War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945

By Hans J. Van De Van | Go to book overview

Conclusion

The reason that I have criticised the Stilwell-White paradigm in this book is not simply because many of Stilwell's actions were badly designed and executed and general Allied strategy often detrimental to Chinese interests. I have suggested that this paradigm obscured that the Nationalists themselves opposed Japanese aggression and that they mobilised their own society to confront it. My aim has been to bring to the fore how they mobilised Chinese society themselves in the 1920s, then to resist Western imperialism, eliminate warlordism, and build a new nation, and how in the 1930s they turned to confront Japanese aggression and finally faced it on the battlefield. The consequence of the dominance of the Stilwell-White paradigm has been that these efforts were pressed to the sidelines by a version of events that I have hoped to have shown was of debatable historical accuracy.

I have presented the story not as an unambiguous triumph of Chinese nationalism. I have shown how during the Northern Expedition cultures of violence became entrenched and have stressed the harmful effects of factionalism within the KMT, debilitating struggles for power, the resort to intrigue, and the reach for nasty and illegitimate forms of violence. I have also stressed the destabilising effects of more or less autonomous militaries in the 1930s and during the War of Resistance itself, the brutalising effects of warlordism that the Nationalists found it difficult to bring under control, and Nationalist bureaucratic shambles and logistical incompetence.

Nonetheless, I have also suggested that the problems the Nationalist confronted were not subject to easy solutions and that the strategies they adopted after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria were not without promise. I have also argued that when war came in 1937, the Nationalists followed military strategies that were appropriate to the conditions they faced and that the Nationalists then mobilised their society in a war that would determine the future shape of Asia with considerable initial success. I have suggested that the Soviet withdrawal from the war in East Asia after the Battle of Nomonhan, the loss of critical grain and recruitment areas, and Allied strategic choices had enormous consequences for the Nationalists' military position.

Once we move away from a Stilwell and US or British centred analysis of the war, it becomes possible to develop a new understanding of the Second World War in East Asia, one in which domestic mobilisations against Japanese aggression take a central place. These mobilisations were rooted in longer struggles of local populations seeking to recapture ownership over their own societies and civilisations and refashioning them according to their own insights. These struggles in India, Burma, Malaysia, Vietnam,

-294-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Illustrations viii
  • Acknowledgements x
  • Conventions xii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1 - Stilwell Revisited 19
  • 2 - Raising the National Revolutionary Army 64
  • 3 - Cultures of Violence During the Northern Expedition (1926-8) 94
  • 4 - Nationalism and Military Reform During the Nanjing Decade (1928-37) 131
  • 5 - A Forward Policy in the North 170
  • 6 - The War of Resistance Before Japan's Southern Advance 209
  • 7 - Wartime Mobilisation 252
  • Conclusion 294
  • Notes 299
  • Bibliography 344
  • Index 360
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 377

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.