The central problem for normative ethics is the conflict between a consequentialist view--that morality requires promoting the good of all--and a belief that the rights of the individual place significant constraints on what may be done to help others. Standard interpretations see Kant as rejecting all forms of consequentialism, and defending a theory which is fundamentally duty-based and agent-centered. Certain actions, like sacrificing the innocent, are categorically forbidden. In this original and controversial work, Cummiskey argues that there is no defensible basis for this view, that Kant's own arguments actually entail a consequentialist conclusion. But this new form of consequentialism which follows from Kant's theories has a distinctly Kantian tone. The capacity of rational action is prior to the value of happiness; thus providing justification for the view that rational nature is more important than mere pleasures and pains.
The Act Itself offers a deeper understanding of what is going on in our own moral thoughts about human behaviour. Many of the descriptions of behaviour on which our moral thoughts are based are confused; others may be free of confusion, but still we are not clear in our minds about what thoughts they are. That it would hurt her, it would be disloyal, it wouldn't be done with that intention, it would be dangerous, it would involve allowing harm but not producing it - thoughts like these support our moral judgements and thus guide our lives. In so far as we do not deeply understand them, this is a kind of servitude. As Locke said, 'He is the most enslaved who is so in his understanding.' This book presents conceptual analysis as a means to getting more control of our thoughts and thus of our lives.
Driver challenges Aristotle's classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues that do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. She argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective that holds that virtue is simply a character trait that systematically produces good consequences.
Robert Myers presents an original moral theory which charts a course between the extremes of consequentialism and contractualism. He puts forward a radically new case for the existence of both agent-neutral and agent-relative values, and gives an innovative answer to the question how such disparate values can be weighed against each other. Practical judgement is shown to be guided in this by two very different ideals: an ideal of cooperation, which is held to shape the content of morality's demands, and one of self-governance, which is held to determine the nature of reason's requirements. Examination of the ideal of cooperation reveals that principles of impartial beneficence and rights protecting individual freedoms are equally fundamental to morality. Examination of the ideal of self-governance reveals that morality's dictates, though not necessarily overriding, are always in an important sense inescapable. The result is a theory of morality which combines a balanced account of its content with a ringing affirmation of its authority.
Frank Jackson is one of the most influential philosophers working in the English-speaking world. In every area of philosophy to which he has contributed, his work has had a major impact. As well as being strikingly original, his work is notable for its range: Jackson has worked on most of the main areas of philosophy, notably on the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of language and ethics. Jackson's versatility and range are illustrated by this new collection, which brings together some of his most important publications on mind, on action, on conditionals, on method in metaphysics, on ethics, and on induction. It deserves to be on the bookshelf of everyone engaged in research in philosophy.