Brussels and the member countries. There are cycles of optimism and pessimism in EU politics, but this apparent imbalance at the two ends of the policy cycle may be a continuing policy-making problem.
This analysis is based on the rather conventional 'stages' view of the policy process often associated with the work of Charles O. Jones (1983). It assumes a linear process moving from agenda-setting through implementation and evaluation. Especially given the complexities of politics within the EC we should expect some aspects of the process to be decidedly non-linear.
The need to fight at this stage may be minimised because of the control which national governments retain over implementation (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988).
As Rose and others point out this rarely works as smoothly in practice as it does in the theory.
The exception is France that has been described as 'semi-presidential' (Duverger 1980), but which also has definite traits of a parliamentary regime.
The principle of subsidiarity tends to provide more opportunity for implementation through sub-national governments. This is particularly true where those governments are well-developed and already powerful, as in Germany.
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Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: European Union: Power and Policy-Making.
Contributors: Jeremy J. Richardson - Editor.
Place of publication: New York.
Publication year: 1996.
Page number: 74.
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