In what we now term a post-September 11 world, the word 'security' has greater implications than ever before. Political concerns and economic interests of the strongest countries and supranational decision-makers, however, direct the articulation of these implications and responses to them. Local issues are prioritised according to the status of the territory in which they occur. Hence the terms 'transnational' or 'global' become politically useful when they allow intrusion by the stronger states into the weaker ones in the interests of protecting the local securities and interests of the former. If the interests converge, there is a win-win situation, but this rarely happens. So far, the Baltic States have reaped many benefits from the assistance provided by member states, from the initiatives and policies issued from Brussels aimed at reforming their criminal justice systems and fighting organised crime. But strategies of inclusion come at a price. If, as Jorg Monar (2000) states, 'the Union has been drifting more and more towards a "fortress" rationale', then the Baltic States need to consider what price they are paying for inclusion into an enlarged Europe and whether the security role expected of them can be fulfilled. The difficulties they face in engaging with this so-called phenomenon of TOC is not only indicative of their own limitations but also reflects the limitations of member states to understand the complexities and realities of organised crime and what its growing presence actually signifies in the broader context of the economic, social and political health of the Union. That is a responsibility well beyond the remit of the Baltic sentinels.