tember 2001, the nascent 'War on Terrorism' should not be allowed to preclude a more imaginative debate over security in the new world order.
The contributions to Part I and the seminar discussions provoked by them differ in attributing the origins of TOC to: the hegemonic influence of US domestic and foreign policy concerns; the process of European political and economic integration; the construction of a new, neo-liberal, world order; and even the utility of this threat for key actors within the United Nations, who were seeking to advance their own bureaucratic interests in increasing the profile of crime control on the UN's policy agenda during the 1990s. Common to these interpretations, however, is scepticism about official narratives of the threat posed by TOC and the efficacy of those policing strategies entailed in these narratives. As Sheptycki argues, to be sceptical is not to deny the social harm that can be caused by the illicit activities that have been conflated into the idea of TOC, such as trafficking in drugs, people, nuclear materials and body parts. But we must also acknowledge the social harm caused by other practices, such as the dumping of toxic waste, insider dealing, tax evasion, fraud and the systematic corruption of state 'kleptocrats', that have, hitherto, been absent from policy discourse on the threat of TOC to global security. To recognise this broader repertoire of social harm and to acknowledge the possibility of governmental interventions that transcend the self-referential appeal for more refined law enforcement is to understand that global security is fundamentally a question of political deliberation, not technical expertise. Subsequent parts to this book examine the contribution that social scientific research on TOC can make to this deliberation.