Academic journal article
By Volokh, Eugene
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy , Vol. 24, No. 1
Most effective speech to the public requires money. If spending more than $1,000 on expression is outlawed, then you may not place more than a tiny ad in any major newspaper, buy virtually any television time, put up a billboard, or mail more than a few thousand newsletters. That's an extremely serious restriction on your ability to express your views.
This, of course, has obvious implications for campaign finance laws, because this means that some such laws may be unconstitutional. But it also has implications for free speech law, since the precedents set in campaign finance cases will affect the rules governing speech restrictions generally. And because campaign finance cases arouse such passions, they risk creating rules that can have unexpected -- and possibly dangerous -- consequences in many areas far outside campaign finance.
This essay aims to briefly highlight the potential unexpected consequences of three kinds of arguments about campaign finance restrictions, arguments that as it happens correspond to three opinions in the recent Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC case.(1) And if the analysis here is right, then it may well be that the Shrink Missouri majority and even the much-lambasted Buckley v. Valeo(2) actually make a good deal of constitutional sense.(3)
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TENSION APPROACH
Let me begin with Justice Breyer's opinion, which I found eloquent enough that I would like to quote it at some length; but let me at the same time quote another similarly eloquent opinion alongside it.
[T]he principal dissent oversimplifies the problem faced in the campaign finance context. It takes a difficult constitutional problem and turns it into a lopsided dispute between political expression and government censorship. Under the cover of this fiction and its accompanying formula, the dissent would make the Court absolute arbiter of a difficult question best left, in the main, to the political branches. [T]his is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation. For that reason there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words "strict scrutiny." Nor can we expect that mechanical application of the tests associated with "strict scrutiny" -- the tests of "compelling interests" and "least restrictive means" -- will properly resolve the difficult constitutional problem that campaign finance statutes pose. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96  (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (objecting, in the First Amendment context, to "oversimplified formulas") (parallel citation omitted). Our judgment is ... solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to the well-being of the country. This conflict of interests cannot be resolved by a dogmatic preference for one or the other, nor by a sonorous formula which is in fact only a euphemistic disguise for an unresolved conflict. If adjudication is to be a rational process, we cannot escape a candid examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition that both are supported by weighty title-deeds. The plain fact [is] that the interest in speech, profoundly important as it is, is no more conclusive in judicial review than other attributes of democracy or than a determination of the people's representatives that a measure is necessary to assure the safety of government itself.... Just as there are those who regard as invulnerable every measure for which the claim of national survival is invoked, there are those who find in the Constitution a wholly unfettered right of expression. Such literalness treats the words of the Constitution as though they were found on a piece of outworn parchment instead of being words that have called into being a nation with a past to be preserved for the future. …