideology-based national identity was couched in what can be described as a realist foreign policy based on securing the new-born Pakistani state against an existential threat from India, out of which it had been carved. Assertions by leaders of independent India to the effect that Pakistan's creation amounted to 'the vivisection of mother India' (7) were seen as a security challenge of gigantic proportions. Constructing a Pakistani identity was considered as much a matter of national survival, lest the country be reabsorbed into India, as one of national construction.
The term identity is referred to in this paper as an umbrella term used in social sciences to refer to an individual's comprehension of other as a discrete or separate entity. According to the Social Identity Theory developed by Henri Tajfel and J.C. Turner, humans classify themselves and others into different social categories like gender, organizational membership, and religious affiliation, among others. The aim of this classification is twofold--one, to provide a means to define others and second, to define oneself. (8) Identity is important in defining nationhood because, as constructivist author Benedict Anderson points out, nations are:
imagined political communities ... imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.... it is a community because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship. (9)
Soon after partition, Pakistani leaders faced the question of defining a Pakistani national identity distinct from that of India. Pakistan's various provinces had ethnic or linguistic distinctiveness, which provided a basis for ethnic- or language-based nationalism, while their shared historical experience and heritage linked them to India as well. Pakistan had to be different from India if partition was to be justified and that raised the question of Pakistani identity. Pakistan's first military ruler General Ayub Khan, who ruled from 1958-1969, and as army commander-in-chief played a crucial role in the country's formative years, explained the problem when he wrote:
Till the advent of Pakistan none of us was in fact a Pakistani.... prior to 1947 our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition ... ideologically we were Muslims, territorially we happened to be Indians, and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller, provincial loyalties ... (10)
Echoing the sentiment of the country's founding fathers, Khan defined Pakistan's 'ultimate aim' as striving to become a 'sound, solid and cohesive nation,' one able to play its 'destined role in world history.' (11) The desire to simultaneously find national cohesion and a significant role on the world stage has shaped Pakistan's history as that of a state in search of a national identity. The key question in political discourse about Pakistan has been whether Pakistan is a 'land for Muslims' or a 'nation of Muslims moving towards its destiny as an Islamic state.' (12)
Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, defined Pakistani nationalism in terms of an ideology, most likely borrowing the concept from European philosophers who used the word to denote ideas that functioned to 'maintain the existing social order.' (13) The notion of ideology as a label for 'scientific ideas and human ideals' had started in 1801 with French philosopher Destutt de Tracy; Marx and Engels had given it a sociological meaning in The German Ideology and Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia (1929) made distinctions between 'particular and total conceptions of ideology.' (14) Liaquat Ali Khan stressed that Pakistan was an ideological state and wondered, while advocating Pan-Islamic unity, 'Why cannot the Muslim peoples get together to protect themselves and show to the world that they have an ideology and a way of life which ensures peace and harmony in the world?' (15) Ayub Khan went further and explained both the need for a national ideology and its definition in Pakistan's case. 'Man as an animal is moved by basic instincts for preservation of life and continuance of race but as a being conscious of his power of thinking he has the power to control and modify his instincts. His greatest yearning is for an ideology for which he should be able to lay down his life,' (16) he wrote. Ayub Khan argued that:
the more noble and eternal an ideology, the better the individual and the people professing it. Their lives will be much richer, more creative and they will have an enormous power of cohesion and resistance. Such a society can conceivably be bent but never broken. Such an ideology with us is obviously that of Islam. It was on that basis that we fought for and got Pakistan, but having got it, we failed to order our lives in accordance with it ... The time has now come when we must ... define this ideology in simple but modern terms and put it to the people, so that they can use it as a code of guidance. (17)
A national ideology, based on and derived from Islam, would serve as an answer to questions of national identity and would define Pakistani nationalism.
Ideological Foreign Policy
Having decided to define Pakistan as a state guided by an inadequately defined Islamic ideology, Pakistan's early leaders sought global friends, allies and partners for their new country. The emphasis on ideology led to a foreign policy that rested on Islam and Islamic unity as its principal drivers. Just as Islamic ideology was to be a substitute for nationalism and the basis for a distinct Pakistani personality, Pakistan's foreign policy highlighted closer ties with Muslim Middle Eastern nations at the expense of normal relations with India. During the Cold War, Pakistan willingly became the eastern anchor of the United States' security strategy in the Middle East by joining the Baghdad Pact and subsequently the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). More recently, some Pakistanis have made the argument that 'Pakistan is a nation that is part of the historical, linguistic and cultural system of a Greater Middle East' (18) and thus not a part of an India-centred South Asia.
More recently, this thinking is reflected in the view that Pakistan should bypass South Asia and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) because the latter is only an umbrella to legitimise Indian hegemony. (19) Pakistan's official narrative of its history reinforces the belief that Pakistan was created not in 1947, but rather twelve centuries earlier, when Islam was introduced to India as a result of the annexation of Sindh (in 712 AD) by the Arab-Muslim Umayyad Empire. The shared history of the peoples of South Asia has been rewritten to stress the divergence and difference between the two principal religious communities, Hindus and Muslims. The thirteen centuries since the conquest of Sindh are described in Pakistani school textbooks as a struggle by Muslims to maintain their distinctiveness and the creation of an independent Pakistan is the culmination of that struggle. Instead of being seen as two communities that lived together and adapted to each other, Hindus and Muslims in South Asia are viewed as two parallel streams flowing in the same general land mass but never actually meeting or merging. Pakistan's foreign policy has been cast in the same terms: because India is dominated by Hindus, with whom Muslims have little in common, Pakistan must draw closer to the Muslim states to its west. The major problem with this outlook has been the reluctance, particularly of the Arab nations, to accept Pakistanis as their cultural kin, notwithstanding enhanced economic and military cooperation in recent years, particularly with the Gulf Arab monarchies. Pakistan has thus been deprived of its rightful place in the South Asian region without being fully accepted by the Middle East. Pakistan's ideological orientation has accentuated conflict between India and Pakistan without ensuring that the Arab Middle East will be firmly in Pakistan's corner.
S.M. Burke wrote the last major academic work on Pakistan's foreign policy in 1973 (Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, London, Oxford University Press, 1973), tracing the mainsprings of Pakistan's foreign policy (20) to Islam. Burke cited Liaquat Ali Khan who said: 'Even when we were subject people we regarded the distress of Muslim countries as our own..... today we are bound by those natural postulates of Islamic Fraternity which were formulated for our guidance thirteen centuries ago ...' (21) According to Burke, Pakistan's emphasis on its relations with Muslim countries, and its joining the anti-Communist alliance, was directly related to Pakistan's Islamic orientation. In Burke's view, Islam divided the world into black and white, friend and foe for Pakistan's founding generation. Pakistan's pan-Islamist foreign policy was tied to an international vision for Islam. Indian Muslims believed they were part of a global Ummah (22) long before partition and this belief was reflected in their vision for Pakistan. Aslam Siddiqui, in his classic work on Pakistan's security (Pakistan seeks Security, Lahore, Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), defended the path followed by Pakistan since its inception on grounds of the security hazards faced by Pakistan and the country's geo-political circumstances. The perennial fear of a life-threatening conflict with its larger and ideologically different neighbour--a Hindu India--lies as the core of Siddiqui's argument. (23) It is an argument repeated often by Pakistani officials and scholars. Indians did not accept Pakistan willingly, they assert, and in their view Indian opposition to the idea of Pakistan posed an existential threat to the new nation since its inception. Orientation towards the Middle East provided potential allies in Pakistan's existential struggle while, at the same time, satisfying the need for national cohesion through Islamic ideology.
Husain Haqqani, in his recent work on Pakistan (Pakistan between Mosque and Military, Washington DC., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), emphasizes the key role of identity and ideology in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies. For Haqqani, Pakistan's founders 'used' (24) religious nationalism to bind the country and the anti-India sentiment tied into this. In order to be able to stand up to India, Pakistan needed allies, both in the West and the Muslim world. Issues of 'national identity, territorial integrity and independence' (25) have been the key focus of Pakistan for Hasan Askari Rizvi, another Pakistani political scientist. Internally, the problems were the fragile political-economic institutions and the deep ethnic, linguistic, regional and economic cleavages. Externally, Pakistan faced a hostile geo-strategic environment with a militarily superior neighbour, India, against whom Pakistan had no territorial depth in the event of a military conflict. Gowher Rizvi (26), a Bangladeshi, speaks of the weak idea of the Pakistani state, the absence of consensus among the elite on the evolution of stable democratic institutions, and the ethnic tensions in the various provinces as contributing factors to authoritarian military-bureaucratic decision-makers deciding to frame an India-centric, militarily-driven foreign policy. According to Stephen P. Cohen, the idea of Pakistan was 'a homeland for Indian Muslims and an ideological and political leader of the Islamic world.' (27) Pakistan's foreign policy has been influenced by the desire of its influential leaders to serve as a 'beacon for oppressed or backward Muslim communities elsewhere in the world' (28) as well as to be a true Islamic state.
South Asian Muslims and the lure of pan-Islamism
Pakistan had little history of its own to appeal to but that of the Indian civilization (including India's Muslim history) it had broken away from. It could have taken one of two roads: acknowledge its Indian history and lay itself open to constant critique over its raison d'etre or try and craft a narrative of history that matched its current ambitions. Pakistan's leaders opted for the latter and, in doing so, searched for episodic evidence in the relatively recent history of Indian Muslims. Before partition, most Indian Muslims had viewed pan-Islamism--the feeling of belonging to a global Islamic community--and Indian-ness as two sides of the same coin. (29) Born and brought up in India, they took pride in their Indian identity. As descendants of India's rulers and of the dominant political class of the pre-British era, Indian Muslims took pride in their political and administrative accomplishments as well as in their cultural and architectural ones. (30) They also took pride in the historic ties of Indian Muslims with other Muslim countries over the ages. Until the advent of representative institutions and parliamentary democracy, this pan-Islamist outlook was largely cultural and religious; it did not have a political tinge. Though there were cultural and religious ties with other Muslim empires, and an acknowledgement of the spiritual authority of the Caliphate in earlier centuries, there was no demand for a pan-Islamic political entity.
The loss of political power to the British and the rise of democratic nationalism as the ideology of anti-colonialism may have led India's Muslims to reinforce their ties with the larger Muslim world outside India. The increasingly political reorientation of the pan-Islamist outlook of India's pre-partition Muslims is a modern phenomenon. It can best be understood in the context of heightened Muslim awareness of their status as a minority in British India. The introduction of representative democracy by the British at the turn of the twentieth century, even though limited in nature, awakened the Muslim political leadership to the significance of numbers. Despite being under Muslim rule from the tenth century onwards, India had remained largely Hindu. Being rulers for so many centuries, their numerical inferiority vis-a-vis the Hindus had never concerned Muslims. In the age of parliamentary democracy, however, numbers mattered far more than in the era of Muslim monarchs.
With the rise of political organizations demanding the creation of representative institutions at all levels in India, there was also a rise of majority consciousness. Though the Indian National Congress was a secular party, it was dominated by Hindus. The need to safeguard the interests of the minority led Muslims to set up organizations that would champion their interests as well as demand safeguards from the British for Muslims. The initial claim for safeguards put forth both before the British and the Congress by the All Indian Muslim League after its founding in 1906 was later encapsulated in the demand for parity with the Hindus. The ground for demanding parity with the Hindus that ultimately led to the call for Pakistan was based on the belief that both Hindus and Muslims had a right to rule and live in India. The Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations living in India and both had equal right to India and Indian territory. For Muslims, strength in numbers was lacking within India but could be obtained by appealing to the Ummah abroad. This explains the rise of pan-Islamism in India through the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Dr. M.A. Ansari, who led the Muslim medical mission to the Balkans during the Balkan War in 1912, points out that 'Pan-Islamic sentiment has been one of the Indian Moslem's most sacred and exalted passions.' (31)
Unable to find strength in numbers in India, Muslim leaders turned to the larger Muslim Ummah for support. Right from the 1877 Russo-Turkish War until the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the Indian Muslim leaders championed the cause of the Ottoman Caliphate. Since in many theatres of conflict the British were involved in one way or another against Muslims, it was easy for India's Muslims to link their pan-Islamism to their sentiments against the British colonial power.
During the First World War, the British promised to treat the Turks fairly after the War. The breaking of this promise and concern about the fate of the caliphate led to the first Hindu-Muslim mass agitation against the British, the 1919-20 Khilafat and Non Cooperation agitations. With the abrogation of the Caliphate in 1924, the major issue championed by Indian Muslims (and later by Pakistan) was the Palestine issue. A Palestine Fund was set up in the 1920s and so was the Red Crescent, which sent medical missions to aide fellow Muslims in the Middle East. The 1930s and 1940s saw continued antagonism between the two major Indian political parties, the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. The continued conflict and sparring between these two parties and the failure of repeated attempts at compromise resulted in the worsening of relations not just between the two parties but also between the two communities.
The initial Muslim demand for separate electorates over the course of the years metamorphosed into a demand for an independent Muslim state of Pakistan. The continued intransigence of the Congress Hindu leadership prevented any compromise on the issue. Eventually, the British Indian Empire was partitioned into the two independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947. The new Pakistani state was separated from the heart of the Muslim empire in South Asia, which now formed part of India. For centuries Delhi had been the consistent capital of India's Muslim empires. The legacy of Indo-Muslim culture had evolved in kingdoms such as Oudh, Hyderabad, Rampur, Bhopal, Murshidabad, Golconda and Bijapur. The territory of these former kingdoms was also located now in India and not in Pakistan.
As if the lack of historical continuity was not enough, the logic and legitimacy of Pakistan was questioned by many around the world, not least by India's post-independence leadership. Pakistan was created in the teeth of rejection and intellectual opposition to the idea. All countries welcomed India's entrance on the world stage, but there was widespread criticism of the creation of Pakistan. (32) The dominant Western attitude of both scholars and politicians was negative and, to Pakistan's surprise, the attitude of most of the countries in the Muslim world was not as friendly as expected. Under such circumstances, Pakistan's leaders were pressured to constantly justify their country's creation.
Insecurity against India
Pakistan's founders added ideology to geography and history as factors in shaping their foreign policy by linking geopolitical realities to ideological concerns. From the perspective of Pakistan's policy makers, their country had been born in an atmosphere of hostility, mistrust and insecurity. It was surrounded by states that not only resented its creation but (in Afghanistan's case) also laid claim to territory Pakistan called its own. It did not matter that Afghanistan was itself a majority Muslim state; its ambitions and its potential to create problems for Pakistan made it an ally of Pakistan's enemy, India. Pashtun nationalism, which Afghanistan championed at the time, was as much a threat to Pakistan's existence as India's supposed refusal to come to terms with the idea of Pakistan. Pakistan fought back by encouraging Islamism in Afghanistan to counteract Pashtun nationalism.
Pakistan's relations soon after independence were bitter with both India and Afghanistan, leading to the fear of being caught in a pincer. Afghanistan was the only country to protest against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations. The Pakistan-Afghan border was demarcated in 1893 as the frontier between Afghanistan and the British Raj. It was an arbitrary boundary that divided tribes and the predominant Afghan ethnic group, the Pashtuns. In 1947, Afghanistan argued that the treaty establishing the Durand Line in 1893 was between Britain and Afghanistan. Now, with the creation of a new country, the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan had to be negotiated afresh. Afghan support for the creation of a state of "Pashtunistan," which would include the Pakistani North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, posed a significant threat to the concept of a Pakistani state in its initial years. The desire to contain Afghanistan has been as important for Pakistani policy makers as the notion of keeping India at bay.
Pakistan's foreign policy, even 59 years later, can be understood only in the context of this fundamental insecurity, exemplified by the dispute with India over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The 562 princely states in pre-partition India had, on the dissolution of the British Raj, the choice of acceding to either Pakistan or India, preferably based on the will of their people and their geographic continuity to the state they wished to join. Kashmir was contiguous to both countries, had a Muslim-majority population, and was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. The Kashmiri ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, initially refused to join either country. However, when faced with a rebellion in his kingdom, aided by Pakistan, he signed the instrument of accession to India. This led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947-48, which ended only after a ceasefire ordered by the United Nations. For India, Kashmir reflects its secular identity and the fear that its secession might lead to balkanisation of the multi-ethnic, multi-religious Indian state. For Pakistan, Kashmir is the 'unfinished business' of India's partition. It represents the letter 'K' in the acronym 'Pakistan.' If a Muslim majority province stays part of India, then the ideological basis for the setting up of a separate homeland for Muslims in the sub-continent comes into question. (33) Lacking in resources to defend itself against Indian-backed efforts to undermine its nationhood, Pakistan's leadership saw alliances with stronger and ideologically similar countries as the way out. Pakistan's pursuit of alliances with the West and the Muslim world were partly the outcome of this strategy.
Pakistan entered into a number of Cold War security arrangements with the United States to obtain economic and military assistance: the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and a mutual defence treaty with the United States in 1959. The latter ensured that Pakistan would get economic and military assistance from the United States to preserve the 'independence and integrity of Pakistan' and in return Pakistan would provide the United States with an air base in Peshawar. The alliance with the West notwithstanding, Pakistan's ties with the Muslim world, especially the Middle Eastern countries, has also been a key aspect of its foreign policy orientation.
During the 1950s, Pakistan's attempts at fostering pan-Islamism and building an Islamic bloc, of which Pakistan would be the leader, were less successful. In an era of de-colonization and nationalism, pan-Islamism was not a popular concept, especially in the Arab world, and Pakistan's attempts at trying to build pan-Islamic institutions and assume leadership of the Muslim world were resented by other, older Muslim states such as Egypt. (34) The announcement in 1949 by the President of the Pakistan Muslim League, Chaudhry Khaliquz Zaman, that the aim of Pakistan was to create a pan-Islamic entity, called Islamistan, was deeply resented by Arab leaders. (35) Attempts by Pakistan to hold a Conference of Muslim States at Karachi in 1949 failed, though it subsequently was able to hold the non-governmental Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami (World Muslim Congress) conferences in 1949 and 1951. Pakistan's efforts to promote international cooperation among Muslim states bore fruit with the formation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1969, but the OIC remains less effective than most inter-governmental regional cooperation organizations. Arab leaders, in particular, have never shared Pakistan's professed view of India as a threat to Islam.
For its part, Pakistan has continued trying to get Muslim support for its position on Kashmir in return for Pakistan's support for Muslim countries and peoples. Pakistani diplomats championed the cause of self-determination for fellow Muslims at the United Nations soon after Pakistan's independence. Pakistani efforts on behalf of Indonesia, Algeria, Tunisia and Eritrea were significant, but it was as a vocal champion of the Palestine cause that Pakistan tried hardest to establish its credentials as a leading Muslim country. Pakistani economic and moral support for Palestinians has been pronounced even after Pakistani troops joined the forces of Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan in virtually eliminating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 'Black September' of 1970. Until recently, Pakistan refused to maintain any relations with Israel, going to the extent of forfeiting matches in sporting events rather than allowing Pakistani sportsmen to face an Israeli player. That has changed somewhat over the last two years, in conjunction with Arab proposals to recognise Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank, and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.
The strategic and economic alliance with the West helped Pakistan somewhat, but never resolved its basic insecurity. Pakistan's primary reason for searching for allies and wanting to build up its strength was to stand up to India. Although the West and the United States gave Pakistan considerable aid, they never stopped building ties with India. From the perspective of Pakistan's leaders, the West could not be trusted as a permanent ally in Pakistan's competition with India. This view was reinforced when, during the 1965 war with India, the U.S. suspended military supplies to both belligerents, adversely affecting Pakistan's capacity for prolonged conflict. For Pakistani leaders, the only trustworthy permanent allies could be those with an ideological affinity with Pakistan.
Pakistan's Middle Eastern focus has also to be seen in the context of its strategic insecurity apropos India and its psychological unease with its own identity. The ties of Islam were expected to ensure that the Muslim countries would always side with Pakistan, not India. Pakistan's leaders did not take into account that 35 million Muslims had stayed behind in India after partition and that in subsequent years their number had increased significantly. India had been a leader of the non-aligned movement, which Pakistan could not join as it was a member of western alliances. Several Muslim countries, notably Egypt, played an important role in non-alignment. During the early years, Indian diplomats made it a point to remind Muslim countries of India's own Muslim heritage. India was seen by many Arab leaders as closer to their own anti-colonial worldview than Pakistan, which was seen as a U.S. protege. Apart from the attraction of close ties with India as the world's largest secular democracy and a potential leader of the third world, India's large Muslim population made it impossible for Muslim countries to decisively choose Pakistan over India.
Although Pakistan has been a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since its founding in 1985, Pakistan continues to give greater importance to its membership of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Some Pakistani scholars and journalists reflecting the thinking of Pakistan's establishment assert that active membership of the OIC and a low-key association with SAARC denies legitimacy to an India-centric organization. Established to foster the economic and social development of South Asia, SAARC has been adversely affected by India-Pakistan animosity. The South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) was signed in 1993, but it took 11 years to agree to the formation of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). (36) Even now, Pakistan's refusal to grant India Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status results in much less regional trade in South Asia than between, say, Southeast Asian states belonging to ASEAN. Pakistan continues to see itself as a nation at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia, and insists on bypassing its South Asian identity.
Reborn Pan-Islamism and Jihadism
The idea of Pakistan received a major blow when, after a violent civil war in East Pakistan and a war with India in 1971, Pakistan broke up into two countries less than a quarter century after its creation. East Pakistan had secured independence as Bangladesh and Bengali cultural nationalism had trumped the concept of a Pakistan united by Islam. If ever there was need to revisit the ideological justifications for Pakistan, it was then, but the domestic scars of the break-up of Pakistan were traumatic. Pakistan's leadership did not turn away from its founding ideology and decided instead to emphasize it afresh; the impact of Bangladesh's separation on Pakistan's foreign policy was profound and long lasting. India was blamed for trying to break up Pakistan, and there was a renewed attempt to seek long-term allies to secure Pakistan against Indian efforts to undermine it. The unwillingness of the United States to militarily safeguard Pakistan's unity was seen as proof of American unreliability. Pakistan had to build its own deterrent against India and there was a tendency to rely even more on the Islamic Ummah.
The conservative monarchy in Saudi Arabia and the newly emerging oil-rich Gulf countries became major economic and political allies of Pakistan in the years immediately following the country's 1971 bifurcation. Another legacy of the 1971 war was that, with the breaking away of East Pakistan, the Pakistani policy establishment felt that there were even lesser ties with South and South East Asia; Pakistan could now identify itself as part of an enlarged Middle East. The 1973 Arab-Israel war and the subsequent oil crisis led to two developments--a rise in the surplus wealth of the Gulf countries and an expanded appeal to pan-Islamism encouraged by Saudi Arabia. In 1969, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), an organization of Muslim countries from around the world, had been set up in Jeddah. Pakistan held the second Islamic Summit Meeting at Lahore in 1974, leading to the energizing of an otherwise moribund organization. The Rabita al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim League), established in Saudi Arabia in 1964 to advance conservative Islamic causes, also had ties with Pakistan, boosting the fortunes of pan-Islamism even further. The ties between Pakistan and the Gulf countries were advanced even more as Pakistani workers started going to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in large numbers. Saudi charities were invited and encouraged to fund the setting up of Wahabi madrassas and universities in Pakistan from the mid-1970s onwards.
Several geo-politically significant events in 1979 helped expand Pakistan's pan-Islamic commitment. Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution brought to an end America's strategy of depending on Iran as its key security ally in the Gulf region. As Iran proceeded to export its revolution to other Muslim countries, the United States found it convenient to back Saudi Arabia in its quest for leadership of Sunni Islam. The Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, to prop up a weak communist regime in Kabul, paved the way for a Pakistan-led and United States-backed jihad against "godless communism" in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis had maintained close ties with Afghan Islamist groups, and had aided them in waging a guerrilla war against Afghanistan's communists even before the Soviet intervention. (37) Once the Soviet troops landed in Afghanistan, Pakistan was able to argue that it might be the next target for Soviet expansion. Even those American strategists who found Pakistani fears of Soviet attack unreal agreed that the jihad in Afghanistan presented an opportunity for the U.S. to bleed the Soviets through a painful guerrilla war. The United States and its allies aided Pakistan in training and equipping mujahideen (holy warriors) to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. (38) Pakistan benefited from enormous aid, both military and economic, which flowed in both from the West as well as from the Gulf Arab countries. (39)
The funding of the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad by the Gulf countries, and the attempts to attack the 'soft Soviet underbelly' by spreading Islamist radicalism into Soviet Central Asia, was in tune with Pakistan's alignment with the Middle East, as opposed to South Asia. The Afghan jihad accentuated Pakistan's view of itself as a crucial crossroads country, and created an interest in a Central Asian role for Pakistan, in addition to its decades old Middle East orientation. While the United States saw the Afghan jihad as an opportunity to inflict military damage on the Soviet Union--a sort of 'Soviet Vietnam'--the war had an entirely different significance for Pakistan. (40) Strategic planners in Islamabad considered the massive enterprise of jihad in Afghanistan as the beginning of a multi-stage Pakistan project to curtail India's influence in Pakistan's neighbourhood (i.e. Afghanistan), but also as building Pakistan's military strength by large-scale military aid from the United States. Pakistan hoped to replicate the experience of the Afghan jihad in similar covert operations against India in the Indian states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir by fomenting rebellion among Sikhs and Muslims, respectively. (41)
Pakistan's view of the Afghan jihad involved the introduction of Islamist fighters from all over the world. As Islamist guerrillas trained alongside the Afghan resistance fighters, Pakistan expected to enhance its leverage in conflicts involving Muslims around the globe. The plan was to create a pocket of support for Pakistan within Muslim countries as well as in disaffected Muslim minority communities. Pakistan expected the Afghan jihad to enhance Pakistan's geo-strategic influence. Gen Hamid Gul, former head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), explained in 1989, 'We are fighting a jihad [in Afghanistan] and this is the first Islamic international brigade in the modern era. The communists have their international brigades, the West has NATO, why can't the Muslims unite and form a common front?' (42)
While fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan with American backing, Pakistan also trained mujahideen fighters for covert war in Kashmir. After fighting three wars against India and not winning any of them, a covert war seemed both cheaper and more effective. Pakistan could not be blamed for what was happening as the 'mujahideen' were not 'regular forces' for whom Pakistan needed to take responsibility. Proxy war by jihad was also a cheaper way to hurt a militarily and economically stronger enemy. Internal developments inside Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir provided the Pakistanis the 'cover' or 'justification' they needed for launching a Kashmir jihad. Resentment against the Indian Central government's meddling in state politics, and the rigging of state elections, led to street protests and strikes. Instead of dealing with these politically, India used force, which in turn enabled the Pakistanis to launch their jihad. Pakistan denied its sponsorship of jihad in Kashmir, arguing instead that the indigenous Kashmiri protest movement had turned militant, as a reaction to India's repressive policies.
The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 as a result of the United Nations-brokered Geneva Peace accords somewhat dampened the plans of Pakistan's military and the ISI. The United States disengaged from Afghanistan once the Soviets were gone. Pakistan lost control over the mujahideen factions, some of whom refused to accept Pakistani dictates about Afghanistan's future course. A bitter civil war ensued, in which Pakistan aided hard-line Islamist Pashtun factions. Eventually, a Pakistani-aided group--the Taliban--succeeded in capturing most of Afghanistan as well as control of the capital, Kabul. The Taliban were madrassa students of Pashtun descent, many of whom had grown up in refugee camps in Pakistan during the period of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Disillusioned by the factionalism and criminal activities and by the continuing war between Afghan warlords, they saw their role as that of restoring peace, cleansing society of its ills, enforcing sharia, and establishing an Islamic way of life. (43)
Still looking away from South Asia
Pakistan saw the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as the culmination of its efforts to protect its western flank and secure its strategic depth. The Taliban's medieval outlook did not seem to bother Pakistan's leaders, who persuaded their allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to recognise the Taliban regime and to establish diplomatic relations with them. But the rest of the world did not accept the Taliban as readily. Problems for the Taliban regime accentuated when they gave refuge to Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 led to far reaching and drastic changes in Pakistan's foreign policy as well as its relations with other countries. The decision by the United States government to attack Afghanistan increased the strategic relevance of Pakistan to the U.S. In the nearly six years since the 9/11 attacks, though Pakistan has obtained vast amounts of aid--both military and economic--from the United States, its primary insecurity vis-a-vis India has prevented it from destroying the terrorist network built since the days of the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad.
Pakistan's alliance with the United States has added to its Middle Eastern orientation and that process now seems to be continuing. Since the 1950s, the United States has seen Pakistan as a partner in 'grand strategy' primarily designed with the Middle East in mind: containment of communism during the 1950s and 60s, bleeding the Soviets during the 1980s, and the global war against terrorism since 2001. Even now, Pakistan falls under the Pentagon's Central Command (CENTCOM) that deals with the Middle East and Central Asia, whereas other South Asian countries, including India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are within the sphere of the U.S. military's Pacific Command (PACOM). Washington has seldom dealt with Pakistan as a South Asian entity, thereby accentuating Pakistan's Middle Eastern focus. During the Cold War, Pakistan was the eastern-most anchor of America's 'northern tier of containment,' which led Pakistan to view itself as part of both Central Asia and the Middle East.
As mentioned earlier, many Pakistani and Western analysts treat Pakistan as part of a 'Greater Middle East.' For their part, Pakistan's leaders preferred to be seen as significant players in other regions rather than playing second fiddle to a much larger India in Southern Asia. Pakistan's open preference for the Muslim body, the OIC, vis-a-vis the South Asian entity, SAARC, as well its repeated attempts to restrain intraregional initiatives in the latter organization are some examples. With the end of the Cold War there was a reduction in Pakistan's importance as an American ally, but once again, after September 2001, Pakistan's role as a strategic U.S. ally in the war on terror has made it part of the 'Greater Middle East' in Western eyes. A recent statement made by the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, reflects this policy. Ambassador Crocker, who has served most of his diplomatic career in the Middle East and left Pakistan to become U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, said: 'Pakistan in the years to come is going to be a regional leader, and the United States being a partner, looks forward to it as the country is fully capable of utilizing its resources and capacities.' (44) Clearly, South Asia is not the region Mr. Crocker is talking about, as India, rather than Pakistan, is the region's leader.
The alliances both with the United States and with the Muslim world continue to form the basis for Pakistan's foreign policy even though the ideological paradigm of the state is being increasingly questioned in the domestic arena. The view that Afghanistan will provide strategic depth in case India attacks Pakistan means that Pakistan still looks upon the possibility of having Afghanistan as a client state. Thus, it continues to covertly aid the Taliban in the belief that, once the United States and its allies move out of this region, Afghanistan will fall back to its earlier chaotic condition (as it did in 1989 after the Geneva Accords). In that scenario, pro-Pakistan Pashtun groups, including the Taliban, will once again become major contenders for power. In the case of Kashmir, the knowledge that Pakistan might not be able to win an overt battle with India has forced the Pakistani military establishment to continue to favour the covert warfare launched under General Ziaul Haq. The aim is not only to pay India back for the 1971 military defeat, but also to inflict damage and casualties of sufficiently high magnitude that they force India to accept a deal on Kashmir favourable to Pakistan.
Pakistan's denial of its South Asian, and embrace of a Middle Eastern, identity has its roots in a fear of being a part of an India-centric South Asia. At the heart lies the belief that India and Indian leaders have not fully accepted partition and the creation of Pakistan. However, in February 1999, during his 'bus trip' to Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited the Minar-e-Pakistan (a symbol of the 1940 Lahore Resolution of the All Indian Muslim League). In the visitor's book Mr. Vajpayee wrote: 'A stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. Let no one in Pakistan be in doubt. India sincerely wishes Pakistan well.' (45) Maybe, if fifty-two years earlier at partition, such sentiments had been expressed by the Indian leadership, (46) Pakistan's leaders may not have been as worried about India threatening the very existence of their country as a separate national entity. The fear of Pakistan's policy-makers of an existential threat from India (along with a worry about being caught in a pincer movement from India and Afghanistan) might have had some basis at the time of partition, but over the years what it resulted in was an ideology to define the nation both within and without.
According to Constructivist theorists, the key to explaining foreign policies of nations lies in understanding the role of norms and identities. The security environments that nations face are not just material, but also cultural and institutional in nature. These security environments have an impact on state behaviour because they have an impact on 'state identity.' Thus, 'Norms, institutions and cultural features of domestic and international environments affect state security interests and policies.' (47) Believing in an existential threat from a stronger neighbour and faced with internal problems of an ethnically and linguistically diverse country (and initially two separate wings of a country), Pakistan's leaders saw the way out in an 'ideology' that would create 'a sound, solid and cohesive nation' and thus help Pakistan play 'its destined role in history.' (48) That ideology was Islam. Geography and history are key factors in shaping the foreign policies of nations--Pakistan's policy makers added a third dimension by adding ideology.
The belief that Pakistan is not integrally South Asian means that it is not concerned with the heavy cost inflicted on the rest of South Asia, India included, as a result of Pakistan's continuous conflicts with both India and Afghanistan. This also means that, instead of assisting India and other South Asian countries to make South Asia an economic powerhouse in the region and the world, Pakistan tries to not only downplay South Asia's importance, but remains willing to act as a spoiler for the region's other nations. Pakistan's rulers have championed pan-Islamism as a means of avoiding acknowledgement of the heritage shared by both India and Pakistan.
Geographically, linguistically, culturally and historically, South Asia is a vital part of Pakistan's personality, one that Pakistan's policy makers have been escaping by appealing to a Middle Eastern identity. Constructivism explains how important identity and ideology are for nations, especially newly carved out nations that are seeking to define their nationalism at the same time that they are trying to create their place in the world. The identity chosen by leaders to define that nation and the ideology that lies at the basis of that identity--and also reinforces it--have an impact on both domestic politics and foreign policy.
The absence of a clear, consistent, binding force other than Islam that would help define Pakistan led Pakistan's leaders soon after partition to craft an ideology with the dual purpose of forging a Pakistani national identity and attaining international legitimacy. This ideology was attributed to the fear of a perceived existential threat from India and the threat of balkanisation within the newly created country. Over time, Pakistani leaders and scholars have alternately used constructivist and realist arguments to emphasise the role of identity and ideology in formulating Pakistan's foreign policy. The existential threat to Pakistan, based on the notion that India might want to undo partition, is often overstated. There is no evidence of India seeking to reabsorb Pakistan into a greater India. In 1971, India helped create the separate Muslim state of Bangladesh in erstwhile East Pakistan instead of trying to merge it back into India, proving that India's reluctance to accept partition in 1947 does not extend to militarily seeking to reverse it.
More than the realist considerations of power politics, it is the desire of Pakistani leaders to seek their rightful place under the sun, their aim to be one of the prominent nations in the world, and the need to seek an identity for Pakistan that have been the principal factors in the Middle Eastern orientation of Pakistan's external relations. Pakistan's alliances with the United States and other western nations provided economic and military benefits, but Pakistan's definition of its ideological-political locus has been driven by the belief that, in the long-term, Pakistan's only true allies could be those with whom Pakistan shared an ideological affinity based on the Islamic religion. In effect, Pakistan's foreign policy has been shaped by this conscious attempt to 'escape' India and a perceived India-centred South Asia, leading to the adoption of a constructed 'Middle Eastern' identity.
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(1) Cited by SM Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis, 1974, p. 45
(2) See Christopher Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?, London/New Delhi, Zed Books/ Manohar, 2002
(3) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Definition of Nationalism http://plato.stanford.edu/ Last accessed May 23, 2007
(4) Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 6-7
(5) The acronym Pakistan was created in 1931 by an Indian Muslim student at Cambridge University, Rehmat Ali and his friends. It stands for P (Punjab), A (Afghania), K (Kashmir), ISTAN (Sindh and Baluchistan).
(6) For examples of books on constructivism please see works by Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt
(7) The Resolution passed by the Hindu right wing organization, the Hindu Maha Sabha, on Partition and the creation of Pakistan noted that: 'India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made integral parts thereof.' Cited by V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, Delhi, Sangam Books Ltd, 1979, p 382
(8) See Henri Tajfel and J.C. Turner, 'The Social Identity of Intergroup Behavior', in S. Worchel and L. W. Austin (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 1986
(9) Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism, London, Verso Books, 1983, pp 5-7
(10) Mohammed Ayub Khan, 'Pakistan Perspective', in Foreign Affairs, New York, July 1960, p 549
(11) Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters: A political autobiography', Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.186
(12) Ian Talbott, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998, p. 1
(13) Peter Freund, 'Ideology', Encyclopedia of Sociology, CT, DPG Reference Publishing Inc, 1981,p 132
(15) M Rafique Afzal (ed), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan ,1941-51, Research Society of Pakistan, 1967, p. 553
(16) Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A political autobiography, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp.196-197
(18) Ahmed Quraishi, 'Pakistan's Place in the Muslim World', Pakistan Link, 26 September, 2003. Accessible via http://www.pakistanlink.com
(19) Ahmed Quraishi, 'A united South Asia? No, thanks!' Jang, January 9, 2004. Accessible via http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews
(20) S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An historical analysis, London, Oxford University Press, 1973
(21) M. Rafique Afzal (ed), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan 1941-51, Research Society of Pakistan, 1967, p. 216
(22) Ummah means the Muslim community
(23) Aslam Siddiqui, Pakistan Seeks Security, Lahore, Longmans, Green & Co., 1960, pp 45-46
(24) Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, pp 20-21
(25) Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan And The Geostrategic Environment: A study of foreign policy, London, St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 4
(26) See Gowher Rizvi and Barry Buzan, South Asian Insecurity And The Great Powers, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986; Gowher Rizvi, South Asia in a Changing world Order, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1993
(27) Stephen P Cohen, 'Nation And The State of Pakistan', Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no.3, 2002, p. 109
(28) Ibid. p 109
(29) Maulana Muhammad Ali, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Muhammad Ali Jinnah represented this tradition. They were nationalist Muslims who were aligned with both the Congress and the Muslim League. They were proud to be Indian Muslims and also championed the cause of Muslims worldwide. Maulana Muhammad Ali claimed to be a Muslim first and last 'where God commands' and an Indian first and last 'where India's freedom is concerned.' Indian Round Table Conference, First Session, 1931, p 102. Cited in SM Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1974, p. 10. As Sarojini Naidu wrote in 1913 when Muhammad Ali Jinnah enrolled in the Muslim League his 'two sponsors were required to make a solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.' (Sarojini Naidu, Mohomed Ali Jinnah: An ambassador of unity: his speeches and writings, 1912-1917, Madras, Ganesh, p.1. Cited in Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The formative phase, 1857-1948, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 38)
(30) Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's Al Hilal newspaper started in 1912 focused on issues reminding Muslims about the larger Muslim world. On April 15, 1946 he also issued a statement in which he stated that over 90 million Muslims live in India and they are 'in quantity and quality a sufficiently important element in Indian life to influence decisively all questions of administration and policy. As a Muslim I for one am not prepared for a moment to give up my right to treat the whole of India as my domain and to share in the shaping of its political and economic life.' From Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Bombay, Orient Longman, 1959, p. 150
(31) RC Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol III, Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963, p. 823
(32) The wording of the resolution passed by the Indian National Congress committee on the eve of Partition said 'The picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our hearts. The All India Congress committee earnestly trusts that, when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations will be discredited and discarded by all.' From K Sarwar Hasan (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1961, p. 261. Cited in SM Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An historical analysis, London, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp 57-58
Time Magazine wrote favorably about 'the mass movement' leading to Indian Independence but called Pakistan 'the creation of one clever man, Jinnah' Time 25 August, 1947. Cited in Husain Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 2005, pp 8-10
(33) As Zulfikar Bhutto, Pakistan's first democratically elected civilian Prime Minister, said in his book 'If a Muslim majority can remain a part of India, then the raison d'etre of Pakistan collapses.... Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically.' Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, London, Oxford University Press, 1969. Cited in Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: Indo-Pakistan tensions since 1947,(New York, Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 32
(34) In a news item in the Pakistani daily 'Dawn' Egypt's King Fahrouk said that Pakistanis believe that Islam was born on 14 August 1947. Dawn 27 September, 1956. Cited in SM Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1974 p. 67
(35) Husain Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 2005, p. 18
(36) 'India-Pakistan trade stuck on SAFTA', The Hindu, 31 July, 2006, Accessible via http://www.hindu.com
(37) For further details please see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004, Especially pp. 53-59
(39) During the course of the Afghan jihad the SU sent between $36M and $48M worth of military equipment since the communist revolution started; US and Saudi and Chinese aid totaled to $6 to $12M. Cited by Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004, pp 101-102
(40) According to Former US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brezinski in a Top Secret Memo a week after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 'Our ultimate goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Even if this is not attainable, we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible.' Cited by Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004, p.51
(41) Ibid, pp.166-175
(42) Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in central Asia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 129
(43) Ahmed Rashid, 'The Taliban: Exporting extremism,' Foreign Affairs, vol 78, no.6, November-December 1999, Accessed via http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org
(44) 'Pakistan to be regional leader: Crocker,' The Dawn, 26 March, 2007, Accessible via http://www.dawn.com
(45) Pamela Philipose, 'The Symbol of Pakistan', Indian Express, 22, February 1999 Accessed via http://www.expressindia.com
(46) Many Congress leaders, however, expressed negative views. As Acharya Kripalani, then President of Congress party, said: 'Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India.' Cited in S.M.Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An historical analysis, London, Oxford University Press, 1973, p58
(47) Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and identities in world politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, pp 33-35
(48) Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters: A political autobiography', Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.186
Aparna Pande * Boston University
* Aparna Pande can be contacted at Boston University, 595 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215; or by email at: email@example.com.…