Soldiers, Statecraft, and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order

By James A. Nathan | Go to book overview

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The calculus of the 1990s sought not to balance effort to interest; rather, it postulated that, absent a central focus, the American people will not abide a fight for principles—especially abstract principles of international order. As former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger reflected on his tenure—at the height of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s:

If the Soviet Union still existed…I would have told you we should have been in there with both feet…. In a world where we are no longer at sword points with the Soviet Union, the decisions the U.S. has to make with regard to when it will intervene…are much more difficult and always—I don’t know how else to say this—always will depend on our judgment on what the American people are prepared to tolerate. In that sense, Vietnam never goes away. 1

The demands of military writers in the 1990s that policy makers deliver crisp objectives and absolute deadlines stem from an urge that, as long ago as Clausewitz, could be recognized as a canard. The military held that matters regarding force were becoming too technical for the hoary Clausewitzian symbiosis between war and policy making to still appertain. 2 Thus, contemporary Pentagon planners insisted that “military power should be used only when there are clear-cut military objectives,” “end points,” and “exit strategies.”

Even when political objectives might be clear enough, when military objectives seemed too fuzzy, force was precluded unless and until, as General Powell insisted, “we can measure [how] the military objective has been achieved.” 3

The constitutional implications of the near veto the American military

-157-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Soldiers, Statecraft, and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 189

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.