Joint Force Quarterly

Articles from No. 34, Spring

A War That Was Not Left to the Generals
There were two men at the top who really fought out and finally agreed on the major moves that led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. They really ran the war ... we were just artisans building definite patterns of strategy...
A Word from the Chairman
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall...
Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform
Three joint operations in the Caribbean--Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983), Just Cause in Panama (1989-90), and Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-95)--reveal substantial limits as well as progress in joint planning and execution as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols...
Innovation: Past and Future
We have entered a period of uncertainty where threats are indeterminate even as changes in technology accelerate. Rapid innovation-apparent in the impact of stealth and precision weaponry in the Gulf War--appears likely to continue. Yet the Armed Forces...
Interdependent Maneuver for the 21st Century
Virtually all intelligence and operational estimates suggest that war in the 21st century will require interdependence among land, sea, and aerospace systems. The services report that precision weapons will so expand the range and capabilities of systems...
Keeping the Strategic Flame
Strategic thinking by the American military appears to have gone into hiding. Planning on the tactical and operational flourishes, but the strategic level is largely discussed in historical terms rather than as current art. Three decades ago, strategic...
Lessons from the War in Kosovo
Allied Force, the most intense and sustained military operation in Europe since World War II, represented the first extended use of force by NATO as well as the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian objectives against a state committing...
Lessons of Desert Storm
Our memories of the Persian Gulf War include CNN images of antiaircraft tracers lighting the sky over Baghdad and smart bombs striking bridges and buildings. Americans recall the event as a stunning victory over a well-armed, brutal, but ultimately...
Making the Joint Journey
Thirteen years have gone by since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act made joint operations and joint force planning the law. Over that time the Department of Defense has established centers, management procedures, planning organizations, and command...
Nanotechnology in a New Era of Strategic Competition
New technologies on the battlefield can alter the course of history and precipitate the rise or fall of nations. The advent of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) coincides with what some regard as a revolution in military affairs (RMA), an onset...
New Contingencies, Old Roles
Few issues are more important than the roles and missions of the Armed Forces in the post-Cold War era. We are in the midst of major changes in the structure of the international system and of serious challenges to national security. This is not, however,...
President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs
As early as May 1964 President Lyndon Johnson seemed to realize that the war in Vietnam would be a costly failure. In a taped phone conversation he confided to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, "[It] looks like to me that we're getting into...
Special Operations Forces after Kosovo
To many observers the NATO air campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999 represents the future face of war. The long-distance, high-tech application of force is an attractive template as the United States and other nations become ever more casualty-averse....
Strengthening Security at Home
The events of September 11, 2001, pierced the sense of invulnerability that most Americans had come to expect. Although the feeling of security at home waxed and waned with the perils of the Cold War--from duck-and-cover drills in the 1950s to detente...
Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols
"One of the landmark laws of American history" is how Congressman and later Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. Speaking as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1986, Aspin added,...
The Impact of NBC Proliferation on Doctrine and Operations
[Editor's Note: From October 1994 to September 1995, the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University hem a series of workshops to examine how service doctrine, operational concepts, and capabilities take into account...
The Second Revolution
A paradox is emerging as the revolution in military affairs (RMA) moves ahead: the larger the magnitude of revolution, the greater the possible long-term advantage to a potential enemy. Why? The answer lies in the second revolution. The system of...
What They've Said in JFQ
it is hard to think of a nonmilitary role without precedent for such roles are as American as apple pie--Samuel P. Huntington the mission and the Rwandans fell victim to inflated expectations that the United Nations could not fulfill--R.A. Dallaire...
Why Strategy Is Difficult
My aim is to relate the nature of strategy to the character of its artistic application and to the unknowable context of the 21st century. The immodesty, even arrogance, of this endeavor is best conveyed through an anecdote about a meeting between...