The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence

By Francis A. Boyle | Go to book overview

Notes
1
West Germany decided on Nov. 23, 1983 to deploy the missiles. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1983, at 11, col. 6. Pershing II missiles were then flown to West Germany less than 24 hours later. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1983, at 114, col. 1.
2
Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–11, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 90.
3
See Risse-Kappen, “Odd German Consensus Against New Missiles”, Bull. Atom. Sci., May 1988, at 14–16; N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1988, at A11, col. 1; Johnson, “Unity Stressed at NATO Summit But Tough Issues Unresolved”, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at A6, col. 1.
4
After meeting on Jan. 7 and 8, 1985, Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko issued a communique stating with regards to forthcoming U.S.-Soviet negotiations:

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strength- ening strategic stability.

N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1985, at 11, col. 4. In October of 1985, the U.S.S.R. then demanded that the components be considered in their interrelatedness, as agreed in the January joint communiqué. Pravda, Oct. 13, 1985 at 5 (27:41 Current Dig. Soviet Press 22).

5
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1986, at 9, col. 3. Contrast the Reagan administration's October 1985 attempt to tie arms control negotiations to discussions of U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflicts not related to arms control at all. Boston Globe, Oct. 25, 1985, at 1.
6
Treaty Limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, amended by Protocol of July 3, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276, reprinted in J. Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements 167, 177 (1983) [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
7
H. Kissinger, White House Years 534–51, 810–23 (1979) [hereinafter White House Years].
8
Id.
9
See Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Interim Agreement and Protocol, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, reprinted in J. Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements 172 (1983) [hereinafter SALT I Interim Accord]. According to its own terms, the SALT I Interim Accord was to remain in force for five years, until October of 1977. In 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed to extend the provisions of the Interim Accord through December 31, 1985. See Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms issued at Vladivostok, Nov. 24, 1974 reprinted in Dep't of State Bull., Dec. 23, 1974 at 879; J. Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements 167 (1983) [hereinafter Vladivostok Agreement].
10
S. Con. Res. 56, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1 M. Glennon & T. Franck, United States Foreign Relations Law: Documents and Sources 21–23 (1980).

-155-

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The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page *
  • Table of Contents *
  • Foreword 11
  • Special Introduction George Bush, Jr. September 11th, and the Rule of Law 16
  • Notes 38
  • Chapter One - The United States Embraces International Legal Nihilism 40
  • Notes 52
  • Chapter Two - The Lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 55
  • Notes 87
  • Chapter Three - The Relevance of International Law to the Paradox of Nuclear Deterrence 92
  • Notes 125
  • Chapter Four - Star Wars vs. International Law 136
  • Notes 155
  • Chapter Five - The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence 162
  • Notes 205
  • Conclusion - Democracy vs. the Nuclear Power Elite 206
  • Postscript 210
  • Notes 210
  • Index 211
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