The history of the modern era has been littered with examples of failed democratic experiments. In ethnically divided societies, the introduction of democratic competition and expanded political participation has often led to disintegrative ethnic conflict.(1) Many have pointed to the impact of representational arrangements as the key factor influencing this conflict. Some advocate structural solutions which maximize the representation of all groups. Others favor systems which exclude groups, lest the political system be infected with ethnic extremism. In short, the relationship between institutions and ethnic political conflict is by no means resolved.
This paper seeks to investigate how representational mechanisms (especially electoral rules and federalism) affected the development of transitional political parties and, in turn, the development of ethnic political relations in the period immediately following the initial elections in Czechoslovakia, Latvia and Estonia from 1990-1991. Attention to the initial period of partisan development is of theoretical interest because, as several scholars have note& early developments in party evolution condition the subsequent structuring of the party system as a whole.(2) Within the context of an ethnically divided society, these developments often set the tenor for future ethnic accommodation, or conflict.(3)
The cases selected for investigation are Latvia, Estonia and Czechoslovakia. Multiple cases are investigated rather than a single case to provide a comparative yardstick by which to assess the impact of representational mechanisms. Although differences are not completely controlled for, these cases provide enough similarities as to warrant their inclusion. Each was a divided society with two major ethnic groups, one numerically smaller (the "Russians"(4) versus Baltic peoples in Estonia and Latvia, Slovaks versus Czechs in Czechoslovakia) and geographically concentrated.(5) Second, all three used a parliamentary model as an initial political framework. Finally all three cases were plagued with similar economic and political problems which were associated with post-communist transitions. However, the electoral mechanisms they employed to govern the initial elections were quite different. Latvia was a unitary system which employed the old Soviet system of single-member districts with a majority formula and two ballots; Estonia employed a variation of PR, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and a unitary system. Czechoslovakia, however, was a federal state which employed a party list proportional representation (PR) system. Another difference was the Baltic States' and Czechoslovakia's relationship to the international environment. The Baltic states during this period were not independent, and hence subject to events in Moscow. But if anything this should increase the propensity toward ethnically based partisan politics, since outside interference often raises the stakes involved and intensifies the potential for conflict along ethnic lines.(6)
Both the recent nature of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and the available evidence precludes a completely conclusive analysis of the ultimate effects of political structures on the evolution of political parties--such an analysis will have to wait until the radical changes which have so transformed Eastern Europe have been assimilated into the political structure of the countries concerned. Thus, rather than systematically test specific hypotheses, these cases will be used to suggest how representative mechanisms influenced the development of transitional parties and how this in turn affected relations between them.
REPRESENTATIONAL MECHANISMS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT
Historically, there has been considerable debate on which representational mechanisms are most apt to promote political stability in ethnically divided new democracies. Two dimensions are involved in the debate over representational mechanisms. The first dimension deals with the scope of representation or the extent to which representation is commensurate with political divisions in society. The second deals with the quality of representation, or in other words, the primary units to be represented.(7)
There has been considerable debate in the literature on whether expanded representation is beneficial or detrimental in ethnically divided states. On the one hand, the "consociational" school contends that representing groups proportionally facilitates the integration of as many subcultures as possible into the political game, thus creating the conditions for inter-ethnic cooperation.(8) Consociationalists therefore tend to favor political structures like PR electoral systems and federalism, because they prevent the consistent denial of representation to important minorities.(9) Further, by securing representation for minority groups, PR serves to facilitate the integration of disaffected groups into the political system, which ultimately leads them to moderate their demands. "Majoritarian" models of politics are inappropriate in ethnically divided societies because they systematically exclude blocs," which is "likely to result in violence and democratic collapse."(10) Thus, by promoting "segmental political parties" and their representation "instead of creating conflict ... [they] now play a constructive role in conflict resolution."(11) Moreover, in the long run, there is also the possibility that such inclusive mechanisms might also serve to activate the cleavages within ethnic blocs and hence weaken ethnic based politics as a whole.(12)
However, critics have pointed out that the introduction of PR might lead to the representation of extremist or anti-system ethnic parties, intent on the destruction of an incipient political democracy. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that such parties will necessarily moderate their demands once they have attained access.(13) In addition, critics of federalism contend that when stare borders coincide with that of the ethnic group, ethnic parties are availed representation which they often use as "springboards" for a bid at national power, or failing that, separation.(14)
Some suggest that the solution to ethnic political conflict does not lie with the scope of representation but its quality. For instance, Paul Brass criticizes the consociational remedy as leading to the "freezing" of ethnic conflicts by promoting measures which reify ethnic groups.(15) Brass suggests a different means to deal with ethnic conflict: give free play to individual competition which will ensure that the system does not discriminate on a group basis. Promoting individual competition and an individually based system of representation would diffuse ethnic conflict by undermining "the segmental cleavages of plural societies and permit inter-segmental alliances on other bases than inter-elite agreement.(16) The promotion of intra-ethnic divisions and cross-cutting cleavages leaves open the possibility for integrating divided societies on a new basis other than ethnicity and promoting, "individual rights and the future prospect of individual autonomy."(17)
In sum, there is little consensus on the effects of representational mechanisms on the development of ethnic political conflict. In part this may be due to the lack of a direct relationship between institutions and such conflict. Rather representational structures affect political parties which, in turn, foster or retard ethnic political conflict.(18)
THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSITIONAL PARTIES
Representational mechanisms affect the evolution of political parties. Most importantly, since they condition the electoral environment in which political parties operate, they influence what kinds of individuals come to dominate in the organization during the course of their evolution.(19) For Panebianco this involves the difference between those who participate in the party's activities to pursue ideological aims and those who seek self-preservation, even to the extent of compromising the ideology.(20) The latter are more apt to compromise, since compromise and moderation tends to increase the probability of winning election. On the other hand the former are often less willing to abandon ideals and hence less inclined toward political compromise.(21) In sum, when an electoral system promotes individual competition it is apt to promote individuals who value compromise within the parties; when group competition is emphasized, it is unlikely to produce such individuals.
However, the "parties" that emerged during the transition period in Eastern Europe were not well-established organizations familiar to western democracies; at best they were only transitional parties. Transitional political parties began originally as organizations whose original purpose was the pursuit of some goal other than political office. However once elections were held, these transitional parties were faced with a qualitative shift in the political incentives facing them; they now had to win and secure political office via competitive elections. In the face of these new conditions, a single important issue confronted the transitional parties: should they pursue office, even to the point of compromising their original goals, or should the organization remain true to their original principles?
Who were the transitional parties in the ethnically divided societies of Eastern Europe? Although there were a myriad of different organizations, some old, some new, three general types, defined in terms of their attitudes to ethnic political issues, can be identified.(22) The first was the broad-based alliance, or the Popular Front. Born of political dissent, the Popular Front was designed primarily to maximize political support, often at the expense of internal cohesion and discipline. The Popular Fronts claimed to be multi-ethnic organizations which recognized the existence of ethnic groups and the importance of ethnic "rights."(23) A second type was the non-ethnic communist party. The communist parties, unlike the multi-ethnic popular fronts, claimed to represent "class" groupings, such as workers and peasants, constituencies which transcended ethnic lines. However, like the popular fronts, these parties were originally designed to perform a function quite different from that of recruiting candidates and participating in competitive election, and hence were also organizations in flux. A third type of transitional party which emerged was the ethnic party. These claimed to represent the interests of a particular ethnic community and often declared themselves as the protector of that ethnic group. In the Baltic states, these included the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP) which sought to advance the national rights of ethnic Estonians, and the United Council of Labor Collectives (OSTK) and Interfront, which were formed in Estonia and Latvia among Russian-speaking workers.(24) In Czechoslovakia, such ethnically based parties included the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Hungarian Coexistence Movement in Slovakia and the Association for Moravia and Silesia in the Czech Republic.(25)
How did representational mechanisms affect developments within such transitional parties? In general I posit that the broader the scope of representation, the more likely that parties will be included in the political process. The more limited the scope of representation the more likely the ethnic parties will be excluded from the political process. Exclusion is particularly dangerous during the transition period since this will rend to lead to the rise of more irreconcilable elements within the parties who purport to represent the ethnic minority. The emergence of irreconcilable elements within these parties in turn sparks a reaction on the part of the other parties to align along ethnic lines.
However inclusion via a relatively broad scope of representation does not guarantee that the parties will moderate their demands and not pursue a separatist agenda. This would depend on the quality of representation (i.e., whether groups or individuals are the primary unit of representation) which will, in turn, affect whether the representative mechanisms promote collective identity or individual identity. Indeed, if the quality of representation is based upon groups, there is a strong incentive to couch politics in terms of conflicts between groups because doing so facilitates the pursuit of electoral success. On the other hand, representing individuals rather than groups will activate interpersonal competition between members of the same group, hence providing an incentive to couch politics in terms of individual conflicts rather than between ethnic groups.(26)
In the following sections, I will employ three cases to illustrate how different representational mechanisms affected the development of the transitional parties in Czechoslovakia, Latvia and Estonia for the period 1990-91. Particular emphasis will be placed on explicating how the scope and quality of representation affected the internal conflict over goals and identity, and how these internal conflicts affected ethnically based partisan conflict in the transitional period.
CASE 1: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Of all of the countries of Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia was nearest to the structural arrangements characteristic of the consociational solution. Federalism had been an innovation introduced during the reforms of the Dubcek era which had survived the post-1968 repression. The election law was based on the list proportional representation system used during the inter-war republic, albeit with modification. In part, this was due to the perceived necessity of quickly implementing a rapid transition to democratic government as well as establishing a measure of continuity with the first Czechoslovak Republic.(27)
While the scope of representation was tempered to some extent by the use of a 5% threshold, this threshold was established for each republic separately, rather than for the federation as a whole. This meant that the effective banner that a party had to pass was lower than if a five percent barrier had existed for the federation as a whole. Further, the threshold for election to the republican Slovak National Council was only 3% as compared to the 5% threshold established for the Czech National Council. As indicated in Table 1 this arrangement made it possible for ethnic parties to gain representation by concentrating only on individual republics. This was evidenced by the results for the SNS and the Hungarian National Movement which ran only in the Slovak republic. Although the SNS received only 3.5% of the total federation vote for the House of the People and 3.88% for the House of the Nations, it received sufficient concentrated support in the Slovak republic to surpass the 5% barrier (see Table 1).
Table 1: Czechoslovak Federal Election Results, 1990: Winners and Seat Allocations
House of People % vote % vote Party and Republic votes republic federation seats Czech Republic OF 3851172 36.19 53.15 68 CPCs 976996 13.48 9.18 15 KDU (Christian 629359 8.69 5.91 9 Democratic Union) HSDS-SMS (Society for Moravia and 572015 7.89 5.38 9 Silesia) Slovak Republic VPN 1104125 32.54 10.38 19 KDH (Christian Democratic 644008 18.98 6.05 11 Movement CPCs 468411 13.81 4.40 8 SNS 372025 10.96 3.50 6 Coexistence/ Hungarian Christian Democratic 291287 8.58 2.74 5 Movement Czech Republic OF 3613513 49.96 36.19 50 CPCs 997919 13.80 10.00 12 KDU 633053 8.75 6.33 6 HSDS-SMS 658477 9.10 6.59 7 Slovak Republic VPN 1282278 37.28 12.84 33 KDH 584571 18.66 5.85 14 CPCs 454740 13.43 4.55 12 SNS 387387 11.44 3.88 9 Coexistence/ Hungarian Christian Democratic 287426 8.49 2.88 7 Movement House of People Party and Republic % seats Czech Republic OF 45.33 CPCs 10.00 KDU (Christian 6.00 Democratic Union) HSDS-SMS (Society for Moravia and 6.00 Silesia) Slovak Republic VPN 12.67 KDH (Christian Democratic 7.33 Movement CPCs 5.33 SNS 4.00 Coexistence/ Hungarian Christian Democratic 3.33 Movement Czech Republic OF 33.33 CPCs 8.00 KDU 4.00 HSDS-SMS 4.67 Slovak Republic VPN 22.00 KDH 9.33 CPCs 8.00 SNS 6.00 Coexistence/ Hungarian Christian Democratic 4.67 Movement
Sources: Rude Pravo, June 11, 1990, 1 and 5; Rude Pravo, June 14, 1990, 1; Wightman, 1990, 323.
The quality of representation, based as it was on the use of party lists and ethnically homogenous federal states, promoted group competition over individual competition. Thus, the quality of representation, led to the emergence of politicians who pursued an ethnically based political agenda, because emphasizing group differences was perceived to be an effective way of securing and maintaining office. This was especially true in the Slovak republic particularly as the adverse effects of market reforms on the Slovak economy became increasingly apparent from 1990-1991. Thus, as Olson notes, federalism and the electoral law essentially converted the initial "country-wide elections into Republic-centric contests" which provided a strong incentive for politically affiliated parties to run as separate organizations in the two republics.(28) In sum, the incentives generated by the representational mechanisms created the incentives which affected the development of the transitional parties, which in turn paved the way for the centrifugation of Czechoslovak politics.
The Evolution of the Transitional Parties
Following the election, the initial evolutionary trajectories of the multi-ethnic alliance, the non-ethnic communist party, and the ethnic Slovak National Party were all characterized by the emergence of conflicts between those who favored transforming the parties into organizations that could stand and win elections, and those who favored retaining the "original" purpose and principles of the organization. In the Czech Civic Forum (OF) and the Slovak Public Against Violence (VPN) "reform" meant transforming the mass movements into organizationally disciplined parties with coherent political and economic programs, rather than collections of noteworthy individuals. In the VPN reform also meant taking advantage of the political opportunities presented by the effects of economic market reforms on the Slovak Republic, which necessarily put them at odds with their Czech counterparts. In the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS) this conflict involved those who favored "federalizing" the party and denouncing the party's past against those who favored maintaining the unity of the party and a link with the past communist regime.(29) In the SNS this conflict took the form of those who favored building a party and a program that would allow the party to appear as a credible coalition partner, by advocating autonomy within, as opposed to independence, from the Czechoslovak federation, which pit them against the those who favored retaining the "purer" national ideals of the original party.(30)
In each case, reformists emphasized political survival as the main reason as to why fundamental organizational changes were necessary. In the OF and the VPN this position was held by both government officials and the parliamentary faction of the Civic Forum, led by individuals like the Czech Premier Peter Pithart and Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, who pointed to the necessity of transforming the movement into an internally disciplined and "vertically" structured political party with a clear commitment to support market reforms.(31) A similar conflict also occurred in Slovakia, although the debates involved not only issues of identity, but were overlaid with growing differences within the VPN over the issue of the impact of the proposed economic reforms on Slovakia. Thus the Slovak Prime Minister Vadim Meciar demanded that the VPN reformulate its platform to take into account Slovak national concerns, particularly those relating to the attainment of Slovak sovereignty within the Federation.(32)
On the other hand, the "traditionalist" camp in both the OF and VPN, led largely by prominent former dissidents, held that the organizations should remain true to their original character as "horizontal organizations" made up of morally inspired individuals with no formal internal structures nor a formal membership. Thus according to Peter Kucera, former dissident and a member of the OF executive coordinating committee, only such an organization could "help to ensure the stability of the state."(33) Further he argued that "in this new form ... the rejection of any kind of party attitude remains the key factor."(34) This point of view was also forwarded by President Vaclav Havel, himself a former dissident and long a champion of the "mass movement" and the role of heroic individuals.(35)
A similar conflict emerged within the ranks of the non-ethnic communist party. In the CPCS, the reformists, led by the party's parliamentary component in the Federal Assembly (and especially the former film director turned politician Jiri Svoboda), sought to fundamentally redefine the party's image by disavowing any connection with the party's past. Svoboda, for instance, pushed for the CPCS's transformation into a "modern left-wing party of the electoral type."(36) Further, the reformists pushed not only for the "face-lifting" of the party's image, hut also its federalization. Federalization, it was argued, was the only way in which the party could improve its electoral prospects for the local elections, in the short ran, and the federal elections in the long run.(37)
The traditionalist group, was led by CPCS chair Ladislav Adamec and, later, Vasil Mohorita. This group, although concerned with changing the party's image, refused, according to Adamec, to accept a "total negation of the past 40 years" and contended that the only a Marxist rebirth "cleansed of deformations" could be the centerpiece of the party's identity.(38) Further, they argued that the best way to contend was to return to "democratic centralist norms" and an emphasis on "hard uncompromising struggle."(39)
In the SNS, founded in March of 1990, and widely considered the most radical of the Slovak nationalist parties,(40) a similar debate occurred. On the one hand was the party's chairman and one of its founders, Vitazoslav Moric, who argued that future successes for the party would be best guaranteed by sticking to its original goals, i.e., the demand for immediate Slovak independence through the mobilization of the "hearts of the people." Indeed, for Moric, the other parties in Slovakia would "obviously adjust" their positions on independence because they would see "our assets, assets of heart and reason."(41) On the other was the party's parliamentary contingent, led by Slovak National Council members Augustin Marko and Anton Hrnko, who favored changing the party's image and organization, and to formulate a more coherent program which would better prepare it for the local elections in November, and the national elections in 1992.(42) Further they argued that the party must adjust its demands for complete independence lest the party become politically insignificant by the time of the local elections. Indeed election polls indicated that the popularity of calls for immediate independence had declined from about 15% in the summer to 10.3% by October.(43)
In all three of these organizations, the "reformists" ultimately won. Yet the victory of the reformists in the popular front and the non-ethnic communist party, essentially led to the demise of these organizations. To be sure, the elections did provide for the emergence of a component within these organizations which was intent on political survival. However, because the elections had created politics based on republics rather than federation-wide issues, the pursuit of office meant that, in the future, political contests could be won by emphasizing differences between the republics. This effect was most apparent in the CPCS, where at the party's Congress on November 3 and 4, the delegates voted to change the name of the party from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the "Federation of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Communist Party of Slovakia." This involved the transformation of the party into a loose federation of two virtually independent party organizations, with federal organs merely acting as mere coordinating agencies.(44) The federalization of the CPCS, however, not only meant the acknowledgment that the party had to adjust in order to win election and survive (especially as the local elections drew closer) but also institutionalized ethnic differences within it. As a result, both wings of the federal party pursued their own agenda, and the Czech and Slovak communist parties grew progressively further apart, especially on the issue of overall Slovak autonomy within the federation.
The effects of the election on the SNS were different. In the case of the SNS, obtaining access to the political system (which would not have occurred had a federation wide threshold of 5% been employed) led to the emergence of a moderate alternative centered around the party's parliamentary contingent. Coupled with the opportunity for real influence on policy in Slovakia, this component argued forcefully for the postponement of the goal of immediate Slovak independence and denounced the "populist hysterics" of the Moric faction. Indeed, following the local elections on November 23-24, Moric was removed as chair at the Party's Third Congress, on March 23, 1991, and was replaced with Jozef Prokes, a physician and Slovak National Council Deputy.(45) Although the congress reaffirmed the Party's commitment to ultimate Slovak independence, it rejected the use of "illegal methods" and proclaimed that independence could only be achieved by "parliamentary and democratic" means.(46) In this sense, because the party had been able to obtain representation, this led to the moderation of the ethnic based political demands of the SNS, and channeled these into more constructive directions. This, however, did not make the SNS any less ethnic than before--it only meant that independence would now be pursued in the halls of parliament rather than on the streets of Bratislava.
In sum, the structural features of the Czechoslovaldan political system encouraged political leaders "to appeal to regional preferences rather than to country-wide concerns."(47) This structure combined regional power and leadership aspirations with latent ethnic disputes which, in turn created the centrifugal political forces which ultimately created two distinct and separate party systems, fragmenting the parties which were most committed to the maintenance of a unified federal state, and paving the way for the Czech and Slovak political "divorce."
CASE 2: LATVIA
In contrast to the Czechoslovak case, the initial Latvian legislative election of March 1990 was governed by a Soviet-style majority system within the framework of a unitary republic. Although the election was conducted while Latvia was still under Soviet control, it represented the first truly competitive election since the annexation of Latvia by the USSR in 1940. In terms of the electoral rule, the standard Soviet formula with single-member districts was employed, with the use of a series of special "electoral meetings" designed to winnow down the number of candidates competing and reduce the ease of candidate access.(48) Candidates ran as individuals, rather than on party lists. There were also several formal requirements for victory. First, at least 50 percent of registered voters in a district had to participate in the election. In case this requirement was not met then new elections would be called with new candidates. If only one or two candidates were running, and all failed to receive a majority of positive votes, then there would be new elections with new candidates.
The election brought a clear victory for the pro-independence political groupings. Candidates explicitly endorsed by the Popular Front of Latvia (PFL) won 111 seats outright (see Table 3).(49) Together with its close allies among the independent candidates (many of whom were associated with the Latvian National Independence Movement [LNIM]) the PFL could rely on a comfortable majority in the Supreme Soviet. Although primary party loyalties of the elected candidates were difficult to ascertain,(50) only thirty-nine winners in the Latvian elections were explicitly endorsed by the anti-independence International Front (Interfront). Thus, on crucial issues, where a two-thirds majority was needed, the elections produced a comfortable parliamentary majority for the proindependence forces.
Table 3: Latvian Election Results: Winners and Seat Allocation, 1990(*)
Party Seat % Total Seats Popular Front of Latvia 111 55.23 CPL 55 22.14 Interfront 13 6.49 Independents 22 10.84
Source: Sovietskaya Latviya, March 23, 1990; News, American Latvian Association, June 7, 1990
(*) affiliations estimated by author.
The Evolution of the Transitional Parties
Although to some extent the PFL's victory was due to its efforts at convincing non-Latvians that independence was necessary (since the Latvian component of the population had been reduced to a mere 52% in the republic), the fact that organizations opposed to immediate independence were not represented in sufficient numbers to influence legislation could only weaken the position of those in the communist party who favored "democratic" means to deal with the issue of independence. Further, ethnic representation in the legislature did not reflect the divisions within society, which provided for the opportunity for some politicians within the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL) to attack the republican government of ethnic one-sidedness. Indeed, of the 197 seats settled by early May, 139 went to Latvians whereas only 58 went to non-Latvians.(51)
Although the use of a majority rule probably did not disadvantage the anti-independence forces (the CPL would have lost regardless) the electoral rule did not advantage them. As a result of the poor performance of the conservatives in the CPL and Interfront, a revolt occurred within the republican communist organization, led by ultra-conservatives who blamed the "ideological double-dealers" in the party for the CPL's defeat. Following the March election, the CPL split at its 25th Congress in April, 1990, a split which occurred largely along ethnic lines.(52) The Congress, controlled by anti-independence conservatives forced the reformers to leave. The remaining delegates elected a new Central Committee with Alfreds Rubiks, former head of the Riga party organization, as First Secretary. The election of Rubiks, a vehement opponent to the republic's independence, was significant in that it provided a formal link between conservatives in the party and the neo-Stalinist Interfront.(53)
Following the split, the CPL leadership took on a decidedly more reactionary stance, engaging in open cooperation with other anti-independence and non-Latvian dominated organizations in the formation of the "Committee to Defend the USSR Constitution" in December, 1990 (commonly known as Latvian Public Salvation Committee), and adopting more extreme "ethnocentric" rhetoric. This was illustrated by statements made by Rubiks in which he accused the PFL of engaging in activities which, "leads to open confrontation" and that non-Latvians, "were even threatened with extermination."(54) More ominous however, was the increasingly open willingness, reflected in the public statements of CPL leaders, to accept extra-systemic tactics.(55)
Faced with an increasingly hostile CPL, the Popular Front of Latvia (PFL) at its Second Congress, on October 6-7 1990, closed ranks and prepared for a direct confrontation with the CPL in order to "destroy the socialist system once and for all."(56) Dainis Ivans, the moderate chairman of the PFL who had resisted close relations with nationalist radicals in the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNIM) and who had opposed completely severing links with the CPL, was ousted and replaced with Romualds Razuks. Razuks advocated closer relations with the national radicals in the LNIM and a more confrontational approach to the CPL, arguing that "we have to understand the present situation, where we are going, who is with us, and who are allies are."(57) Coinciding with these events, there emerged a growing degree of Latvian nationalism within the ranks of the PFL. For instance the PFL fraction in the Latvian National Citizens' Committee, an alternative "parliament" established by the LNIM, issued a position statement calling upon "the non-indigenous population to repatriate voluntarily," and that the presence of the non-Latvian population in the republic was "contributing to Latvia's ethnic death."(58) Although the PFL leadership stopped short of reiterating the principle of repatriation of all non-Latvians, there was some tolerance for such views.(59)
Thus, in the first year following the initial legislative election in Latvia, there was a movement towards the polarization of politics into two camps, both of which adopted ethnocentric rhetoric in their dealings with the other. On the one hand there were the communists, who by the middle of 1991 claimed to represent an "oppressed" minority; on the other, the PFL, which was becoming increasingly identified with preserving Latvian culture against the onslaught of "colonial" forces. To large extent, this emergent polarity had been sparked by the results of the March election which had limited the representation of forces committed to the maintenance of union with the USSR. As a result, the forces within the communist party which were most likely to employ democratic means to resist immediate independence were purged from the CPL. In turn, this led to a chain reaction which resulted in the weakening of those forces most committed to maintaining multi-ethnic accommodation overall, and the polarization of partisan politics along ethnic lines.
In sum, the Latvian case represents the situation where the representational mechanisms employed did not lead to the inclusion of the representatives of the opposition. This led to the emergence within the Communist Party of a irreconcilable leadership who ousted the moderates, setting oft a chain reaction of partisan confrontation between the main transitional parties in Latvia.
CASE 3: ESTONIA
Unlike the previous cases, the initial election of March 1990 in Estonia was governed by a variation of PR, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. Seats per constituency ranged from 1 to 5. The adoption of STV, however, in Estonia was not so much by design as it resulted from political compromise.(60)
Like other proportional representation systems, STV has been lauded on the grounds of its inclusiveness.(61) However, under STV, votes are not cast for party lists but rather for individual candidates.(62) Competition tends to be based on individual rather than party competition, and political parties are organized primarily as coalitions of individuals rather than as ideological blocs.(63) Thus since the quality of representation is based on individuals rather than groups, this provides for both inclusiveness and the promotion of individual rather than group competition.
Unlike in Latvia the results of the March elections prevented the political hegemony of the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE), and had produced a respectable showing for the Communists as well as for "reactionary" elements (See Table 4). Indeed, the Free-Estonia Association (the electoral front organization for the CPE) had captured 29 seats in the parliament, with the anti-independence OSTK/Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power with 27.
Table 4: Estonian Election Results, 1990: Winners and Seat Allocation(*)
Party Seats % Total Seats Popular Front of Estonia 49 46.67 Free Estonia Association/ Communist Party of Estonia 29 27.62 OSTK/Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power 27 25.71
(*) as reported in Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 23, 1990.
Did the electoral system serve to affect these results? The results were somewhat surprising, given that in pre-election polls the Free Estonia Association/CPE was expected to receive only about 18% of the vote and OSTK about 7%.(64) Part of the reason may have been due to fact that STV, unlike list PR, provided an opportunity for candidates to hide their real affiliation, hence duping the voter.(65) However, an additional factor was the way in which STV translates votes into seat allocations.(66) Given the structure of the system in which votes for candidates who received the fewest first-place votes are transferred to those who received the most, it is quite possible for candidates with relatively limited support (but who finished high enough) to receive a seat, especially in multi-member districts. This was the case in many districts such as in Tallinn and Kohtla-Jarve, where, for instance, OSTK candidates took the last available seats in the larger constituencies.(67) Whether it was because candidates were able to dupe voters, or whether the electoral system provided opportunities for parties which might not have been elected under a majority system, the results of the election were not as disastrous for the Communists and the anti-independence forces as had been the case in Latvia.
The Evolution of the Transitional Parties
The results of the election seemed to encourage the reformist leadership of the CPE, many of whom had been elected to the legislature. At the CPE 20th Congress, held immediately following the election on March 25, 1990, First Secretary Vaino Valyas claimed that the election had demonstrated the necessity of immediately transforming the party into an organization independent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in order to survive under the conditions of democratic competition.(68) Mikk Titma, the Secretary of Ideology and a leader of the Free Estonia Association, then moved for a declaration of independence from the CPSU which occurred on March 26. The delegates who opposed immediate independence then left the Congress to form their own loyalist party.(69)
Yet the split did not occur along ethnic lines. Indeed, not all Russian local organizations joined the newly established loyalist party. Several regional party organizations, upon which the loyalists had counted on for political and organizational support, opted not to join them (although the Tallinn and Tartu city organizations did). On March 29, a special plenary session of the party committees of Narva, Sillamae and Kohtla-Jarve, voted to stay with the Independent Communist Party and nominated Vladimir Malkovsky, a Russian and First Secretary of the Narva party committee, to the position as one of the secretaries of the Independent Communist Party.(70) Increasingly isolated, the Soviet loyalists, soon after the split, began to press for reconciliation with the Independent CPE. At the 21st Congress of the CPE-CPSU held in the fall of 1990 an Estonian, Lembit Annus, was elected as First Secretary of the loyalist party, and subsequently articulated a program which was far less confrontational than the policies of his predecessor, Alexander Gusev, arguing that isolation had made change necessary, "or we can expect the same fate as the Communist Parties of other East European countries."(71)
The transformation and moderation of the CPE, in turn, prevented the consolidation of an ethnic bloc based upon a PFE alliance with Estonian nationalists. Shortly before the March election the PFE had followed a policy of limited cooperation with the alternative legislature established by Estonian nationalists, the "Congress of Estonia." Indeed, several members of the Estonian Congress had been elected to the Supreme Soviet (they had run as independents during the campaign), and the PFE had participated in the elections to the Estonian Congress in February. However, following the election and the subsequent split in the CPE, relations between the PFE and the Estonian nationalists grew progressively worse. In the weeks following the election, leading PFE activists conducted a bitter press campaign against the Congress, accusing them of splitting Estonian society because demands for immediate independence would only compel the Russians in the northeast to secede. Further, they argued, what was required was not the pursuit of Estonian nationalism but the maintenance of the multi-ethnic character of the republic and the PFE.(72)
In sum, in Estonia, the use of STV contributed to preventing transitional partisan relations from aligning on exclusively ethnic lines. First, the system contributed to the representation of both the CPE and the pro-USSR conservatives by providing opportunities to win seats in key multiple member districts, and second, by allowing their candidates to hide their affiliations. The results of the election, in turn, strengthened the position of reformists in the CPE who argued for independence from the CPSU while at the same time promoting the multi-ethnic character of the party. When the inevitable split did occur within the CPE between the reformists and CPSU loyalists, it did not occur on ethnic lines as had been the case in Latvia. With the victory of the reformist wing in the CPE, the threat posed by the CPE to the PFE, although not entirely eliminated, took on a less sinister edge, which provided an opportunity for the PFE to attack the Estonian Congress, which, at times, seemed to distract the "eyes from the prize" of independence for Estonia, but also prevented the consolidation of ethnic political blocs.
ESTONIA AND LATVIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
In addition to the legacy of the past, current political structures have also contributed the course of ethnic politics in both Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, the basic framework of the political systems was established by the 1992 constitution, which followed the basic structure of the pre-Soviet 1937 constitution. Cognizant of the rise of authoritarian rule in the 1930's the designers of the constitution were careful to invest the single-chamber parliament Riigikogu (State Assembly) with most of the political powers. The parliament consisted of 101 members elected to a four year term by a variation of list proportional representation. The President was elected by the assembly through a two-thirds majority vote, and was largely a ceremonial post. However in the 1992 election, as a one-time exception, the president was directly elected, with the provision that if no candidate received an absolute majority then the election of the president would be entrusted to parliament. In the presidential election of 1992, the popular ex-head of the Communist Party of Estonia, Arnold Ruutel received 41.8% of the vote, but lost to the ex-foreign minister Lennart Meri, who had received just 29.5% but was supported by the majority of the members of the Riigikogu in the subsequent runoff.
The election law which governed both the Riigikogu elections of 1992 and 1995 was a complicated system which was based upon party lists, but allowed for individual candidates to run for election. Indeed, unlike in strictly proportional representation party list systems (such as in the Netherlands) voters were afforded the opportunity to vote for individual candidates rather than party lists. The country was divided into twelve electoral districts, the first four comprising the four municipal districts of Tallinn with the other districts comprised of 2-3 counties or cities together with the surrounding region. Every district, as in all PR systems, were multi-mandate.
Each party put forward a candidate list. Voters however voted for individual candidates rather than party lists; voters could only vote for one candidate. Once the votes were tallied, the candidate lists were rearranged according to the number of votes received by each candidate, with the candidate receiving the largest number of votes placed at the top of the list. Each list received as many seats in a district as the number of times the number of votes obtained in the district exceeded a simple quota. Individual candidates were elected only when their votes surpassed the simple quota. If there were any remaining mandates these were distributed as compensation seats to the parties receiving at least 5% of the national vote, or for those which had at least three candidates elected by simple quota. The parties then distributed these seats to the candidates they preferred most.(73)
Yet perhaps one of the most important institutional factors for both Baltic states was the establishment of boundaries for political participation, particularly citizenship laws and voter enfranchisement. In Estonia the initial citizenship law, adopted on February 23, 1992, was basically patterned after the 1938 citizenship law. The law granted automatic citizenship to all pre-1940 citizens and their descendants. For other residents (with some exceptions such as those who worked for the KGB) the naturalization process involved a two year residence requirement, a one year waiting period, a fairly rigorous Estonian Language test, and a loyalty oath.(74) The two year residency period would begin on March 30, 1990, the day that the Estonian Supreme Council declared the beginning of a transition to independence.
The Latvian electoral system, on the other hand, resembled a more traditional list proportional representation system. The country was divided into only five electoral constituencies, using party-lists and a five percent threshold. Only registered parties or electoral associations could nominate candidates. Parties and coalitions submitted lists for each of the five constituencies. Certain categories of persons were excluded by law, which aroused a great deal of controversy; persons were not eligible to run for election as a candidate if they (after January 13, 1991) had been active in the CPSU, Interfront and the All-Latvia Salvation committee as well as other pro-Soviet organizations (including some veterans associations). Several parties were affected by these provisions in 1995, most notably two parties which were the successors to the Latvian communist party, the Labour and Justice Party and the Latvian Socialist Party (the latter lost twelve candidates to this clause, three of whom had been elected to the Saeima in 1993). In all thirteen candidates were removed from the party lists for the election of 1995.
Each voter received ballot papers for each party or coalition lists of candidates. They chose the party they wished to vote for by selecting the party's ballot paper. Once receiving the paper the voter had the opportunity to reorder the party's list. They could place a plus (+) sign next to a candidate's name which indicated support for a particular candidate or they could delete the candidate's name or they could leave the ballot sheet unaltered. The candidate lists were reordered based upon voter preferences, and seats were awarded based on the number of votes received, and the particular preferences the party's voters had for which candidates. In all nine parties passed the 5% threshold for the 1995 election.
Although the electoral systems in both Estonia and Latvia could be classified as proportional representation systems, there were some noteworthy differences, particularly in terms of the quality of representation. For the Estonian system, the voter was afforded the opportunity to base their choice on the qualities of individual candidates, rather than merely voting for a party label or program. The Latvian system was a more traditional Proportional representation system, where individual voters chose parties and programs as opposed to voting based on the characteristics of individual candidates. Given this difference, we would expect that the development of ethnopolitics in Estonia would be qualitatively different from the development of ethnopolitics in Latvia. Indeed, according to Brass the quality of representation is a key element in the promotion or mitigation of ethnic political conflict.(75) Promoting individual competition and an individually based system of representation would diffuse ethnic conflict by undermining "the segmental cleavages of plural societies and permit inter-segmental alliances on other bases than inter-elite agreement."(76)
Most importantly, however, the initial Latvian citizenship law set almost insurmountable hurdles for Russophone citizenship. The issue of citizenship in Latvia had created tensions between the Latvians and Russophones as well as with Latvia's neighbors, particularly Russia. An initial law on citizenship was passed by the Latvian Supreme Council on October 15, 1991 which provided for citizenship for those who could prove that at least one of their parents had been a citizen of the Republic of Latvia prior to Latvia's occupation on June 17, 1940.(77) All others were subject to provisions introduced for acquiring citizenship via naturalization, which included three requirements--a knowledge of spoken Latvian, continuous residence in Latvia for at least 16 years and the renouncement of citizenship of any other country. Particularly problematic were the language requirements, particularly since most Russophones did not speak Latvian. The law was never confirmed and action was postponed until after the election of the fifth Saeima in 1993.
In June 1994 the Saeima passed a new citizenship law which set strict quotas on for naturalization. The law elicited considerable protest from Russia and local Russophones as well as from Western Europe and the United States. The latter put considerable diplomatic pressure on the Latvian government to eliminate the quota provisions. In response, President Guntis Ulmanis decided not to sign the document and returned it to the Saeima for reconsideration. On July 22, 1994, the Saeima passed a revised bill which did not include the numerical quotas, which was then signed into law on August 11. Residents were eligible to become naturalized citizens if they had resided in Latvia for at least live years, had a command of the Latvian Language and renounced any previous citizenship. In March 1995 amendments were adopted which liberalized the law further by providing for language certificates to persons who had obtained an education in schools with Latvian as the language of instruction or in Latvian language classes in mixed schools. Persons with such certificates would then receive automatic citizenship upon registration.(78)
Although Latvia and Estonia now have comparably restrictive citizenship laws, the two countries have differed in many ways regarding "political citizenship." For instance, in Estonia, voting rights were extended to 170,865 non-citizens, or 19.6% of the electorate for the local elections in 1993. Further, the Russophone community has gained official representation at the national level as well in the form of the "Our Home is Estonia" electoral coalition (Meie Kodu on Eestimaa). The coalition was launched prior to the March 1995 election as alliance of Russophone parties, which included the Estonian United Peoples party, the Russian Party of Estonia (formerly the Russian National Assembly) and the Russian Popular Party of Estonia. The movement continued to oppose the 1993 Estonian Law on Foreigners, but expressed a willingness to cooperate with the Estonian parties in the new Center-Left coalition. Among the Russian speakers in Estonia there appeared to be broad support for the moderate line put forward by the coalition.(79) The Estonian government's effort to include Russophones politically stands in stark contrast to the more restrictive Laws in Latvia which limits voting rights to only citizens of the Latvian Republic.(80)
Thus although, the Russophone political parties have generally been more aggressive in Estonia than in Latvia in making demands for political autonomy for regions where Russophones comprise a majority of the population (particularly around Narva and Sillimae) the high point occuring with the local government sponsored referendum on political autonomy in 1993, the potential for more radical demands on the part of Russophones in Latvia is probably far greater than Estonia. This is because Russophones in Estonia have not only gained representation (and hence a voice) in post-Soviet Estonian politics, especially after the 1993 local and 1995 parliamentary elections, but the parties which represent the most moderate elements have emerged to become the political voice of the remain essentially excluded from the political process--they neither have an independent voice nor moderate political parties which can channel demands into constructive directions. Further, whereas the Estonian nationalists, who had pushed for the most onerous legislation on language and citizenship (at least from the perspective of the Russophone population), had suffered a political setback in the parliamentary election in 1995, the Latvian nationalists made significant gains in 1994. Thus the Russophone parties in Latvia have little recourse than to continue to rely on other organizations to defend the interests of the Russophone community, or more ominously, to increasingly depend on the intervention of Moscow to promote their interests in post-independence Latvian politics. Although currently the leadership of the Russophone population in Latvia does not appear to be inclined toward making demands for the fundamental restructuring of the Latvian stare, this is due to the fact that the Russophone population has yet to develop their consciousness as a distinct group and the organizations to articulate their growing dissatisfaction with the current regime.
The above cases illustrate how representational mechanisms affected the evolution of the transitional parties and in turn how these developments impacted ethno-political relations. The Czechoslovakian case, which most closely approximated the consociational remedy, demonstrates how a relatively inclusive set of representational mechanisms provided an opportunity for ethnically based parties, such as the SNS, to enter into the political arena. However, although inclusion of the SNS did serve to moderate its tactics, especially after the replacement of the more radical Moric leadership, it did not abandon the push for independence for Slovakia. Moreover, the quality of representation, which emphasized the representation of groups based upon republic-level contests, led to the "ethnification" of the popular fronts and the communist party, the very organizations which could have transcended ethnic differences.
On the other hand, the Latvian case represents the other extreme in terms of initial institutional arrangements--a unitary system with single member districts and a majority formula. Yet the Latvian example illustrate what occurs as the result of the exclusion of parties. Indeed, the single most important effect was the limited scope of representation which resulted from the initial election. Whether this was due directly to the majority system with single member districts, or the support rendered to the independence forces by non-Latvians, the fact remains that the groups which were opposed to immediate independence were effectively excluded from the political process (as were Russophones following the establishment of independence). Although the use of a majority rule probably did not disadvantage the conservative forces (the CPL would have lost regardless) the electoral rule did not advantage them. Thus the representative "guarantees" which might have promoted the peaceful exit of anti-independence forces, favored by so many scholars, were absent.(81) As a result, the overwhelming victory of the PFL in the March elections sparked a reactionary coup in the CPL and the victory of those who were more willing to resort to "extra-constitutional" means to block the drive towards Latvian independence. This in turn led to the movement of the PFL in the direction of seeking a rapprochement with the Latvian nationalists. Ultimately this legacy of suspicion has served to promote the emergence of further problems in independent Latvia. Thus as in the Czechoslovak case, although for very different reasons, the institutional arrangements promoted the polarization of the main transitional parties and ultimately politics in general along ethnic lines even after the collapse of communism.
In Estonia, as in Czechoslovakia, hut unlike the Latvian case, the scope of representation provided opportunities for the representation of the anti-independence forces. Moreover, the quality of representation, based as it was on individuals rather than groups, allowed individuals to campaign other than on party program, which weakened the pressure for group consolidation (unlike in Czechoslovakia). This produced a dynamic towards political moderation and politics which was not based exclusively on ethnicity, a process which was different when compared to those which occurred in Czechoslovakia or Latvia. Although political disputes emerged which divided the ethnic Estonian and Russophone communities after the establishment of independence, the extension of the scope of representation to include Russophones has greatly assisted the promotion of less ethnic political tension.
Although the volatility of politics in this initial period precludes conclusions based on the "ultimate" or "distal" effects of these representational mechanisms, there is some reason to believe that the evolution of ethnic partisan politics in the transitional period set the stage for the subsequent evolution of ethnic politics. Indeed, the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1992, to some extent, can be explained by making reference to the initial period of partisan transition which set the tenor for subsequent developments. Although the scope of representation did lead to the moderation of the demands of the SNS, the quality of representation provided and incentive for office-seeking politicians to play the ethnic card. Further, although the very real difficulties in both Baltic stares (especially the legal status of resident non-Balts) should not be overlooked, Latvia and Estonia currently differ in many ways regarding the political status of non-citizens. The scope and quality of representation in the initial election may have contributed to the emergence of a perception of equity and measure of trust between groups in Estonia, which made the extension of political rights, albeit limited, to the non-Estonian component of the population less daunting a concession.
With the grand democratic experiment in full swing in the new democracies of the world, it is critical that the interaction between institutions and ethnic politics is better understood. Indeed the success or failure of these experiments may hinge upon the institutional systems that are initially created. Certain choices may yet yield the elusive goal of building political stability and equity in ethnically divided societies. Other choices may lead to the creation of insurmountable problems, whose only solution is often violence.
Table 2: Czech and Slovak National Council Results, 1990; Winners and Seal Allocation
Party and Republic vote % vote seats % seats Czech Republic OF 3569201 49.49 127 63.50 CPCs 954690 13.23 32 16 HSDS-SMS 723609 10.30 23 11.00 KDU 607134 8.41 19 9.50 Slovakia VPN 991285 29.34 48 32.00 KDH 648782 19.20 31 20.67 SNS 470984 13.94 22 14.67 CPCs 450855 13.34 22 14.67 DS (Democratic Party) 148567 4.69 7 4.67 SZ (Green Party) 117871 3.48 6 4.00
Source: "Elections in Czechoslovakia," Commission Security and Cooperation East Europe Report, June, 1990; Rude Pravo, June 11, 1990, 5.
(1.) See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 55 (1961), pp. 493-514; Donald L. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," World Politics, 23 (1971), pp. 232-236; Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (New York: Little Brown, 1973).
(2.) Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 192; Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 19.
(3.) Renee de Nevers "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 61-78; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
(4.) The term "Russians" is used here to refer to the non-Baltic components of the population, although this includes Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians.
(5.) Whether or not the group were indigenous (such as with the Czechs and Slovaks) or imported (such as the "Russians" in the Baltics) is not the issue here. That they existed and shared the same political space is what defines a divided society. See R.S. Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bi-Polar Stares (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981).
(6.) Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
(7.) For a discussion of this debate, see Eric A. Nordlinger, "Representation, Governmental Stability and Decisional Effectiveness," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), pp. 108-127; Maureen Covell, "Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State in Belgium," in Paul Brass, ed., Ethnic Groups and the State (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985), pp. 230-235.
(8.) Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1972); Kenneth D. McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974); Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," World Politics, 26 (1974), pp. 604-621; Val R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," Comparative Politics, 3 (1971), pp. 141-175.
(9.) Arend Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985), pp. 106-107; Arend Lijphart, "Proportionality by Non-PR Methods: Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany and Zimbabwe," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 113-123; Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).
(10.) Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa, p. 86; Ivo Duchacek, "Antagonistic Cooperation: Territorial and Ethnic Communities," Publius, 7 (1977), pp. 3-29.
(11.) Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa, pp. 106-107.
(12.) Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 649.
(13.) Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, 5 (1975), 57-67; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, 303-304.
(14.) C.S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; Horowitz, Ethnic Groups; David Olson "Political Parties and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia," Communist and post-Communist Studies, 26 (1993), pp. 301-314; see also Sharon Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991): Gordon Wightman, "Czechoslovakia," Electoral Studies, 9 (1990), pp. 319-326.
(15.) Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).
(16.) Ibid., p. 340.
(17.) Ibid., p. 346, note 11.
(18.) This point is made by Sartori when he notes that political parties both "presuppose" and "produce" political cleavages in society. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 192; see also Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, pp. 291-298.
(19.) Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967); Panebianco, Political Parties, p. 19.
(20.) Ibid., pp. 8-9.
(21.) Joseph A. Schlesinger, "On the Theory of Party Organization," The Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), pp. 369-400.
(22.) This classification scheme is based upon that offered by Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, pp. 298-302.
(23.) Rein Taagepera, "Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists, Centrists and Restorationists," Journal of Baltic Studies, 20 (1989), pp. 175-190.
(24.) Michael Urban, "Popular Fronts and `Informals'," Detente, 14 (1989), pp. 4-5.
(25.) This emphasis on ethnic particularism is illustrated by the initial program of the SNS. See Bratislava Smena, February 28, 1990, pp. 2-3, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Eastern Europe (hereafter referred to as FBIS-EEU), March 7, 1990, p. 27.
(26.) For a discussion of the effects of systems which emphasize interpersonal competition on intra-party conflicts, see Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
(27.) A draft of this law appears in the March 7, 1990 edition of Rude Pravo. Czechoslovakia in 1990 was divided into twelve electoral regions (eight in the Czechoslovak republic and four in the Slovak republic). The Federal Assembly was comprised of 300 seats divided into two chambers: the House of People (with 150 members, 101 from the Czechoslovak lands and 49 from Slovakia) and the House of the Nations (with 150 members, 75 from each republic). In each of the republics there were unicameral legislatures, the Czech (200 members) and Slovak (150 members) National Councils, which were also elected on June 8-9. For both the Federal Assembly and the National Councils, all seats were elected from party lists and additional seats were allocated according to a standard d'Hondt formula.
(28.) Olson, "Political Parties," p. 313.
(29.) Rude Pravo, September 25, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU, October 2, 1990, p. 9.
(30.) See comments by SNS chairman V. Moric, reported by Prague Domestic Service, May 8, 1990, in FBIS-EEU, May 9, 1990, pp. 22-23.
(31.) CTK, October 15, 1990, in FBIS-EEU, October 16, 1990, p. 27; See also Pithart's comments in Rude Pravo, Sept. 26, 1990, pp. 1-2, in FBIS.EEU, October 4, 1990, p. 22; and in Lidove Noviny, October 11, 1990, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU, October 16, 1990, p. 26; See also comments by Emmanuel Mandler, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in Lidove Noviny, October 5, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU, October 15, 1990, p. 13.
(32.) Narodna Obroda, April 29, 1991, p. 1.
(33.) CTK, July 23, 1990, in FBIS-EEU, July 24, 1990, p. 18.
(34.) Rude Pravo, July 18, 1990, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-EEU, July 25, 1990, p. 16.
(35.) See interview in Lidove Noviny, October 1, 1990, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-EEU, October 11, 1990, p. 18; See also Rude Pravo, September 26, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU, October 4, 1990, pp. 22.
(36.) Jiri Pehe, "Changes in the Communist Party," Report on Eastern Europe, November 30, 1990, p. 2.
(37.) See statement issued by Milan Ftacnik, Ivan Hudec and Gabriela Rothmayevova, Communist deputies the Federal Assembly and the Slovak National Council, reporter in Bratislava Pravda, September 4, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS-EEU, September 12, 1990, p. 34.
(38.) Rude Pravo, July 24, 1990, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-EEU, July 26, 1990, pp. 22.
(39.) See opening statement made by Chairman Vasil Mohorita, on October 7, at a meeting of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. CTK, October 7, 1990, in FBIS-EEU, October 7, 1990, p. 34.
(40.) Other Slovak nationalist parties abhorred SNS tactics. On July 26, the Slovak Freedom Party's leadership berated the SNS's pre-election rallies as "fanatical and demagogic." Bratislava Smena, July 26, 1990, p. 7, in FBIS-EEU, July 27, 1990, p. 12.
(41.) Bratislava Pravda, September 20, 1990, pp. 1 and 3, in FBIS-EEU, September 23, 1990, p. 15.
(42.) Zemeldelske Noviny, July 27, 1990, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-EEU, August 2, 1990, p. 20.
(43.) Poll reported by CTK, October 26, 1990, in FBIS-EEU, October 26, 1990, p. 23.
(44.) Prague Domestic Service, November 4, 1990, in FBIS-EEU, November 5, 1990, p. 21.
(45.) Verejnost, March 25, 1991 in FBIS-EEU, March 28, 1991, p. 25.
(46.) For accounts of the SNS Third Congress, see CTK, March 23, 1991, in FBIS-EEU, March 26, 1991, p. 30; Bratislava Domestic Service, March 25, 1991, in FBIS-EEU, March 26, 1991, p. 31.
(47.) Olson, "Political Parties," p. 312.
(48.) Reported in Sovietskaya Latviya, February 27, 1990, p. 3, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Soviet Union (hereafter referred to as FBIS-SOV), March 16, 1990, p. 105.
(49.) A complete list of Latvian deputies elected on March 18, 1990 was provided by Sovietskaya Latviya, March 23, 1990, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-SOV, April 18, 1990, pp. 100-106.
(50.) Fifty-five winners listed or co-listed Communist Party affiliation, 19 listed or co-listed Latvian National Independence Movement affiliation.
(51.) Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic Stares," Electoral Studies, 9 (1990), pp. 303-311.
(52.) Sovietskaya Rossiya, April 10, 1991, p. 2.
(53.) Rubiks, at the time of his election, was also chair of the general strike committee which had been organized by the Latvian Interfront.
(54.) Moscow TASS, November 30, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, December 3, 1990, p. 84. For similar CPL pronouncements, see Moscow TASS, December 14, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, December 16, 1990, p. 91.
(55.) Indeed, the CPL commanded the loyalty of a fairly large military contingent--the infamous "Black Berets" stationed in Latvia. It was widely speculated that these units acted as a kind of "pocket army" of the Latvian Communist Party. The Washington Post, February 18, 1991.
(56.) Moscow TASS, October 7, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, October 9, 1990, p. 89.
(57.) Moscow TASS, October 6, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, October 9, 1990, p. 89.
(58.) Moscow TASS, December 17, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, December 18, 1990, pp. 82-83.
(59.) lzvestiya, April 26, 1991, p. 3.
(60.) Taagepera, 1990.
(61.) George H. Hallet, "Proportional Representation with the Single Transferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 113-126.
(62.) Richard Katz, "The Single Transferable Vote and Proportional Representation," in Lijphart and Grofman, eds., Choosing an Electoral System, pp. 128-135.
(64.) Data obtained from Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(65.) This argument was made by Edgar Savisaar, leader of the PFE, who contended that "[t]he CPE knew ... it would be beaten as a party among other parties. In an election of individuals, however, the CPE does not win or lose." Riina Kionka, "How Democratic Will the Estonian Elections Be?" Report on the USSR (March 2, 1990), pp. 21-22.
(66.) For a description of STV, see G. Hand "Ireland" in Hand et al., eds., European Electoral Handbook (London: Butterworths, 1979), pp. 121-139.
(67.) For party and organizational affiliation of candidates, see Sovietskaya Estoniya (February 21, 1990), p. 3; For the list of winning candidates per district, see Sovietskaya Estoniya (March 23, 1990), p. 1.
(68.) Moscow TASS, April 14, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, April 16, 1990, p. 104.
(69.) Proceedings of congress reported in Tallinn Domestic Service, March 25, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, March 26, 1990, p. 126.
(70.) Tallinn Domestic Service, March 29, 1990, in FBIS-SOV, March 30, 1990, pp. 92-93.
(71.) Moscow Pravda, April 29, 1991, p. 2.
(72.) Interview with Rein Ruutsoos, reported in FBIS-SOV, May 11, 1990, p. 78.
(73.) Vabariigi Presidendi Ja Riigkogu Valimised 1992: Dokument ja materjale (Tallinn: Eesti Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon, 1992).
(74.) Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to lndependence, 2nd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 310.
(75.) Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).
(76.) Ibid., p. 340.
(77.) Juris Dreifelds, Latvia in Transition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 97-98; Rasma Karklins, Ethnopolitics and the Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 145-151.
(78.) United Nations Development Programme, Latvia Human Development Report (1996), Chapter 2.
(79.) Ole Norgaard, Hinsgaul, Lars Johannsen and Helle Willumsen, The Baltic States after Independence (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 207-208.
(80.) See Saulius Girnius, "The Baltic States," RFE/RL Research Report, 2:16 (1994).
(81.) Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe C. Schmitter, "Convoking Elections (and Provoking Parties)," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy," PS, 20 (1987), pp. 861-866.
John T. Ishiyama
Truman State University3…