Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition

By Randall W. Stone | Go to book overview

7
Ukraine

UKRAINE belongs to the ranks of the late reformers. Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, failed to make a decisive break with the past, instead combining Soviet-style economic micromanagement with the introduction of elements of a market economy. For the first three years of the transition, Ukraine trailed the pack of former Soviet republics in terms of every major indicator: Inflation was high, reaching a 10,200 percent annual rate late in 1993; privatization was nonexistent; GDP was falling steadily; and corruption was ubiquitous. Ukraine's second president, Leonid Kuchma, has followed a policy of stop-and-go reform that delayed macroeconomic stabilization and prevented structural adjustment in the agricultural, energy, and industrial sectors. Although Ukraine eventually achieved a shaky macroeconomic stabilization, political instability and an ill-defined division of powers blocked the government's efforts to liberalize and deregulate the economy until after the third presidential election at the end of 1999. The result of this delay was rampant economic mismanagement. “Among the post-socialist countries that have avoided military conflicts,” wrote Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Lysytskyi, “independent and democratic Ukraine is the undeniable leader in the rate of price increases, the decline in the scope of production, and in the population's standard of living.”1 The cumulative decline of GDP from 1991 to the end of 1998 was more than 60 percent. Ukraine is the best argument against the gradualist approach to economic reform in former Communist countries.

The IMF required the former Soviet republics to provide some evidence of their readiness to launch market reforms before agreeing to finance their programs, and it was not until 1994, after three years of high inflation and declining production, that Ukraine first qualified for an IMF program. Ukraine managed to impose a provisional stability on financial markets in 1996, but stabilization remained a hostage to microeconomic reforms. Like Russia, Ukraine developed a vibrant barter economy that concealed the profits of enterprises that kept their export earnings offshore as well as the losses of enterprises

____________________
1
Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Lysytskyi, “Nadmirne derzhavne spozhivannia iak golovnyi faktor finansovoi nestabil'nosti Ukraini,” unpublished manuscript, July 1998.

-169-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page *
  • Contents vii
  • Figures xi
  • Tables xiii
  • Acronyns xv
  • Preface xix
  • Lending Credibility *
  • 1 - Introduction 1
  • Part I - Models and Data 13
  • 2 - A Formal Model of Lending Credibility 15
  • Appendix - A Formal Model of Lending Credibility 29
  • 3 - Studying Imf Effectiveness 39
  • 4 - An Empirical Test of the Model 59
  • Part II - History 87
  • 5 - Poland 89
  • 6 - Russia 116
  • 7 - Ukraine 169
  • 8 - Bulgaria 209
  • 9 - Conclusion 233
  • Appendixes 243
  • A - Data 245
  • B - Statistical Methods 250
  • C - List of Interviews 262
  • Bibliography 266
  • Index 279
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 286

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.