The Political Economy of Corruption

By Arvind K. Jain | Go to book overview

business conduct. Resulting research has led to increasingly firm conclusions about the damaging impact of grand bribery on international development. Much of this research has almost certainly been stimulated by political pressures designed to see anti-corruption legislation in the US either scrapped or internationalized. Patterns of research are affected by political and legal initiatives. Once again, it would be hard to deny that research into the effects of corruption is one of the beneficiaries of the FCPA.


Notes

The authors of this chapter would like to acknowledge the capable research assistance of Ruth Rosen.

1
The Swedish penal code did, however, outlaw the bribery of foreign officials at the same time as the passage of the FCPA. Swedish Penal Code, SFS 1977; 103 (January 1 1978).
2
See note 24 for details.
3
Asserted by former US Ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Korry, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence Activities, also chaired by Senator Frank Church.
4
The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) had established the practice of financial contributions to pro-US politicians in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia as early as 1948.
5
The Church Subcommittee investigation was focused largely on five US multinationals: Lockheed, Northrop, Exxon, Gulf, and Mobil.
6
US corporations were prohibited by Section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue Code from deducting out of taxable income specific types of payments that would, in effect, include kickbacks or payments to government officials. Moreover, under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, any US corporation deriving income from such questionable payments was denied certain foreign tax credits and deferrals (Jacoby et al. 1977:68-9).
7
Surveys of businessmen conducted in 1975 by the Conference Board and the Opinion Research Corporation showed that 50 percent of them accepted foreign payments as necessary in countries that accepted the practice (Kugel and Gruenberg 1977:5).
8
At the time of the Watergate hearings, some 9,000 corporations regularly filed disclosure documentation with the SEC pursuant to the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. These disclosure requirements entailed reporting material information (e.g., executive salaries, significant transactions, etc. deemed important to disclose to shareholders).
9
US corporations were prohibited by Section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue Code from deducting out of taxable income specific types of payments that would, in effect, include kickbacks or payments to government officials. Moreover, under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, any US corporation deriving income from such questionable payments was denied certain foreign tax credits and deferrals (Jacoby et al. 1977:68-9).
10
In a speech to the American Bar Association in Montreal on August 11 1975, Kissinger noted: "A multilateral treaty establishing binding rules for multinational corporations does not seem possible in the near future" (Jacoby et al. 1977:223-4).

-207-

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The Political Economy of Corruption
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Figures vii
  • Tables viii
  • Part I - Governance and Corruption 1
  • 1 - Power, Politics, and Corruption 3
  • 2 - The Definitions Debate 11
  • Notes 29
  • Part II - Political Systems and Corruption 33
  • 3 - Political Corruption and Democratic Structures 35
  • 4 - Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? 63
  • Part III - Policy and Political Outcomes 87
  • 5 - Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances 89
  • Notes 107
  • 6 - Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services 111
  • Notes 133
  • Appendix 136
  • Bibliography 138
  • 7 - Historical Antecedents of Corruption in Pakistan 142
  • Bibliography 154
  • Part IV - Solutions and Future Research 155
  • 8 - Measuring Corruption 157
  • Appendix 176
  • Bibliography 177
  • 9 - Legislating Against Corruption in International Markets 180
  • Notes 207
  • Bibliography 212
  • 10 - Controlling Power and Politics 214
  • Bibliography 219
  • Index 220
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