The History of the Bundesbank: Lessons for the European Central Bank

By Jakob De Haan | Go to book overview

Notes
1
The German Länder have only a suspensive veto on changes of the Bundesbank law. See Berger (1997b). Even if the veto were decisive, however, one could probably argue that a move against the Bundesbank would be easier in the German case. The reason is that the ECB is (as yet) not faced with the power of a strong federal government that has the means to co-ordinate or enforce such a move.
2
On the theory, see also Schneider (1979). For official central bank targets see, among others, Borins (1972), Duwendag (1973), Parkin and Bade (1978), Cukierman (1992) and Eijffinger and de Haan (1996). The evidence from reaction function studies is mixed, but on the whole it indicates that price stability has been the main goal of central bank policy in most countries and for most periods. See Taylor (1993) for recent US and international evidence. Basler (1978) has found that, for Germany, price stability was the central bank’s most important goal from 1958 to 1974. The recent VAR-based literature on German monetary policy has come to similar conclusions. See Weber (1996), Clarida and Gertler (1997), Berger and Woitek (1997b) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997). Despite the Bundesbank’s rhetorical commitment to a Friedman-type policy rule, most of these studies show that its behaviour is best described as following an interest rate policy rule that sets the short-term interest rate to minimise deviations from rational expectations equilibrium values of inflation and real growth.
3
On the relation between central banks and the financial sector, see also Posen (1993) and Cukierman (1992). For a critique of their quantitative results, see Eijffinger and de Haan (1996).
4
For evidence on such behaviour in the case of the Fed, see, e.g., Weintraub (1978) and Havrilesky (1995).
5
This is true even when the central bank is constitutionally independent. See, for instance, Borins (1972) and Duwendag (1973). See Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) for the terminology.
6
As the anchor country of the post-1973 European exchange rate system, the Bundesbank was never really constrained by currency markets after the end of the Bretton Woods period. See Kenen (1995).
7
This influence varies with the prevailing exchange rate system. See, among others, Berger and Woitek (1997a).
8
Tabellini’s (1988) concept of a ‘degree of fiscal dominance’ bears some resemblance to this interpretation. See Fratianni and von Hagen (1993).
9
Budget figures are available on an annual basis only (POLGOVj). To be able to use monthly data on monetary and economic variables when desirable, we transformed the series into monthly data (POLGOVt) by minimising the expression

where ΔPOLGOVt is the first difference of the computed monthly series and j=1951,…, 1994. The procedure can be interpreted as an extension of the Hodrick-Prescott filter that takes into account the fact that the computed monthly budget flows sum to the observed annual flows.

10
The series has also been corrected for the effects of German unification. See the data appendix.
11
The quarterly and annual series were constructed by setting C equal to its quarterly or annual value in each month of the respective quarter or year.

-63-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The History of the Bundesbank: Lessons for the European Central Bank
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Figures viii
  • Tables ix
  • Preface xi
  • Introduction xii
  • 1 - Introductory Remarks on 50 Years of the Bundesbank 1
  • 2 - How Independent Is the Bundesbank Really? 6
  • Notes 39
  • 3 - The Bundesbank’s Reaction to Policy Conflicts 43
  • Notes 63
  • 4 - From Low Inflation to Price Stability in Germany 67
  • Notes 94
  • 5 - Credibly Conservative Monetary Policy and Labour-Goods Market Organisation 97
  • 6 - Monetary Policy of the Ecb 125
  • References 142
  • 7 - The European Central Bank as a New Institution and the Problem of Accountability 143
  • References 155
  • Index 157
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 162

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.