Antitrust Law

This book provides the first detailed examination of how private individuals and companies can enforce their rights under competition law against other private parties in the EU and UK. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal basis for private antitrust enforcement both under EC and the new UK law, and of the available procedures and remedies. The book then goes on to systematically survey all of the key issues of law and practice that arise in private antitrust litigation in the USA, such as locus standi, antitrust injury, methods of proof of damage, types of damage for which compensation is recoverable, and the principles of antitrust damage calculation. In each case, the author draws upon his experience of such litigation as a practitioner in the USA to set out detailed practical conclusions as to how the same issues should be addressed in the EU and UK.

Americans have long appealed to images of free competition in calling for free enterprise, freedom of contract, free labor, free trade, and free speech. This imagery has retained its appeal in myriad aspects of public policy--for example, Senator Sherman's Anti-Trust Act of 1890, Justice Holmes's metaphorical marketplace of ideas, and President Reagan's rhetoric of deregulation. In Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992, Rudolph Peritz explores the durability of free competition imagery by tracing its influences on public policy. Looking at congressional debates and hearings, administrative agency activities, court opinions, arguments of counsel, and economic, legal, and political scholarship, he finds that free competition has actually evoked two different visions--freedom not only from oppressive government, but also from private economic power. He shows how the discourse of free competition has mediated between commitments to individual liberty and rough equality--themselves unstable over time. This rhetorical approach allows us to understand, for example, that the Reagan and Carter programs of deregulation, both inspired by the rhetoric of free competition, were driven by fundamentally different visions of political economy. Peritz's historical inquiry into competition policy as a series of government directives, inspired by two complex yet distinct and sometimes contradictory visions of free competition, provides an indispensable framework for understanding modern political economy-- whether political campaign finance reform, corporate takeover regulation, or current attitudes toward the New Deal Legacy. Competition Policy in America will be of great interest to lawyers, historians, economists, sociologists, and policy makers in both government and business.

Using perspectives from American history, economic theory, and legal analysis, the Garveys take an interdisciplinary approach to U.S. public law and policy--antitrust and regulation--and develop the essential unity of the two major fields based on a clearly written summary of pertinent microeconomic principles. They establish that economic growth has been a primary goal of U.S. public policy throughout the nation's history. A critical survey of neopopulism and neoclassicism, the two major post-war impulses in public economic law, is also provided.

This is the first study to apply the interest-group model of regulation to the study of antitrust law and policy. The application of this model enables the author to both identify important trends in the antitrust arena and demonstrate which groups have benefited most from antitrust legislation. Divided into three sections, the first provides an overview of antitrust law and policy, the second explores the various private interests that impinge on antitrust policy, and finally, Shugart examines the political economy of antitrust. His analysis clearly shows that the antitrust legislation of the last few decades has tended to benefit well organized private interest groups more than consumers.