CHAPTER LVIII
REGIONAL PACTS VERSUS COLLECTIVE
SECURITY

To dismantle the League, the doctrine of "regional pacts" was at hand.

The Covenant of the League had been based on the assumption that all countries were prepared to participate in military, financial, and economic sanctions against the aggressor, in whatever part of the world the aggression occurred. But countries that were remote from the threatened area felt a natural reluctance to take a part in the burden of collective action equal to that of countries which were directly involved in the dispute. Therefore, the reformers of the League maintained that the powers of each geographical area should sign regional pacts of mutual assistance and pool their military forces against any aggression occurring in their own area; the other League members, not directly affected, were to act as second-line supporters, applying only economic and financial measures.

This was tantamount to dismantling the League. The countries directly affected by war in a given area, if they had sufficient strength, could take military action against the aggressor even had the League never existed. The League had been devised precisely for the purpose of enabling those who were weak in a given area to get help from stronger Powers not directly affected. As for economic and financial sanctions, the case of Ethiopia had shown that the Covenant of the League might be circumvented even by Powers which were not at all remote from the area under aggression.

Covenant or no Covenant, all British Conservatives agreed that Germany should never be allowed to threaten British security in the Channel and the North Sea by gaining control over France and the Low Countries. Their "regional pact" was to stop there.

But those in England who worshipped the League had, from 1925 to 1936, accepted the Locarno Pacts, not as a regional substitute for the Covenant, but as a local outcome of a universal principle. During the Ethiopian affair, they realized that most French politicians, while fighting for the Covenant tooth and nail so long as it buttressed the Locarno pacts, would ignore it as soon as French immediate interests were not at stake. As a consequence, in the eyes of large sections of the British people, the guarantee given by Britain to France in the West lost all moral significance and juridical compulsion. Why should Britain worry about the peace of France, while France was concerned only with her own peace?

-494-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Prelude to World War II
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 519

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.