Antonin Scalia

This book analyzes why the Rehnquist Court never fulfilled expectations for the reversal of liberal judicial decisions from the Warren and Burger Courts. At its conservative high point in 1991-1992 the Supreme Court was dominated by seven justices who had dependably conservative voting records over the course of their early careers. Five of these justices were appointed in the 1980s and early 1990s by Reagan and Bush, presidents who made concerted efforts to appoint judicial officers who would undo liberal precedents. This is the first book to focus on scholars' growing recognition that the Rehnquist Court has not been as conservative as most presumed it would be. In focusing on Justice Antonin Scalia, whose role inadvertently contributed to the Court's failure to achieve conservative goals, the study examines how individual justices can affect Supreme Court decisions through their judicial behavior.

We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim--"distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal--good law." But is this common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative.In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the "strict constructionism" that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly "smuggle" in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals.This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia's ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints.

Millions of Americans were baffled and outraged by the U.S. Supreme Court's role in deciding the presidential election of 2000 with its controversial ruling in Bush v. Gore. The Court had held a unique place in our system of checks and balances, seen as the embodiment of fairness and principle precisely because it was perceived to be above the political fray. How could it now issue a decision that reeked of partisan politics, and send to the White House a candidate who may have actually lost the election? In Supreme Injustice, best-selling author and legal expert Alan M. Dershowitz addresses these questions head-on, at last demystifying Bush v. Gore for those who are still angered by the court's decision but unclear about its meaning. Dershowitz--himself a former Supreme Court clerk--argues that in this case for the first time, the court's majority let its desire for a particular partisan outcome have priority over legal principles. As in his other bestselling books, Dershowitz clarifies complex legal issues, explaining concepts such as "equal protection" and "irreparable harm." Digging deeply into their earlier writings and rulings, Dershowitz proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the justices who gave George W. Bush the presidency contradicted their previous positions to do so. The most egregious ruling since the Dred Scott Decision, Bush v. Gore has shattered the image of the Supreme Court as a fair and impartial arbiter of important national issues. The resulting loss of the American people's respect, Dershowitz concludes, has severely compromised the Court's role in national affairs. And yet Dershowitz sees some benefit emerging from this constitutional crisis--if we understand its lessons and take action to prevent it from happening again.

This study analyzes the process of constitutional interpretation, that is, the methodology by which the Supreme Court goes about interpreting the Constitution, and offers a comprehensive view of constitutional law through the lens of history, political science, and jurisprudence. Shaman examines the practice of creating meaning for the Constitution, the dichotomy of legal formalism and realism, the levels of judicial scrutiny, the perception of reality, and the puzzle of legislative motive. While the book traces the historical development of constitutional law, its main focus is on modern jurisprudence, including analyses of the major themes of constitutional interpretation developed by the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts.