Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress

By Eric Schickler | Go to book overview

Notes

Chapter One
Disjointed Pluralism and Institutional Change
1
Additional examples of works that emphasize members' multiple goals are Dodd 1977, Maltzman 1997, Rohde 1991, Sinclair 1989, and Smith 1993. See also Remington and Smith 1998, and Smith and Remington 2001, who show the importance of multiple goals for institutional development in the Russian Duma.
2
Shepsle and Weingast (1994) and Rohde (1994) suggest possible paths to such a synthesis.
3
Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) use “disjointed incrementalism” to describe a decision-making strategy they attribute to policy analysts. I use the term disjointed to describe processes of institutional change, while Braybrooke and Lindblom primarily use the term to describe thought processes. Still, my usage of the term borrows from their understanding of decision making as a fragmented process.
4
The second column of table 1.1 refers to the group highlighted by theorists who focus on the collective interest in question while the third column refers to the authority structure expected based on such models. In practice, a few of the collective interests could apply to other groups. For example, party-centered interests can apply to the minority as well as the majority party. Similarly, power base interests apply to senior members as well as juniors. The analysis of individual cases addresses such interests when they are relevant, but table 1.1 simplifies matters by focusing only on the groups highlighted by the theoretical literature.
5
While Mayhew (1974) emphasizes members' electoral goals, his discussion of control committees highlights members' interest in congressional power.
6
Organizational theorists have long pointed out that individuals who acquire status from an organization will typically develop a vested interest in that organization's survival and growth. This leads members to pursue organizational maintenance goals in addition to the organization's stated goals (Scott 1998). As their status comes to depend on Congress's institutional standing, careerist members likely experience an analogous goal expansion.
7
A handful of scholars have also pointed to members' shared stake in congressional prestige (see table 1.1). But it is not clear what sorts of institutions boost Congress's reputation, and therefore it is difficult to derive predictions based on this interest.
8
Polsby (1968) also highlights how the committee system encourages specialization and therefore helps Congress meet modern policymaking challenges.
9
Krehbiel (1991) is agnostic as to whether members' primary motive for creating a specialized committee system is electoral or policy based. He argues that both individual goals can generate a collective interest in information.
10
The Cannon case would fit the Diermeier and Myerson model if Cannon had added to the number of veto points in the House. However, Cannon at times

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