Economic Inquiry

Articles from Vol. 39, No. 2, April

Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games
PHILIP J. GROSSMAN [*] We report the results of ultimatum game experiments designed to test for differences in the behavior of women and men. Women's proposals are on average more generous than men's, regardless of the sex of the partner, and women...
Expectation Formation in Step-Level Public Good Games
ARTHUR SCHRAM [*] This article focuses on the process of expectation formation. Specifically, the question is addressed whether individuals think strategically when they form beliefs about other players' behavior. Most belief learning models assume...
Female Self-Employment and Demand for Flexible, Nonstandard Work Schedules
KAREN V. LOMBARD [*] Motivated by the rising importance of female self-employment, this article develops and estimates a two-step empirical model to explain why married women choose self-employment over wage-salary employment. The article also develops...
Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game
SARA J. SOLNICK [*] I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players' gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the...
Marriage, Divorce, and Legal Change: New Evidence from England and Wales
In this article, we explain the evolution of divorce rates in England and Wales over the post-war period. Following the approach of the predominantly North American literature in this area, we focus on the liberalization of divorce law and socioeconomic...
Reliant Behavior in the United States and Japan
YOSHIHARU MATAGA [*] Japanese economic success is often attributed to culturally reinforced psychological conditioning that promotes interpersonal reliance, cooperation, and a group interest orientation. This article provides direct experimental...
Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory
HARRIE A. A. VERBON [*] We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve on the unique no-gifts equilibrium by two different types of gift exchange: simple and complex exchange, respectively Complex exchange gives higher...
SO YOU WANT TO EARN A Ph.D. IN ECONOMICS: HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK YOU'LL MAKE?
JOHN J. SIEGFRIED [*] Using data from individuals who earned a Ph.D. in economics in 1996-97, this study identifies factors associated with securing full-time permanent positions and determinants of starting salaries for new Ph.D. economists. Where...
Spouse Selection and Earnings: Evidence of Marital Sorting
MICHAEL A. ZIMMER [*] This article investigates economic bases for individuals' selection of marriage partners. Its central focus is matching of spouse pairs based on unobservable components of hourly earnings. Using a data extract from the Panel...
The Effect of Recommended Contributions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
MELANIE MARKS [*] Recommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other public goods. We present an experiment investigating the impact of recommended contributions in a voluntary threshold public goods process....
Why Do Married Men Earn More: Productivity or Marriage Selection?
INJAE LEE [*] Using data from the Current Population Survey March Supplement 1999, this study examines why married men earn more than men who have never married. We find that the marriage wage premium cannot be attributed to the unobservable higher...