The Tet Offensive

By Marc Jason Gilbert; William Head | Go to book overview

this context, and given the intentions of the participants at the beginning, Khe Sanh was an overall failure for both sides.

One final point must be made regarding the intentions of the Communist forces at Khe Sanh. Today, at the site of the former marine combat base, there is a masonry monument erected by the Vietnamese. The text on the monument explicitly refers to the fighting at Khe Sanh as another Dien Bien Phu. Thus, the Communists appear to regard the battle of Khe Sanh as the victory that enabled them to win the war in Indochina, or at least prefer to have it remembered that way.65

In 1994, the journalist Malcom W. Browne of the New York Times visited the former Khe Sanh combat base. Browne noted that there are seventy-two graveyards for Communist troops in Quang Tri Province alone. An official of the local People's Committee near Khe Sanh village looked across a vast field of grave markers and remarked, "We paid dearly for this land."66 Of that there can be no doubt.


NOTES
1.
The fighting in Vietnam continued from the beginning of Vietnam's war for independence from France in 1946 until after 1975, when Vietnam was unified by the Vietnamese Communists. The fighting between the Vietnamese and the French is referred to as the First Indochina War. The Vietnamese war with the Americans is termed the Second Indochina War, and the fighting between Vietnam and its neighbors after 1975 is known as the Third Indochina War.
2.
For the early history of the U.S. involvement at Khe Sanh, see John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 13- 24 [hereafter Valley].
3.
General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports ( Garden City, N.Y.: 1976), p. 336 [hereafter A Soldier].
4.
Giap made these remarks in a series of articles published in September 1967, in North Vietnam's armed forces newspaper, Quang Doi Nhan Dan, quoted in Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967", in The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973 ( Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1985), p. 97.
5.
General Willard Pearson, The War in the Northern Provinces 1966-1968 ( Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1975), p. 6.
6.
Captain Moyers S. Shore II, The Battle for Khe Sanh ( Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1969), p. 6 [hereafter Battle].
9.
Prados and Stubbe, Valley, pp. 270-271.
10.
Peter Macdonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam ( New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 279 [hereafter Giap].
11.
Robert Pisor, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh ( New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), p. 112 [hereafter End of the Line].

-210-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Tet Offensive
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Abbreviations and Acronyms ix
  • Preface xiii
  • 1: Introduction 1
  • Notes 15
  • 2 - The Tet Offensive 17
  • Notes 43
  • 3 - The Tet Offensive and Sino-Vietnamese Relations 45
  • Notes 59
  • 4 - The Nlf and the Tet Offensive 63
  • Notes 69
  • 5 - Giap and Tet Mau Than 1968: The Year of the Monkey 73
  • Notes 85
  • 6 - The Tet Offensive and Its Aftermath 89
  • Notes 119
  • 7 - My Recollections of the Tet Offensive 125
  • Notes 134
  • 8 - The Tet Offensive and Middletown: A Study in Contradiction 135
  • Notes 141
  • 9 - The Warning That Left Something to Chance: Intelligence at Tet 143
  • Notes 163
  • 10 - Don't Bother Me with the Facts; I've Made Up My Mind: The Tet Offensive in The Context of Intelligence and U.S. Strategy 167
  • Notes 179
  • 11 - Tet Beyond the Wire: TCK/TKN, the General Offensive/General Uprising 181
  • Notes 189
  • 12 - The Battle of Khe Sanh, 1968 191
  • Notes 210
  • 13 - President Johnson and the Decision To Curtail Rolling Thunder 215
  • Notes 228
  • 14 - The Myth of Tet: American Failure and The Politics of War 231
  • Notes 249
  • Selected Bibliography 259
  • Index 269
  • About the Authors and Editors 283
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 288

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.