European Union: Power and Policy-Making

By Jeremy J. Richardson | Go to book overview

NOTES
1
This delay was due to the French veto of the British application in 1961, which brought all four membership applications to a temporary halt.
2
After a negative referendum, Norway did not become a member but stayed within the 'non-supranational' European Free Trade Area (EFTA).
3
On the EFTA applications and negotiations see Wallace 1991; Michalski and Wallace 1992; Luif 1994; Journal of Common Market Studies 1995/3.
4
This was mainly because the EC, contrary to initial expectations, did not give up its decision-making autonomy. This meant that only EC law, decided upon by the Union members exclusively, could (by unanimous decision) develop into EEA law. Furthermore, the judicial system initially agreed upon was declared incompatible with the Treaty of Rome by the EC Court of Justice, so that the proposed EEA Court had to be dropped. In short, the final say on the interpretation of EC (and, as the two are normally identical, de facto also EEA) law lies with the EC Court. The Union is thus clearly a somewhat hegemonial actor within the EEA. In economic terms, the EEA constitutes an improved free trade area (with exemptions such as agricultural goods), but no Customs Union (for further information see Schwok 1991).
5
The Swiss 1992 membership application was suspended after the negative referendum on the EEA.
6
The co-operation agreements signed with Russia and the Ukraine, in June 1994, do not-in contrast to the 'Europe agreements' with the above-mentioned states (see below)-contain any provisions mentioning possible future membership.
7
See Bradley 1993 for a debate of necessary reforms in implementation and control.
8
See Wessels' 'fusion thesis' 1992 and Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995.
9
In the process which led up to the Copenhagen European Council (June 1993) the basic decision was that the Associated States, which so wished, should be welcome members. Thus neo-function-alist patterns seemed to prevail. Under purely intergovernmentalist assumptions, the fact that several member states had no particular interest in further widening and even faced the prospect of funding financial transfers should have prompted vetoes (at least as long as the necessary preconditions had not been met). In fact, a kind of 'advocacy coalition' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) consisting of pro-widening advocates in various national governments (notably Germany), pressure groups (ETUC, Round Table of Industrialists), EC institutions (Commission Task Force) etc., was successful in pushing for a pro-widening decision in principle. However, the date and the precise terms were left open and were conditional on a further deepening of the Union.
10
The following draws on Falkner and Nentwich 1995.
11
However, the British and later the Danish were in the end allowed to opt-out in Protocols to the Treaty.
12
'Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies'.
13
The GDR was treated as a special case when it entered the FRG on 3 October 1990 (for the course of events and an analysis of the background to the East German EC entry, see Kohler-Koch 1991).
14
This was mainly to satisfy those EU members whose interests lie in the south rather than the east of Europe. Furthermore, a 'Mediterranean Agreement' was signed in November 1995 with twelve neighbours of the Union, providing for the successive establishment of a free trade area until 2010. The Customs Union with Turkey was, after much debate, consented by the European Parliament in December 1995.

REFERENCES

a
Anderson, J.J. (1995) 'The State of the (European) Union. From the Single Market to Maastricht, from Singular Events to General Theories', World Politics 47:441-465.

b
Bradley, K.S.C. (1993) 'The Increase of Effectiveness: Problems of Implementation (in the Light of a Possible Enlargement)', in Wessels, W. and Engel, C. (eds) The European Union in the 1990s-ever closer and larger?, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag.
Breuss, F. (1995) Costs and Benefits of EU's Eastern European Enlargement, WIFO Working Papers (78), Vienna.

c
Cameron, F. (1995) 'Keynote Article: The European Union and the Fourth Enlargement', in Nugent, N. (ed.) The European Union 1994, Oxford: Blackwell.
'Charlemagne' (1994) 'L'Equillibre entre les Etats membres', in Volume in Honour of Niels Ersboll, Bruxelles.

-244-

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European Union: Power and Policy-Making
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Tables vii
  • Preface ix
  • Part I - Theoretical and Historical Perspectives 1
  • 1 - Policy-Making in the Eu 3
  • 2 - The Development of the European Idea 24
  • Notes 38
  • 3 - Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process 40
  • Notes 55
  • References 56
  • Part 2 - Agenda-Setting and Institutional Processing 59
  • 4 - Agenda-Setting in the European Union 61
  • Notes 74
  • 5 - A Maturing Bureaucracy? 77
  • References 92
  • 6 - From Co-Operation to Co-Decision 96
  • 7 - National Sovereignty Vs Integration? 127
  • Notes 145
  • 8 - The National Co-Ordination of European Policy-Making 148
  • References 165
  • 9 - The Court of Justice and the European Policy Process 170
  • References 183
  • Part 3 - Channels of Representation 185
  • 10 - European Elections and the European Voter 187
  • 11 - The Logic of Organisation Interest Groups 200
  • Note 214
  • 12 - By-Passing the Nation State? Regions and the Eu Policy Process 216
  • Part 4 - A Supranational State? 231
  • 13 - Enlarging the European Union 233
  • Notes 244
  • 14 - The Eu as an International Actor 247
  • 15 - A European Regulatory State? 263
  • References 276
  • 16 - Eroding Eu Policies 278
  • References 293
  • Index 295
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