Global Governance and Financial Crises

By Meghnad Desai; Yahia Said | Go to book overview

1

Introduction

Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said

The new century is barely three years old and many of the certainties of the last century are being re-examined. During the last decade of the last century, there was an overwhelming confidence about the economy. A 'New Paradigm' was hailed; the business cycle had been abolished we were told. It seemed that the knowledge economy did not obey the old laws of economics. There would be no longer boom and bust as a new generation of central bankers and prudent Finance Ministers had fashioned the perfect combination of monetary and fiscal policies for us.

There was a warning in 1997 with the Asian crisis and the triple bypass for Long-Term Capital Management. The 1997 crisis was the first crisis of the new phase of globalisation. But while it sloshed about in Russia and Brazil, it failed to reach the shores of the New York or London financial markets. Smugness returned until in early 2001, the Dow Jones and Footsie began their journey southwards. We were soon hearing of a double-dip recession, retrenchment in the financial services sector and large budget deficits in the USA, Germany, France with no upturn in sight for Japan after ten years of stagnation.

The business cycle is back with us; indeed, it never went away. While a financial meltdown is a rare occurrence in developed country markets, the frequency of such events in periphery is worrisome. In the last ten years, we have had crises in Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey. There is financial fragility in India and China. The uneasy marriage of moral hazard of lenders lending to sovereign governments in the knowledge of a certain bailout and the inability of sovereign borrowers to follow time-consistent strategies in shaping their debt profile is becoming a major problem. The questions are many but the answers are few.

This volume attempts to address some of the questions raised by the string of financial crises over the past ten years. As Desai puts it - are global financial markets rational or are manias possible? Should crises which follow manias be allowed to run their course and purge the system or should a lender of last resort intervene to dampen their impact on the real economy? Who can play this role at the global level?

In Chapter 2, Desai explores the term 'crisis' and finds parallels between the medical and financial use of the words. Crises in both areas indicate (a) a turning

-1-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Global Governance and Financial Crises
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page v
  • Contents vii
  • Figures viii
  • Tables x
  • 1 - Introduction 1
  • 2 - Financial Crises and Global Governance 6
  • 3 - Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy 19
  • 4 - The International Monetary Fund 43
  • Bibliography 68
  • 5 - Regulating Global Finance 70
  • 6 - Crises, Recovery and Reforms in East Asia 83
  • 7 - Mexico, Korea and Brazil 120
  • Notes 153
  • Index 159
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 162

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.