Soldiers, Statecraft, and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order

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NOTES
1.
The portrayal of a European balance of power distinguished by its brevity and tentativeness is a minority position, to be generous. Still, there are even harsher judgments. For a flawed but powerful statement that European politics before the French Revolution was a mere extension of the dictums of raison d’état and sauve qui peut, see Albert Sorel, Europe and the French Revolution: The Political Traditions of the Old Regime (Alfred Cobban and J. W. Hunt, eds. and trans.) (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971).
2.
The common understanding of the eighteenth-century international system as a “golden age” is reflected in the following volumes: Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire: 1740–1763 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940); Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955), pp. 36–40, passim; Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and the International System (New York: New York University Press, 1970), especially chapter 1; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 189; Robert B. Mowat, The European State System (London: Oxford University Press, 1929); Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), especially chapter 1.
3.
See Sorel, Europe and the French Revolution, pp. 33–35; and Penfield Roberts, The Quest for Security: 1715–1740 (New York: Harper, 1947) pp. 2–3 and 37, passim.
4.
Robert R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Knopf, 1960). p. 243.
5.
Roberts, The Quest for Security, p.4.
6.
H. T. Dickenson, Bolingbroke (London: Constable, 1970), p. 254.
7.
John U. Nef, War and Human Progress (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 165 and 254, passim.
8.
David Hume, “Of the Jealousy of Trade,” Essays Moral, Political and Literary, Vol. 2 (London and New York: Longman’s, Green, 1898), p. 348.
9.
As Walter Dorn puts it: “What appears absurd as an economic measure maybe sound common sense from the point of view of military strategy. Great Britain and France fought each other with navigation acts and the ‘Exclusif’ with navies and privateers, by keeping their respective trade routes open and closing those of their rival, but they fought also with normal peacetime commerce and shipping, with trade monopolies and the economic self-sufficiency of the respective colonial empires. This, power and politics and economic policy became interchangeable terms.” Dorn, Competition for Empire, p. 9.
10.
John B. Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685–1715 (New York: Harper & Row, 1951) p. 174, passim.
11.
Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 140.
12.
See Frederick’s own comments in Frederick the Great, “History of My Own Times,” Posthumous Works, Vol. 1 (London: C.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1789), pp. 71–72. (Hereafter, Frederick’s Posthumous Works are cited by title and volume number.)

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