Academic journal article Federal Reserve Bulletin , Vol. 84, No. 4
Statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US. Senate, February 12, 1998
The global financial system has been evolving rapidly in recent years. New technology has radically reduced the costs of borrowing and lending across traditional national borders, facilitating the development of new instruments and drawing in new players. One result has been a massive increase in capital flows. Information is transmitted instantaneously around the world, and huge shifts in the supply and demand for funds naturally follow.
This burgeoning global system has been demonstrated to be a highly efficient structure that has significantly facilitated cross-border trade in goods and services and, accordingly, has made a substantial contribution to standards of living worldwide. Its efficiency exposes and punishes underlying economic weakness swiftly and decisively. Regrettably, it also appears to have facilitated the transmission of financial disturbances far more effectively than ever before.
As I testified three years ago, the then-emerging Mexican crisis was the first such episode associated with our new high tech international financial system. The current Asian crisis is the second.
We do not as yet fully understand the new system's dynamics. We are learning fast and need to update and modify our institutions and practices to reduce the risks inherent in the new regime. Meanwhile, we have to confront the current crisis with the institutions and techniques we have.
Many argue that the current crisis should be allowed to run its course without support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the bilateral financial backing of other nations. They assert that allowing this crisis to play out, while doubtless having additional negative effects on growth in Asia and engendering greater spillovers onto the rest of the world, is not likely to have a large or lasting impact on the United States and the world economy.
They may well be correct in their judgment. There is, however, a small but not negligible probability that the upset in East Asia could have unexpectedly negative effects on Japan, Latin America, and eastern and central Europe that, in turn, could have repercussions elsewhere, including the United States. Thus, while the probability of such an outcome may be small, its consequences, in my judgment, should not be left solely to chance. We have observed that global financial markets, as currently organized, do not always achieve an appropriate equilibrium, or at least require time to stabilize.
Opponents of IMF support also argue that the substantial financial backing, by cushioning the losses of imprudent investors, could exacerbate moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when someone can reap the rewards from his or her actions when events go well but does not suffer the full consequences when they go badly. Such a reward structure, obviously, could encourage excessive risk-taking. There has doubtless been some of that type of inappropriate risk-taking attributable to expectations of IMF bailouts, though arguably it has been the expectation of governments' support of their financial systems that has been the more obvious culprit. In any event, the expectation of broad bailouts, at least in the Asian case, has turned out to have been an illusion. Many investors in Asian economies have to date suffered substantial losses. Asian equity losses, excluding Japanese companies, since June 1997, worldwide, are estimated to have exceeded $700 billion at the end of January, of which more than $30 billion has been lost by U.S. investors. Substantial further losses have been recorded in bonds and real estate.
Moreover, the policy conditionality, associated principally with IMF lending, which dictates economic and financial discipline and structural change, helps to mitigate some of the moral hazard concerns. …