Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War

By Albert J.Mauroni | Go to book overview
Save to active project

Foreword

It must be said to our shame that we sent our army into that most modern war with weapons and equipment which were quite inadequate, and we had only ourselves to blame for the disasters which early overtook us in the field when fighting began in 1940.

—Montgomery of Alamein

The professional world of my generation was defined in a bipolar context, with intense competition between two superpowers—Russia and the United States. That nonambiguous threat provided a rational approach to the study of the operational art, focused our training and shaped the supra-national alliance, NATO. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the national security environment became more confusing: threats were ambiguous, NATO was reestablishing a new relevance and the operations tempo of the US armed forces was increasing. While some looked to claim a “peace dividend, Saddam Hussein claimed sovereignty over Kuwait and proceeded to invade. The US-led coalition's response was remarkable. Desert Shield and Desert Storm were unprecedented operations: they brought a focus in the United States that had not been seen since the early 1940s. America's military doctrine, equipment and personnel were demonstrating impressive capabilities, which were reported upon worldwide. The fact that Iraq had used chemical weapons as recently as 1988 was not lost on military planners and commanders.

This lucid and thorough study covers heretofore unexamined territory in the contemporary analysis of chemical-biological defense. What follows is a superb history of the people and events that shaped the coalition's response to the very real threat of weapons of mass destruction being used on the battlefield. It chronicles the efforts of individuals and organizations to mitigate what was viewed by many as the near certainty that Saddam would use chemical weapons. While it was generally agreed that battlefield effectiveness of coalition forces would be diminished by the use of chemical weapons, there was no lack of conviction that

-xi-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

While we understand printed pages are helpful to our users, this limitation is necessary to help protect our publishers' copyrighted material and prevent its unlawful distribution. We are sorry for any inconvenience.
Full screen
/ 244

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.