See Audi (1991a), Benn (1988: ch. 10), Feinberg (1986: ch. 18), Haworth (1986),
Lindley (1986: ch. 5), and Young 1986.
For other restrictive features of Aristotle's notion of enkrateia, see Charlton 1988:
An issue that has received significant attention in the philosophical literature on
self-control revolves around an interesting puzzle about how an exercise of self-control
against one's strongest desires at the time is possible. I lack the space to review it here.
See Alston (1977), Kennett and Smith (1996, 1997), McCann (1995a), Mele (1987: ch. 5,
1995: ch. 3, 1997a, 1998a), Pugmire (1994), and Velleman (1992).
More strictly, ideal self-control has maximal range relative to the psychological
and physical life of a being. Immaterial beings incapable of overt action may be perfectly self-controlled; the same may be true of some hypothetical emotionless beings.
But such beings are not my primary concern. By “maximal categorial range” in 1, I
mean, roughly, the full range of self-control open to a being whose life is at least as
robust and complex, physically and psychologically, as that of the average reader of this
The assumption is motivated partly by the possibility that some ideally selfcontrolled person rarely, if ever, needs to exercise his powers of self-control. On the relevance of mental health, see Mele (1995: 122–26).
Indeed, some theorists have used autonomy as a theoretical foil (for example,
Refer to Fischer's distinction between “guidance” and “regulative” control, Fischer (1994: 132–35).
For more sophisticated versions of this argument, see Ayer (1954), Bergmann
(1977: 234–35), Hobart (1934), Nowell-Smith (1948), and Smart (1961); compare 1960
Hume: bk. II, pt. III, sec. 2 and item 1955. sec. 8.
The quoted words are from Schrödinger (1983: 157). On triggering cases of this
general kind, also see Anscombe (1981: 144–47), Lewis (1986a, vol. 20 176), Sorabji (1980:
28), and van Inwagen (1983: 191–92).
The connection between control and “moral luck” is a major theme in Nagel's
“Moral Luck” (1979: 24–38).
Since agent-causation is a central topic of other essays in this volume, I will not
discuss it here.
This tripartite distinction is not intended to be exhaustive.
For further discussion of Christman (1991), see Mele (1993), where essentially
this case appears.
This is not to deny that Alice is responsible (causally or morally) for her continued possession of the desire.
In Mele (1995), I compared the distinction between internalist and externalist
conceptions of psychological autonomy with the distinction between internalism and externalism about the individuation of psychological states (a major issue in the philosophy of mind), and I suggested some ways in which the distinctions are independent of