the independent researchers tell us about OC, that intelligence analysts cannot (or maybe the latter can tell us more)? This, of course, is an interesting question, one that it would be stimulating to explore in a structured manner, but the point for this conclusion is that, as intelligence becomes proteiform, so it is reshaping the world of the researcher, as well as that of the policy-maker, and that of the thief.
The author is grateful to the editors of Les Cahiers de la Sécurité Intérieure for the stimulus to write the first version of this chapter (Dorn, 1999a).
For a general review, see Van Den Wyngaert (1998).
With full acknowledgement for the concept to Alexandro Missir di Lusignana, previously with Directorate General 20 of the European Commission.
The events and aftermath of September 2001 are outside the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, clearly, they rather undercut sceptical positions and give a further boost to international co-operation whilst, at the same time, perhaps loosening the degree of attention to be paid to economic criminality that is reckoned not to be closely related to terrorism. These themes and contradictions will be taken up elsewhere.
Limitations of space forbid an excellent discussion of issues arising in policing practice, but a stimulating review is given by Brants and Field (1995). For a comprehensive review of legal issues arising in police co-operation, see Van Den Wyngaert, op. cit., sections 3-6.
See successive annual reports of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, and the sections on Performance Indicators from the UK government's ten-year drug strategy (Cabinet Office, 1998).
Notably, from a UK perspective, see Ryder (1995:1-11) and, on comparative issues, Johnstone (1998).
One issue too complex to be dealt with here is the vexed question of 'extra-territoriality', meaning any claim that may be made by the regulatory authorities of one state to have jurisdiction over another state's trade with a third state. This issue is familiar in the form of actions by US authorities to enforce trade sanctions.
Neither the subsequent Treaty of Nice nor the mooted 2003 Convention much affect the EU's approach to organised crime.
Source: European Commission, Secretariat General, 1998.
The question of the extent to which criminal and administrative control agencies share the results of internally commissioned strategic research on OC is an interesting one. The author's impression is that agencies are quite often unaware of each other's internally commissioned research or consultancy on aspects of OC. We may have arrived at the situation where operational intelligence about specific OC targets is considered less sensitive, and easier to share, than non-operational research and development done for an agency's own strategic or planning purposes. The EU Action Plan's commitment within five years to 'set up a research and documentation network on cross-border crime' (Article 48(ii)) and other initiatives may help to unblock this situation, if new ways of working can be found.
At other times it has been suggested to me that too prompt payment of sums routinely due to state authorities could be equally suspicious.
Such targeting may occur, for example, because of the suspicion of a regulatory or control agency that the economic enterprise may be used as a 'front' by employees, or may be manipulated by third parties.
This is the case with AFIS, see p. 232.
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security.
Contributors: Adam Edwards - Editor, Peter Gill - Editor.
Place of publication: New York.
Publication year: 2003.
Page number: 239.
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