In March 1935 the government announced a white paper which planned to increase the all-round spending upon rearmament for the first time since the end of the First World War. From that moment onwards debate was to be waged in media, military and political circles over the priorities for rearmament: was the air force, army or navy of greatest importance? Should the Royal Air Force prioritise bombers or fighters? And was a continental expeditionary army necessary or not? By 1935 few Conservatives denied the necessity for rearmament. There had been growing momentum from the grassroots upwards since early 1934 for some increased defence expenditure. 1 Nevertheless, there were concerns that the British population would not tolerate such expansion. This domestic concern had to be balanced against the deteriorating international situation as the European dictators attempted to consolidate and then expand their spheres of influence. This was the backdrop to the British rearmament programme. It also provides the starting point for this chapter’s examination of the Conservative party’s attitudes and expectations of the National government’s rearmament programme from 1935 to the end of 1938. It will highlight the link between the deepening international abyss and Conservative concerns that British rearmament was failing to deliver. After considering the formative years of the programme, the means by which rearmament was funded will be examined. An assessment will then be made of the party’s reception of the Inskip defence review and the subsequent impact this had upon defence requirements. Rearmament was perceived in terms that required the prioritisation of the best deterrent capabilities, but what did Conservatives judge to be the greatest deterrents? The Munich crisis was to shatter any illusions held about the improved defence position. What will become apparent was that as 1938 drew to a close, it was defence policy and not foreign policy that proved the most controversial and divisive of topics.