Notes

1

Introduction

1
The term 'capital structure' has been used in the literature to refer both to the relative composition of different types of contracts (e.g. of debt and equity), and to the relative composition of these contracts between different groups of investors (e.g. between an entrepreneur and any external investors). In this book, we adopt the definitions provided by Jenson and Meckling (1976) who define 'capital structure' as 'the relative quantities of bonds, equity, warrants, trade credit etc.', and 'ownership structure' as 'the relative amounts of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders (investors) with no direct role in the management of the firm'.
2
In this book, we refer to 'management' as all people and institutions who directly undertake strategic decision-making in the corporation, including senior managers as employees as well as the Directors of the Board as delegates of the general shareholders.
3
Such accounting measures are still used, where appropriate, in the study.
4
We intend to replicate these studies with more recent data once the new data becomes available.
5
Much of this information will be useful in future studies such as the relationship between Board structure and corporate performance.
6
More detailed descriptions can be seen in STATA Reference Manual Release 5 volume 3, pp. 46-57, 171-2.
7
As Wallace and Silver (1988, p. 265) point out, 'Generally speaking, it is probably a good idea to use the White option routinely, perhaps comparing the output with regular OLS output as a check to see whether heteroskedasticity is a serious problem in a particular set of data.' Cited in Gujarati (2003, p. 418).
8
More discussion on the methods used in the study of corporate governance can be found in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001).

2

Theoretical approaches to corporate governance

1
According to Williamson (1975), the transactions costs consist of the costs of searching for products, negotiation costs, the costs of writing contracts, and the costs of implementing the contracts.
2
Coase (1937) defined the boundaries of the firm as that range of exchanges over which the market system was suppressed, and resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction.
3
See Hart (1995b) for more discussion of these arguments.
4
A more recent study on the ownership structures of Western European countries is reported in Faccio and Lang (2002).

-153-

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Corporate Governance in China
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Figures x
  • Tables xi
  • Preface xiii
  • Acknowledgements xiv
  • Abbreviations xv
  • 1 - Introduction 1
  • 2 - Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Governance 10
  • 3 - The Evolution of Corporate Governance in China 31
  • 4 - The Effect of Ownership Structure on the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings 62
  • 5 - Ownership Structure as a Corporate Governance Mechanism 88
  • 6 - The Determinants of Capital Structure 105
  • 7 - Chinese Corporate Groups 123
  • 8 - General Conclusions and Future Work 146
  • Notes 153
  • References 157
  • Index 170
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