Virtue

". . . the great Catholic philosopher Yves Simon explains with admirable clarity just in what the Aristotelian conception of virtue consists." -Crisis

The last four decades have seen a remarkable revival of interest in the virtues, which lay at the heart of ancient and medieval moral philosophy. This collection is the first general survey of this revival, containing specially commissioned articles on topics central to virtue ethics and virtue theory, written by a distinguished international team of philosophers. It represents the state of the art in this subject, and will set the agenda for future work. Topics covered in How Should One Live? include: practical virtue ethics; ancient views of the virtues; impartiality and partiality; Kant and the virtues; utilitarianism and the virtues; the virtues and human nature; natural and artificial virtues; virtue and the good life; the vices; virtue and the emotions; virtue and politics; feminism, moral education, and the virtues; and virtue and community.

This volume brings together much of the most influential work undertaken in the field of virtue ethics over the last four decades. The ethics of virtue predominated in the ancient world, and recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in virtue ethics as a rival to Kantian and utilitarian approaches to morality. Divided into four sections, the collection includes articles critical of other traditions; early attempts to offer a positive vision of virtue ethics; some later criticisms of the revival of virtue ethics; and, finally, some recent, more theoretically ambitious essays in virtue ethics.

This book proposes an approach to values education centered on an analysis of the relationship between thinking and valuing. It also focuses on strategies for nurturing the capacity for sustained, disciplined, and informed reflection on the issues of moral decision and religious belief. It contends that there is an urgent need for education at the present time to effect a return to the traditional ideals of intellectual and moral virtue. Sandin's central tenet is that the methods of disciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship are applicable--and indispensable--to the formation of responsible moral judgments.

Driver challenges Aristotle's classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues that do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Modesty, for example, is generally considered to be a virtue even though the modest person may be making an inaccurate assessment of his or her accomplishments. She argues that we should abandon the highly intellectualist view of virtue and instead adopt a consequentialist perspective that holds that virtue is simply a character trait that systematically produces good consequences.

Most traditional accounts of Aristotle's theory of ethical education neglect its cognitive aspects. This book asserts that, in Aristotle's view, excellence of character comprises both the sentiments and practical reason. Sherman focuses particularly on four aspects of practical reason as they relate to character: moral perception, choicemaking, collaboration, and the development of those capacities in moral education. Throughout the book, she is sensitive to contemporary moral debates, and indicates the extent to which Aristotle's account of practical reason provides an alternative to theories of impartial reason.

Although few want to deny their importance, many political theorists have recently complained that too much weight is now attached to individual rights. The result, as they see it, is an excessive individualism that blinds people to the needs of the community or state to which they belong. We should be less concerned with our rights, in their view, and more concerned with our responsibilities. Those who advance this view typically argue against liberalism. In Civic Virtues, the newest addition to the distinguished Oxford Political Theory series, Richard Dagger takes a different approach. Finding the proper relationship between rights and responsibilities requires us not to choose betwen liberalism and republicanism, he argues, but to unite them in a republican form of liberalism. Is such a marriage of republicanism and liberalism possible? Is it desirable? Dagger demonstrates how republican liberalism proceeds from a fundamental right of autonomy, to the recognition of interdependence and reciprocity, and on to the cultivation of the civic virtues of the public-spirited citizen. Indeed, republican liberalism promises not only to reconcile individual rights and civic duties, but to enhance political deliberation and the sense of community as well.