Jessica Benjamin's recent work seeks to establish the possibility for intersubjective recognition, thereby setting a philosophical norm for a therapeutic discourse. Her work has always been distinctively defined by its groundedness in critical social theory and clinical practice. Whereas the Frankfurt School maintained a strong theoretical interest in psychoanalysis and spawned the important work of Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn, among other texts, it has been rare since that time to find a critical theorist trained in that venue who actively practices psychoanalysis, and whose theoretical contributions combine critical reflection and clinical insight in the way that Benjamin's does. Central to her philosophical inheritance is the notion of recognition itself, a key concept that was developed in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (111-19) and which has assumed new meanings in the work of Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. ¹ In some ways, Benjamin's work relies on the presumption that recognition is possible, and that it is the condition under which the human subject achieves psychic self-understanding and acceptance.

There are several passages in almost any text of hers that give a sense of what recognition is. It is not the simple presentation of a subject for another that facilitates the recognition of that self-presenting subject by the Other. It is, rather, a process that is engaged when subject and Other understand themselves to be reflected in one another, but where

-131-