Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Policies and the National Interest

By W. Gray Nichols; Milton L. Boykin | Go to book overview

2

The Future of American-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations: The Strategic Defense Initiative Debate

Kenneth L. Adelman
I am pleased to report that 1984 is behind us. It was many things, but it was not at all the year George Orwell had depicted. Rather, it was a year in which the Soviet-type government continued its downward slide, becoming less—not more—attractive around the globe. Wars in sundry regions troubled us, but the perpetual wars of Orwell's imagination were nowhere upon us. So much the better. Instead, 1984 was most significant in what did not happen by the 15th of May. On that day, the world broke the modern record for length of time without major war. The old record, just short of 39 years, was set between the battle of Waterloo (1815) and the outbreak of the Crimean War (1854). The year marked another significant unfolding: the increasing discourse surrounding—and at times, even enveloping—the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Over the coming years, this subject will surely dominate our discussions on arms control, deterrence, and military strategy, if indeed its domination of our subject is not evident already. Even now it is paramount in the parlors of America dealing with security issues.
PREDICTING THE FUTURE
The starting point for any rational discourse on SDI—and many discourses on SDI have not been rational, but have been wrapped in and warped by emotion—is a large dosage of modesty at predicting what science can offer in the future. How many times in our history has human ingenuity overcome human expectations and even predictions. To take just a few examples:
• Thomas Edison forecast:

Fooling around with alternating currents is just a waste of time. Nobody will use it, ever. It's too dangerous…Direct current is safe.

-9-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Arms Control and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Policies and the National Interest
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 139

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.