FREE WILL SUBJECTIVISM
THIS essay has four main divisions. In section 1, I describe a view that I call free will subjectivism. I show how this view and the free will problem in general are related to metaethical objectivism and subjectivism, and how free will debates are influenced by debates over metaphilosophy—our views about the nature of philosophy. In section 2, I explicate my version of free will subjectivism, demonstrating its connection to metaethical subjectivism and metaphilosophy. In section 3, I show how my view differs from those of several prominent thinkers: Bruce Waller, B. F. Skinner, Daniel Dennett, Galen Strawson, Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter Unger, and Ted Honderich. In section 4, I consider reasons that philosophers endorse the theories they do.
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Publication information: Book title: The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Contributors: Robert Kane - Editor. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Place of publication: New York. Publication year: 2003. Page number: 506.
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